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SUMMARY 
Advances in technology and medicine have greatly impacted on religious thought 
and have contributed to a large extent in bringing to the fore questions regarding 
euthanasia, suicide and abortion. This has raised a plethora of questions regarding 
actions and consequent ethical choices. What impact this has had on the Durban 
Hindu regarding the interpretation and re-interpretation of scripture to 
accommodate euthanasia, suicide and abortion is examined in the background of 
karma and dharma. 
A cross-section of Durban Hindus consisting of lawyers, doctors, academics, school-
teachers, Hindu scholars, priests and housewives were interviewed. Their views on 
karma and dharma, to what extent these concepts underlie their thinking with 
respect to euthanasia, suicide and abortion and what influence classical views based 
on Hindu scripture as well as Western thinking have had on the contemporary 
Hindus of the Durban area, are examined. Consequently, karma and dharma are 
viewed from a hermeneutical perspective and examined in the light of the 
phenomenological approach. The key hermeneutical concepts of karma and 
dharma have been modified and re-interpreted to accommodate changing 
circumstances. The views expressed range from the extremely liberal to the ultra 
conservative. Although the subjects were not all familiar with Hindu scripture, the 
views expressed were similar to scripture. Many Hindus therefore are reasoning on 
traditional lines, although the basis of their reasoning has shifted from scripture. 
Ethics and morality are not the only underlying principles affecting the euthanasia, 
suicide and abortion debate: financial and social considerations are also important. 
Although euthanasia and abortion are strongly condemned by the conservative 
Hindu they are accepted on medical, social and utilitarian grounds. 
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PREFACE 
The advances in science and technology are extensive and they enrich human lives 
to such a degree that people generally accept these advances without reservations. 
However, the benefits of science and technology cannot always be counted as a 
blessing. This so called "progress" often creates complex dilemmas which can only 
be resolved by agonising decisions. The most difficult of these problems are not 
simply theoretical or technical questions requiring empirical research. They are 
instead moral questions which require research with the application of new 
information and skills. In most cases, these problems expose the inadequacies of 
our conventional, moral and legal systems. In other words developments in science 
and technology cause ripple effect in our system of beliefs. When this happens it is 
necessary to adjust our values and institutions in order to come to terms with the 
moral dilemmas posed by scientific and technological developments. 
Moral questions that arise as a result of advances in medical science and technology 
cannot be treated lightly. Perhaps, the greatest problems are posed by the 
physician's ability to exercise extensive control over the processes of life and death. 
From a strictly medical standpoint, life and death decisions have become routine. 
From a moral point of view such choices are seldom easy to make. The dilemma is 
particularly acute when traditional medical ethics imposes conflicting requirements. 
The question of euthanasia is one of a broad spectrum of moral problems of 
terminal medical care. It arises in those cases in which the duty to relieve suffering 
conflicts with the obligation to preserve life. In some respects this problem is 
related to that of abortion. When a pregnancy is terminated because the foetus is 
defective, abortion may constitute what can be referred to as foetal euthanasia. The 
question of abortion for eugenic reasons or as a form of birth control or out of 
consideration for the mother, however, is a different matter. The crucial difference 
is that it is concerned with factors other than regard for the primary life that is 
terminated. The question of terminating "hopeless" life in order to secure vital 
organs for lives that can be "saved" differs from the question of euthanasia in the 
same way. 
This study concerns itself with the morality of the deliberate termination of life for a 
particular purpose. Research has shown that euthanasia cannot be studied as a 
phenomenon in isolation, since voluntary euthanasia (as a form of suicide) and 
abortion are important facets of the euthanasia debate. Therefore, one would be 
doing gross injustice to the study of euthanasia if the accompanying phenomena of 
suicide and abortion were not included in the study. The aim of the study is to study 
the phenomenon from a theocentric perspective. Research has shown that the 
medical and legal dimensions of the question cannot be ignored. This entails taking 
into account not only the requirements of law and of professional medical ethics, 
but also the ways in which decisions are reached in the context of concrete cases. 
These standards and practices are analysed in order to discover the underlying 
ethical principles. Since this topic deals with Hindu views on euthanasia, suicide 
and abortion, these ethical principles are evaluated and interpreted in relation to 
the two fundamental Hindu principles of karma and dharma and their interpretation 
amongst Hindus in the Durban area. 
The primary purpose of this study is to off er moral guidelines for medical decisions 
and for legal norms for medical practice in cases involving hopeless suffering. Until 
recently, this question has received little attention in Hindu ethics. It is hoped that 
this research stimulates thinking of these issues (euthanasia, suicide and abortion) in 
the light of Hindu scriptures so that there is a reconciliation between their religious 
injunctions and their contemporary views. 
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for giving me the strength and the courage to undertake the study. It is my pleasant 
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co-operation and assistance this research would not have been possible: to 
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The question of euthanasia is one of the most difficult, complicated and 
controversial problems that arise in the context of terminal medical care. Because 
suffering and death are perennial this is an ancient problem, which has plagued the 
minds of men of yesteryear and each day presently becomes even more complex 
than the other because of the advances in the science of medicine. This thesis 
examines the ways in which this question has been understood and dealt with in the 
past and how present day Hindus, especially in Durban, cope with it. It is a question 
that is unique not only to a particular group or culture, but is a phenomenon that 
has been questioned universally both by Eastern and by Western thinkers, 
philosophers, moralists and theologians. As will be seen later in the thesis heated 
arguments are presented by lawyers and physicians alike who are either against or in 
support of euthanasia. The different arguments provide conflicting opinions (in a 
society that is so diverse in race, religion and culture) with regard to the morality of 
euthanasia. 
The mental image that is created by the term "euthanasia" is often seen as a scene of 
a doctor or a close relative helping, perhaps in a clandestine fashion, a semi-
moribund patient to cut short his agony or deliberately terminating the life of a 
malformed infant, thus "mercifully" delivering it from lifelong suffering. The Hindu, 
would probably interpret this act of mercy as a dharmic performance thereby 
relieving the subject of its karma, and hence providing an opportunity for the freed 
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soul to find a new healthy and disease-free body. In this image attention is focused 
not so much on death, which may be considered merciful, as on the act and motive 
by which death is brought about (Wilson 1975 : 17). 
However, in order to understand the phenomenon of euthanasia (mercy killing) 
from a historical perspective it is necessary to study the history of euthanasia (easy 
death) as a rationale for allowing the suffering person to die and as a justification 
for taking his or her life. 
The debate over euthanasia takes place primarily on moral and ethical levels. 
Although it can be understood and resolved only in the context of current medical 
technology and its consequences, it has become essentially a moral controversy. It 
involves such moral questions as: should life be preserved as long as technically 
possible? Is life being prolonged or is death being delayed? Are there 
circumstances in which life should be terminated? Should patients who are 
suffering and dying be allowed to die by withdrawing or failing to employ 
life-sustaining procedures? Should their lives be taken by death dealing narcotics? 
Should such steps be taken only at the request of the patient or in consultation with 
the family concerned and the physician in attendance. 
The controversy over euthanasia is also concerned with the adequacy and the 
validity of rules or standards of medical practice. Implicit, if not explicit, in the 
various arguments on both sides of the question are basic ethical values and 
principles. These include such principles as the sanctity of life, the right to live, 
human dignity, personal autonomy, justice and least, suffering. So many different 
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factors are taken into account and so much time is taken sorting out the pros and 
cons that the essence of euthanasia is lost in a welter of arguments. It is with 
reference to ethical values that the moral standards of medical practice are 
criticised or defended. It is also on this basis that new standards of terminal medical 
care are proposed. 
The way in which ethical values are interpreted and applied in moral norms is 
contingent upon changing historical and cultural situations. They are flexible in 
relation to a broad range of human capacities, needs and institutions. However, 
when fundamental human needs conflict and when the claims of the individual cut 
across those of society difficult choices often have to be made from among ethical 
principles, all of which are right for the time and situation in which one finds 
oneself. Circumstances alone determine the course of action, and at times legal and 
medical ethics are put "on hold". In relatively closed societies, however, religion or 
political ideology serves as the basis on which such decisions are made. The Hindus 
are very flexible and open-minded on such issues and their decisions are based on 
circumstances and situations, rather than on religious injunctions. 
It is in the context of this crisis of values that the controversy over euthanasia must 
be understood. Conflicting arguments with regard to the validity of traditional 
moral standards of medical practice result from fundamentally different 
interpretations of ethical values. Even when there seems to be a common 
commitment to a given principle, there are sometimes important differences of 
opinion. The value of life, for example, is affirmed both by those who favour 
euthanasia and by those who oppose its practice. The meaning of "life", and "death", 
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however, is interpreted differently. Advocates of euthanasia emphasize the quality 
of life over mere existence and insist that the value of life is destroyed when it is 
accompanied by severe restrictions or suffering. Opponents of euthanasia 
emphasize the sanctity of life per se and claim that life always has value regardless 
of its quality. 
Conservative Hindus on the other hand attribute suffering to the Law of Karma. If 
one is destined to suffer, then one must fulfill that suffering in this life time. Liberal 
Hindus on the other hand consider euthanasia as an act of dharma. 
In the final analysis, decisions and actions are taken in the context of specific cases 
' 
thus putting aside ambiguities of conflicting alternatives, cohsequences and 
obligations. This occurs when a suffering patient asks to die, when a member of his 
family requests that efforts to prolong his life be stopped or when a doctor orders an 
end to life-sustaining treatment or administers a lethal dosage. This may also occur 
when a district attorney fails to prosecute or a jury refuses to convict someone who 
has practised euthanasia. It will be seen later in the thesis how these decisions and 
actions transcend the limits of moral discourse. They momentarily bring moral 
deliberation to a halt by cutting through the complexities and by positing answers. 
These ad hoc solutions to the problems of caring for the suffering and dying, 
however, become subject to moral appraisal. This is the Western view. To the 
Hindu ad hoc solutions (to the problems of caring for the suffering and dying) 
bearing significant moral and ethical considerations may be termed dharmic. 
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There are two distinct (though they may seem closely related) issues involved in the 
controversy over euthanasia. The first is the question of the morality of various 
forms of euthanasia. The second question has to do with the legal aspect of 
euthanasia. Arguments against euthanasia generally appeal first to prevailing 
professional and legal standards of medical practice. They then appeal to basic 
ethical principles in order to validate these moral norms forbidding euthanasia. 
Arguments favouring euthanasia usually begin by appealing directly to ethical values 
in order to challenge the validity of current standards of medical practice and to 
sanction the practice of euthanasia (Wilson 1975 : 53). 
The medical profession is said to be dedicated to the alleviation of suffering, the 
enhancement and prolongation of life and to the destinies of humanity. In complex 
cases in which all these values cannot be achieved, decisions have to be made 
regarding which of these values takes precedence. As will be seen in the thesis the 
legal system is more specific than professional medical ethics. It protects the right 
to life by enacting laws against homicide and at the same time it acknowledges the 
priority of other values by sanctioning certain forms of "justifiable" homicide. 
Nevertheless, when under the legal system, suicide is condemned and homicide at 
the request of the victim or in order to relieve suffering is equated with murder, the 
legal system places the value of life over the values of personal autonomy and least, 
suffering. 
The validity of these moral rules and standards remains unchallenged so long as 
their requirements are compatible with the accepted ethical principles and values. 
Their adequacy for determining proper medical practice is not questioned as long as 
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the way in which basic values adhered to is consistent with human needs. 
Arguments in favour of euthanasia, however, challenge the relevance of these moral 
standru;ds to the needs of the terminally ill, the fatally injured, the irreversible 
, 
comatose, and the severely abnormal. This challenge takes the form of an "ethical 
criticism" both of medical practitioners that prolong life after hope of recovery has 
been abandoned and of legal norms that censure the practice of euthanasia (Wilson 
1975: 54). 
Proposals to sanction the practice of euthanasia are based on essentially different 
conceptions in lieu of the order and priority of ethical values. There are five basic 
principles to which appeals are made for the practice of euthanasia. 
In the first the dignity of life is said to be superior to the value of the life per se. 
Hindus in the Classical Period also agreed with this quality of life principle and 
supported euthanasia on these grounds. This claim serves as the basis of a variety of 
arguments. The belief is that man should have the right to die with dignity, just as 
he should have the right to live with dignity. A number of legislative proposals has 
been made to guarantee the right to die with dignity. 
Secondly it is often argued that when a patient is suffering from an incurable disease 
the physician's responsibility to relieve the suffering is more important than his 
responsibility to prolong life. This is a re-interpretation of the Hippocratic Oath. 
When death is imminent and inevitable it is neither scientific nor humane to use 
artificial life-sustainers to protect the life of a patient. Instead, when all hope of 
recovery has diminished, it is right to choose only ordinary means to sustain his life 
6 
and it is the duty of the doctor to provide palliative care. Others approve of more 
direct measures of preventing suffering and agree with Glanville Williams that a 
man is entitled to demand the release of death from hopeless and helpless pain, and 
a physician who gives this release is entitled to moral and legal absolution for his 
act. 
The principle of autonomy, or the right to be at liberty, is a third value which is 
often given precedence over the value of life which is radically restricted. For 
example, Joseph Fletcher insists that to prolong life uselessly, while the personal 
qualities of freedom, knowledge, self-possession and control and responsibility are 
sacrificed is to attach the moral status of a person, to deny morality and to submit to 
fatality (Wilson 1975 : 55). 
In the fourth place, the principle of justice, or fair treatment, is cited in at least two 
ways as an important reason for permitting the practice of euthanasia. It is argued, 
frequently, that laws should be amended in fairness to suffering patients because 
legal requirements tend to cause their suffering to be prolonged unnecessarily. It is 
claimed that while an easy death is secretly granted to some, it is denied to many 
others. Legalizing the practice of euthanasia would make it available to all. On the 
other hand, appeals on the ground of the principle of justice are sometimes based 
on the claim that euthanasia should be permitted out of consideration for those 
other than the patient. Some claim that in fairness to doctors, who believe that the 
relief of suffering is their only principal duty, the risk of being accused of breaking 
the law in order to fulfill this obligation should be removed. The needs and the 
rights of the families of the hopelessly ill and deformed are also said to justify the 
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practice of euthanasia, since it is unfair to require of them the financial and 
emotional expense of prolonged and useless therapy. Euthanasia administered in 
such circumstances would be regarded dhannic in Hindu cosmology. 
A fifth principle affirmed in some of the arguments for modifying current medical 
practices of prolonging life and for changing laws against euthanasia is the principle 
of utility. On the basis of this principle life is understood to be of value not as an 
end in itself but in terms of its usefulness as a means to the ends prescribed by 
society. The practice of euthanasia, therefore, is justified in certain circumstances, 
for those who are physically or mentally incapacitated, when treatment places a 
useless burden on society. In Hindu philosophy suicide and euthanasia are 
recommended for such people. 
In most of the proposals with regard to appropriate medical practices and legal 
norms relative to cases in which there is no hope of recovery attempts have been 
made to preserve a number of ethical values and moral rights. Active euthanasia is 
frequently opposed, for example, because of the value of life itself. At the same 
time, however, passive euthanasia is often favoured on the basis of other values such 
as, least suffering. Furthermore, voluntary euthanasia is often advocated over 
involuntary euthanasia because the will or freedom of the individual is given 
precedence both over the value of life and over the needs or desires of family or 
society (Wilson 1975 : 56). 
Those who oppose the practice of euthanasia simply defend their positions by 
appealing to customary rules and procedures. They argue the doctor's pledge in the 
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Hippocratic Oath. "I will use treatment to help the sick according to my ability and 
judgement, but never with a view to injury and wrong doing. Neither will I 
administer a poison to anybody when asked to do so, nor will I suggest such a 
course". However, modern medicine is now asking for a re-interpretation of the 
Hippocratic Oath. It is not a matter of preserving life at all costs, but acting in the 
best interest of the patient should be the essence of the oath. Arguments of such a 
nature deal not only with strictly moral questions but also with empirical questions 
of terminal medical care. They express fundamentally different interpretations of 
medical problems of treating suffering patients and of the consequences of the 
various alternatives. Many who oppose the practice of euthanasia insist that dying 
patients continue to cling to life regardless of the circumstances and would not avail 
themselves of an early and easy death. The claims that euthanasia should be 
practised in order to relieve their suffering are rejected. 
On the other hand it is often argued that there is no place for unbearable pain in 
modern medicine. It is also argued that doctors can and do make mistakes in 
diagnosis and prognosis that would result in unnecessary loss of life if euthanasia 
were permitted. The terms "hopeless" and "incurable" are said to be outmoded 
medical concepts. There might be a strong possibility that incurable conditions may 
in the future be cured by a new medical breakthrough and as a result life should be 
prolonged as long as possible. 
Those who argued in favour of the practice of euthanasia insist that because of the 
improvements in medical science, the prolongation of life often becomes the 
prolongation of dying. They conclude that when death is inevitable and efforts to 
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prolong life cause suffering, doctors should hasten death for the benefit of the 
patient. The argument that life should be preserved as long as possible, because a 
cure might be found, is rejected by the claim that any new cure would be of no 
benefit to the patient for whom euthanasia would seem to be the most 
recommended and only alternative. 
In addition to factual and moral disagreements relative to the practice of 
euthanasia, there are similar differences of opinion with regard to legalizing 
euthanasia. Opponents of euthanasia emphasize the difficulties and the negative 
consequences which they claim would result if euthanasia were legalised. People in 
the legal profession feel that it would be virtually impossible to determine whether a 
patient whose mind is so weakened by narcotics and pain really wants to die. They 
point out that such a patient would not be able to make an informed decision. In 
the second place, they argue that to permit euthanasia would require families to 
make life and death decisions when they are least able to do so emotionally. In the 
third place, they warn that legal sanctions for euthanasia would expand the power 
and responsibility of the physicians which is already so great. In the fourth place 
they claim that the practice of euthanasia would weaken medical research by taking 
away incentives to find cures for painful diseases. Finally, it is argued that if the 
public once came to think that their doctors might exchange the role of preserver for 
that of destroyer, their suffering and anxiety would far outweigh that is now 
attributable to the unnecessary prolonging of life (Wilson 1975 : 58). 
Many who approve of limited forms of euthanasia have misgivings about legalizing 
its practice in any form. They too fear that the benefit to a few would be out-
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weighed by the threat to many others. With those who oppose euthanasia 
altogether, they argue that, since there can be no adequate safeguards the practice 
would be open to serious abuse. On the other hand ardent proponents of 
euthanasia say that all abuse would be eliminated by the "Living Will". This 
argument was also supported by many of the Hindus who were interviewed. 
Euthanasia of defective newborns is of particular interest in this thesis, since infants 
cannot speak for themselves. Hindus explain the defects in children according to 
their past kannic deeds, and say that these children should be left to live so that they 
can work out their karma. Any interference to shorten their life would mean a 
repetition of a similar birth and so the cycle would continue. More liberal Hindu 
views say that these children should be left to die and so shorten their miserable 
lives on earth. Hence one can see the re-interpretation of the fundamental Hindu 
principles of karma and dharma. 
Suicide is both condemnatory and praiseworthy depending on the reason. In 
Classical Hinduism suicide was the highest form of sacrifice. As time went on, 
people resorted to suicide for reasons other than religious. In the Classical Period 
cremation and sraddha rites were denied to those who committed suicide. 
Contemporary Hindus cremate and perform post-cremation ceremonies for those 
who commit suicide. They do not discriminate against the dead. 
However, Hindus recommend suicide for the physically incapacitated and the aged 
and for those who become a burden to society. Presently people commit suicide out 
of stress and frustration, disappointment in life, failure to achieve success (e.g. in an 
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eiXamination) and generally to escape from the pressures of society and life. This 
type of suicide is strongly condemned by all people including Hindus. Durban 
Hindus who were interviewed said that the soul of the person who commits suicide 
does not reach its rightful destination, becomes an evil spirit and causes harm to 
others. 
Abortion, according to the conservative view is adharmic and can never be 
condoned. This was the general view of most of the Hindus who were interviewed 
in the Durban area. Bad karma was being accumulated by those who performed 
and to those on whom abortion was performed. The Vedas and the Upanisads reject 
abortion and regard it as a heinous crime. 
However, today the Western scholars and the more liberated Hindus are 
questioning the moral status of the unborn, and on those grounds support abortion. 
Hindu scripture supports abortion on certain grounds, especially when the mental 
and physical health of the mother is at stake. But research shows, and one can 
support this by newspaper articles, that abortions are carried out more for social 
reasons than any other reason. Another philosophy that is creeping in is the 
philosophy of utilitarianism. Unwanted babies are regarded as a burden on career 
women, hence they recommend foetal euthanasia. Because of the problems that 
unwanted babies bring into the world, people, including Hindus, are adopting a 
pragmatic view on the subject and say that it is right for those who think it is right 
and wrong for those who think it is wrong. Because of this relativity the legal aspect 
of this phenomenon is of crucial importance. One can reach consensus through the 
legal aspect. 
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Religion and morality have become relative issues to the whole controversy of 
euthanasia and abortion. It would be seen in the thesis that chaos would reign if the 
legal aspects of the phenomena are not taken into consideration. It is on these 
grounds, that an entire chapter is devoted to the legal and medical aspects on the 
phenomena in question. 
Perhaps it might be appropriate to say at this point, that euthanasia is the heart of 
the thesis. Because of the complex and controversial nature of the subject, a lot 






The aim of this thesis is to examine what ethical choices and actions are taken or 
adopted by the Hindus of the Durban area in regard to the phenomenon of 
euthanasia, suicide and abortion. Ethics is about choices and actions that affect 
human welfare or what is right. Ethics is primarily a social phenomenon concerning 
relationships between human beings and how they treat each other. Is it possible 
for human beings to apply to others the same standards that they apply to 
themselves? What ought to be done and what is really done depends on 
circumstances and situations. Morals are relative. Moral beliefs and practices vary 
from place to place and from time to time (Reid 1981: 7, 14). An attempt has been 
made in the thesis to show what impact the Classical views based on Hindu 
Scriptures, have had on the contemporary Hindus of the Durban area. It also 
attempts to show how these views, especially the key hermeneutical concepts of 
karma and dharma, have been modified and re-interpreted to suit the Hindu society 
in Durban, a community that has undergone a great deal of Westernization. The 
Hindu society is bound not by its scriptural laws and values, but by the law of the 
country, that is South Africa. South African law is based on Roman Dutch Law. 
The thesis also shows to what extent the law of the country influences individual 
ethics. The Hindu medical doctor's training along Western standards have also 
influenced their views on the phenomena in question. Although the research has 
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been conducted in a predominantly Hindu society, the views expressed by those 
interviewed has shown that a great deal of modification and re-interpretation has 
taken place to suit changing circumstances and needs of a society pressurised by 
social and economic norms. 
1.2 KARMA AND DHARMA 
Karma and dharma are pivotal to the Hindu view of life and death. For the Hindu 
the different facets of life and death revolve around these two concepts. It is 
imperative therefore that euthanasia, suicide and abortion be viewed against the 
background of karma and dharma. Scriptural teachings of life and death and 
consequent Vedic acceptance of euthanasia, suicide and abortion are to a large 
extent based on the understanding of karma and dharma. Order in the individual is 
the basis for order in society and the maintenance of this order could be achieved 
through rational action whose basis lay in scriptural injunctions. This included the 
performance of certain rituals. Although the idea of dharma involves the 
maintenance of order, the Vedic Hindu recognised the dynamic nature of this order. 
Contemporary understanding of karma and dharma vary greatly from their Vedic 
interpretation. It becomes necessary therefore to understand these concepts that 
still constitute the basis of Hindu thinking. It is only through an understanding of 
these concepts can the changes they have undergone and their influence on 
contemporary thinking evaluated. Consequently, karma and dharma are viewed 
from an hermeneutical perspective and examined in the light of the phenomeno-
logical approach. 
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1.2.1 PHENOMENOLOGICAL APPROACH 
In order to investigate the relevance of karma and dharma to the present study the 
phenomenological approach is adopted. Phenomenology, as a method, is directed 
at an investigation of the essence of phenomena. Avoiding "speculative 
constructionism" (Kruger 1982 : 17) the approach confines itself to an investigation 
of the experienced data. The human is an active, not a passive recipient of the data 
experienced: experience is, of consequence, intentional. The focus of 
phenomenology is therefore on data as these appear in human consciousness. 
Intentionality 
Aspects of human behaviour and experience which it cannot express in terms of 
causes or mathematized formulae, positivistic science tends to ignore or deny. In 
such a view human experience of and reaction to the Universe is largely 
unaccounted for. However human experience of the Universe is a consequence of 
particular situation and experience - which is therefore object-directed. This brings 
into focus the subjective intentionality (Kruger 1982 : 18) of experience which views 
an object as it appears to the consciousness of an experiencing subject. Far from 
being a passive recipient of data, the human is an active participant in the data he 
experiences. And it is this active participation that constitutes the basis for the 
interpretation and re-interpretation of data and concepts, for experience in each 
human is personal and unique. 
Consequently the interpretation of karma and dharma is also situation and 
experience bound. Although Classical views of these concepts are accepted in broad 
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outline their interpretation, (which can be seen as utilitarian) in practice, is largely 
dependent on particular situations. Within these situations or circumstances 
euthanasia, suicide and abortion are accepted as the fulfillment of particular karma. 
Euthanasia is viewed as putting-an-end to suffering and giving some dignity to the 
patient in death. This is also guided by utilitarian considerations, e.g. cost of 
keeping a terminally ill patient alive. Abortion is also viewed under similar 
considerations. To a large extent the (Hindu) medical profession sees itself as the 
agents in the fulfillment of the karma of such patients. It is felt that it is their 
dharma (where dharma is interpreted as "duty") as agents to perform actions that 
restore order (where dharma is interpreted as "wholeness" or "goodness"). Suicide is 
also interpreted as the product of a person's karma. 
Epoche 
Since intentionality is inherent in experience it is imperative that the investigator 
"suspend all previous assumptions". However, as assumptions cannot always be 
"suspended" the investigator must become aware of them so that they do not 
influence the judgement with regard to phenomenon being investigated. Thus the 
investigator is aware of karma - assumptions and that from a phenomenological 
perspective karma presents the perspective of human reality - a jiva-centric world. 
According to Sinha karma is the statement regarding the universal human condition 
in which man consciously reflects on his existential involvement. Although Sinha 
does not view karma as causal or deterministic, he attempts to investigate and 
interpret the causal and deterministic forces of karma through an analysis of human 
experience. Through such an analysis the relationship of jiva to the world order 
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could be understood: the world order exists for the individual who is the subject of 
experience. Through the cycles of death and rebirth, driven by karmic forces, Sinha 
recognizes the human individual - jiva - as the focus of the cosmos (Sinha 1987 : 
347). 
Sinha's view that karma can be seen in terms, not of empirical reality but of 
transcendental ideality, shows that the force of knowledge can destroy the bondage 
(when karma is seen as the causal element of rebirth) that is believed to be caused 
by vice and virtue. This negates the view that historicity is constitutive of karmic 
continuum. Experience is thus understood in terms of non-factual "essences" gained 
through "eidetic" insights. 
This focus on jiva is evident as early as Brahmanic times where there is a shift from 
the changing or transforming world to the world of samsara (i.e. "the cosmic theatre 
of transmigration" (Sinha 1987 : 349). The centre of the changing cosmos is thus the 
experiencing human. Since the human is also experiencing a change, his is 
extricably linked to the object obviating the subject-object dichotomy. The human is 
therefore totally involved in the continuum of existence. The close link of Nirvana 
(moksa - freedom from the accumulation of karma) with karma, where the human 
attains freedom from the idea of self through knowledge or insight into the " ... 
nature of things as they really are" (Sinha 1987 : 353) brackets (epoche: the 
reductionistic approach of the biological and psychological sciences) all 
presuppositions shifting the focus to what is presented to the senses from the 
surrounding world, but also how the experiencing subject is presented to the world. 
However, although attempting to break the subject-object dichotomy, this view 
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introduces the causal perspective into the meaning of kanna. And it is this 
perspective from which kanna is usually viewed. Self thus becomes an agent and is 
also understood as knowledge (Knowledge of the Self). 
Essence 
Since the Hermeneutical approach emphasises the living experience as the basis of 
its investigations, the phenomenological approach attempts to penetrate the primary 
experiences from which these concepts have been developed and formulated: from 
a pre-scientific viewpoint more fundamental than that of the sciences. Where the 
empirical sciences describe natural phenomena in terms of abstract symbols which 
intend to portray reality itself(in terms of a particular Weltanschauung), 
phenomenology tries to divest itself of all previous assumptions and to investigate 
the experiences themselves. In investigating experiences themselves it is realised 
that although rooted in the Hindu Brahmanic, Buddhist and Jaina traditions, kanna 
and dhanna also have non-Aryan sources. From these, over time kanna grew into 
the "... stereotype of an ethico-metaphysical dogma (with almost a theological 
overtone)" (Sinha 1987: 347). Karma thus came to constitute to some extent the 
basis for explanations regarding human conduct and situations. Closely related as it 
is to dhanna - rtam - or the expression of Universal Order in the Rg Veda, the 
concept of kanna, understood as action, is vital in the maintenance of this Universal 
Order. Karma thus introduces the idea of causality, retribution or a strict moral law. 
The existence of dharma or the world order, gives meaning to kanna: human action 
or condition thus formed the basis of a deterministic world view or ethical 
determinism. Buddhism sees ignorance or avidya as the cause of kanna: cycles of 
death and rebirth - of suffering and death - escape from which to moksa could be 
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achieved only through knowledge. This preoccupation with death and suffering led 
to a devaluation of the bodily self in favour of a spiritual self: "The true self must be 
of the nature of knowledge, for only in the knowing self is there found a changeless 
core of existence that transcends the ravages of samsaric existence" (Koller 1987 : 
256). 
Karma and Dharma Reinterpreted 
Sinha outlines the change in the meaning of karma from Vedic times to the present 
(Sinha 1987 : 347 - 348). From the ritualistic ethos (rites and ceremonies) of the 
Vedas to the Buddhistic-Upanisadic-Vedantic interpretation in which karma came to 
be seen as action (of both mind and body). Buddha, however, emphasised the 
spiritual advancement aspect of karma, obviating the need for rites, rituals and 
sacrifices. From volition or mental action the meaning of karma in the Gita 
changed to freedom of the mind from attachment; even a sin could be committed if 
it were only a physical action! Thus volition, mental action or premeditation is very 
important before any action can be performed. This makes action deliberate and 
being deliberate the notion of responsibility is introduced into the performance of 
any action. 
later the idea of sense data from the external world contributed to the internal 
consciousness. The consequences of previous actions were believed to be stored as 
"mental deposits". Meritorious deposits were dharma and unmeritotious ones were 
adharma. These were produced by desire (kama), avarice (lobha), delusion (moha) 
and anger (krodha ). All actions, virtuous or otherwise originate in these mental or 
inner states. 
20 
It is evident that with time the primary meaning of karma changed and came to be 
understood differently under changing times and circumstances. From the 
metaphysical law of Vedic times it came to be regarded as a "complexity of material 
particles" (that fill the soul) to radical idealism which regards karma as an invisible 
force. Those who viewed the world as delusive felt that in its highest sense karma 
has "no central reality of its own" (Sinha 1987 : 358) since the world of objects is not 
real. Nagasena (in Sinha) is of the view that it is only the karma which 
transmigrates at rebirth. Besides this it also produces an external world which a 
being has to refer to and experience. 
Jaina tradition, although in a subtle form, sees karma as being material in nature. 
Buddhist systems do not recognise this material nature of karma. They introduce 
the idea of aura introducing the motion of colours around the soul, generated 
through ignorance. This could only be overcome by knowledge of the real nature of 
things. 
Knowledge of this real nature according to the Gita could be attained through the 
performance of action in a detached manner; which rids the soul of ignorance. 
Unlike that of the Greeks, and consequently that of Christianity and modem man 
the visible "form of a creature is only the temporary garb of an inhabiting life" 
(Sinha 1987 : 363). The importance of such a view is that it accentuates the karmic 
view that of the continuance of the soul until freed by knowledge. From action in 
the form of rituals to human action itself born of knowledge it becomes obvious that 
the Indian view has changed from "idealities" or "pure apriorities" to "concrete 
realities" (Sinha 1987 : 364) of spiritual experience. The action of the experiencing 
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human subject becomes the basis of the realisation of freedom from karma or 
karmic conditions. Detachment becomes an important factor of this action pointing 
to the "core of human subjectivity" (Sinha 1987: 364). 
The phenomenological approach thus shows that the basic meaning of karma in its 
widest sense is action of dharma, order: individual and universal. To maintain this 
order it was necessary to act with knowledge. Knowledge and action thus become 
inseparable for order to be maintained both in the individual and in the universe. 
Since knowledge was paramount in the attainment of moksa (the chief aim of life) 
the relevance of euthanasia and suicide in Vedic times can easily be understood. 
This was usually in the fourth asrama when the elderly retreated from active life to 
become ascetic and sanyassins. Although euthanasia and suicide were accepted 
abortion was abhorred. Abortion was acceptable only in exceptional cases. Where 
euthanasia and suicide were performed through choice and with knowledge of the 
Self, the child in abortion had neither choice nor knowledge. Nor was abortion 
accepted as retribution for this idea was not embodied in the concept of the Vedic 
karma. 
With the Jaina view of moksa and the high moral standards set by the Jains and 
Buddhists the Jaina advocation of sallekhana (Koller 1987 : 257) can easily be 
understood as the path to moksa. Since suffering and death were also seen as the 
results of actions or karma, euthanasia became an acceptable way to rid the self of 
the body which is the vehicle of suffering. 
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1.2.2 HERMENEUTICAL PERSPECTIVE 
Hermeneutics is generally concerned with the interpretation of what is regarded as 
the spiritual truth of scripture (especially the Bible) (Flew 1981 : 136). Within the 
context of historical change and the re-modelling of religious ideas, it becomes 
imperative to re-examine and to re-interpret religious text and consequently, 
concepts, in order to accomodate these in contemporary thinking and practice. New 
discoveries result in new experiences necessitating re-interpretation of religious 
doctrines. In this re-interpretation it is very important that due consideration be 
accorded the fact that whatever is being interpreted, for example, religious texts, 
must be seen to have their own life and individuality. They must therefore be 
re-interpreted in the context of their time which must be seen as living: for they are 
products and artefacts of a living past. The voice of the past lives and "speaks" to 
the present through its cultural products. Literature, art, music, artefacts of daily 
life, etc., are integral to an understanding of the past, as are religious texts, for they 
are products of human endeavour to place himself into, and to understand and 
accept his relationship to, and position in, the universe. 
Religious doctrines, e.g. karma and dharma thus become not merely past "objects" or 
doctrines but cultural products with their own reality communicating across time 
and cultural differences (Kruger 1982 : 21). The past therefore becomes a part of 
the present due to its historical continuity, contribution and influence, so that its 
relevance in its own time as well as its relevance and relationship to the present is 
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re-interpreted and understood. It thus becomes necessary to investigate the 
experiences which resulted in the formulation and formalization of the concepts of 
karma and dharma. 
1.3 KEY CONCEPTS : DEFINED 
In carrying out this investigation it becomes necessary to understand what 
euthanasia, suicide and abortion really mean. The end result of all these 
phenomena mentioned is death. Death in this investigation or study is looked upon 
not as an event but as a process. Therefore, an attempt will be made to define these 
terms. These phenomena have been studied in relation to two fundamental Hindu 
principles, namely, karma and dharma. Hence karma and dharma have become key 
hermeneutical concepts. 
1.3.1 DEATH 
Death is commonly regarded as an event. A variety of circumstances in this 
investigation has forced us to come to the conclusion that death must be viewed as a 
process and not simply as an event. One of the most dramatic of these 
circumstances is the development of techniques or organ transplants. In such a case 
the "donor" must be dead enough to justify removing the organ, but "not dead 
enough" to the extent that the organ is not suitable for transplanting. Another 
relevant development has been the increase in sophisticated techniques to maintain 
biological life far beyond anything previously possible and in some cases far beyond 
the apparent termination of self-conscious personal life (Bube 1982 : 29 - 30). 
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Nelson (in Bube 1982: 30) distinguishes four stages in the process of dying against 
which criteria for death are chosen. 
1. Clinical death is the most commonly encountered and the simplest to 
ascertain. When respiration and heart beat stop, then clinical death has 
occurred. It is evident that clinical death is not irreversible for there are 
many cases of patients who have been revived after having been pronounced 
clinically dead. Presumed reports of life after death described in such books 
as Life after Life use death in this sense of clinical death. If an irreversible 
stage of death had been passed the people who report their impressions after 
clinical death would never have been revived to tell them. 
2. Brain death is the second stage of death. It is well known that if the brain is 
deprived of oxygen for a critical period irreversible changes occur that 
prevent recovery of the living person. Brain death itself can be separated 
into two parts: first death of the higher brain functions that control 
consciousness followed by death of the lower brain functions that control the 
nervous system and operation of the heart and lungs. 
3. Biological death implies the irreversible and permanent end of all bodily life. 
4. Cellular death means the final termination of all life processes of any kind in 
the body, some parts of the body reaching this final termination more rapidly 
than others (Bube 1982 : 30). 
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As long as a human being is alive (that is not dead) regard for that human life calls 
for actions that will preserve it; when a human being is dead, however, a greater 
freedom of action is possible, as for example, arranging for transplants. It becomes 
a critical question therefore to consider "when does death occur?" Recognizing that 
death is a process and not an event, this question translates into another, when 
should efforts to preserve life be abandoned? Various suggestions have been 
advanced to answer this question. (1) Since the irreversible stage of dying centres 
on the cessation of brain function, then this cessation is the criterion for death. The 
test of brain function is a measurable electroencephalogram (E.E.G.) and therefore 
flat-line independent E.E.G. is the criterion of death. Although recovery from 
spontaneous flat E.E.G. patterns is rarely if ever encountered it is also known, 
however, that flat E.E.G. patterns can be induced by certain drugs from which 
recovery is commonly encountered. (2) A second suggestion calls for more 
extensive symptoms of death than simply a flat E.E.G. In addition to the latter it 
would include all the criteria of clinical death, lack of any response to stimuli or 
reflex action. All of these indications of death would be required to persist for a 
twenty four hour period before death was accepted. (3) A third and even more 
stringent perspective downgrades the significance of brain action, and looks instead 
to the total loss of the integrated functioning of the various parts and systems of the 
body as the necessary condition for death to be pronounced. 
These criteria are of necessity essentially empirical and biological in nature. They 
leave unsaid however, other definitions of death that may be as important or even 
more important for the whole person. Such other definitions would focus on the 
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value of human life as being centred in personal existence: the ability to experience 
self-consciousness to relate to other human beings and to God, and to engage in 
rational and abstract thought (Bube 1982 : 30; Veatch 1975 : 27). 
According to Barnard (Barnard 1980: 36) a person is considered dead when: 
There is no receptivity and complete lack of responsiveness. There is a total 
unawareness of externally applied stimuli and complete unresponsiveness - a state 
of irreversible coma. Even the most painful stimuli evoke no vocal or other 
response, not even a groan, withdrawal of a limb, or quickening of respiration. 
There is no movement or breathing. Observation covering a period of at least one 
hour by physicians is adequate to satisfy the criteria of no spontaneous muscular 
movements or spontaneous respiration or response to stimuli such as pain, touch, 
sound or light. 
There are no reflexes. Irreversible coma with absence of central nervous system 
activity is evidenced in part by the absence of elicitable reflexes. The pupils will be 




Cerebral death is confirmed when there is a loss of all responses to the 
environment. There is a complete loss of reflexes and muscle tone. There is an 
absence of spontaneous respiration. There is a mass drop in arterial blood pressure 
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when not artificially maintained. There is an absolutely linear electro-
encephalographic tracing recorded under the best technical conditions even with 
artificial stimulation of the brain. 
The Sydney Declaration (in Barnard 1980 : 49 - 50) read: "The determination of the 
time of death in most countries is the legal responsibility of the physician and should 
remain so". A complication is that death is a gradual process at the cellular level 
with tissues varying in their ability to withstand deprivation of oxygen. But clinical 
interest lies not in the state of preservation of isolated cells but in the fate of the 
person. Here the point of death of the different cells and organs is not as important 
as the certainty that the process has become irreversible whatever techniques of 
resuscitation that may be employed. 
A person will be considered medically and legally dead if, in the opinion of a 
physician based on ordinary standards of medical practice, there is the absence of 
spontaneous respiratory and cardiac function and because of the disease or 
condition which caused directly or indirectly these functions to cease, or because of 
the passage of time since these functions ceased, attempts at resuscitation are 
considered hopeless; and in this event death will have occurred at the time these 
functions ceased, or a person will be considered medically and legally dead if, in the 
opinion of a physician based on ordinary standards of medical practice, there is 
absence of spontaneous brain function; and if based on ordinary standards of 
medical practice, during reasonable attempts either to maintain or to restore 
spontaneous circulatory or respiratory function in the absence of aforesaid brain 
function, it appears that further attempts at resuscitation or supportive maintenance 
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will not succeed, death will have occurred at the time when these conditions 
coincide. Death is to be pronounced before artificial means of supporting 
respiratory and circulatory function are terminated and before any vital organ is 
removed for purpose of transplantation. 
1.3.2 EUTHANASIA 
The definition of euthanasia consists of three components: 
1. An act which has resulted in death. Legally there is no difference between 
acting and omitting to act if acting is a duty. Causing the death of the patient 
by action is the same as not helping him, with death as a result, when 
treatment is available. The act must have hastened death which would not 
have occurred without that act. 
2. The act has to be performed at the request of the person who has died. 
3. This request constitutes the borderline between euthanasia on one hand and 
murder and manslaughter on the other. Medical acts not requested by the 
patient but causing death legally fall under the second category. 
From the above three components the following definition can be composed: 
Euthanasia is a deliberate life-shortening act, including an omission to act by a 
person other than the person concerned at the request of the latter (Leenen 1984 : 
333 - 334 ). The word euthanasia is derived from the Greek eu = good and thanatos 
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= death meaning a good death. That should be the intention of the person who is 
performing euthanasia. 
In other definitions other elements are sometimes included, for example, the phase 
of dying must have been entered, an incurable disease must exist and the victim 
must suffer unbearable pain. These elements however cannot be part of the legal 
definition, for two reasons. In the first place they would bring into the definition 
judgements on which people disagree. Such judgements cannot be part of the 
definition. Including them would bring into the definition a debate on the 
permissibility of euthanasia. They can play a role in legalisation or in court decision 
as prerequisites to be fulfilled before euthanasia is acceptable, but they cannot be a 
definitional instrument to determine whether a given set of facts legally constitutes 
euthanasia or not. Secondly, these elements cannot be delineated precisely and 
therefore would take away the discriminating character of the definition. Entering 
of the phase of dying cannot exactly be established. Dying is a gradual process, in 
which it is impossible to fix a moment when dying starts. If entering the dying phase 
was an element in the definition this moment would be very important because 
before that moment no euthanasia could exist. Suffering from an incurable disease 
is also too vague a criterion to be included in the definition. The incurability of 
different diseases is scientifically not very well defined, which is a requisite for 
inclusion into a definition. Furthermore, incurability as such is not significant for 
the delimitation of euthanasia. Would a healthy diabetic be eligible for euthanasia 
and a victim of a severe accident (no incurable disease existing) not? The same 
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problems arise with unbearable pain. If psychic pain is included, against which few 
arguments can be raised, then a broad scope of human suffering would fall within 
the definition, making it thereby vague and useless. 
In the euthanasia debate differentiation of euthanasia is also used. Thus a 
distinction is made between voluntary and involuntary euthanasia, between active 
and passive euthanasia and between euthanasia by ordinary and extraordinary 
means. Voluntary euthanasia is euthanasia on request and falls within the definition 
and the legal concepts of murder and manslaughter. Including involuntary 
"euthanasia" in the definition is legally not possible. Another question is, whether 
the termination of a life without request can be justified at all. The distinction 
between voluntary and involuntary euthanasia has no legal basis and does not fit 
into the legal system. The concept of involuntary "euthanasia" seems to justify 
termination of life without request. But the request of the person concerned is a 
central legal criterion which cannot be set aside. As a consequence the request of 
others (next of kin or friends) is legally irrelevant and cannot justify the action of the 
doctor. There are also other reasons for this, for example, the human right of 
self-determination. 
The distinction between active and passive euthanasia is based upon the difference 
between acting and not acting. The distinction, however, is not valid because as was 
mentioned, in law acting is the same as omitting to act if acting is a duty. Doctors 
often are of the opinion that non-acting is morally and legally different from acting. 
But this is not true. It is comprehensible, however, that the doctor mostly prefers to 
terminate a life on request by non-action and that psychologically the distinction 
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under discussion is relevant for him. The so-called passive euthanasia without a 
request of the patient is acceptable, which in fact is not. This legally does not 
constitute euthanasia but termination of life without request. Apart from the legal 
irrelevance of the distinction between active and passive euthanasia, the two 
methods also cannot be delineated from each other. Non-acting can cause the same 
effects as acting. Is, for instance, stopping resuscitation by turning off the machine 
different from not again turning it on after it has stopped by accident? Rachels 
points out that omitting to act is not non-acting: the doctor acts by letting the 
patient die. By way of example he refers to an omission to shake hands which in a 
given situation can be very insulting. Legally important is the relation between the 
instrument and the aim and the proportionality between these two, not the reaching 
of the goal by acting or omitting (Rachels 1979 : 146). 
The distinction between ordinary and extraordinary means also has no legal 
consequences. It is the proportionality of means which is decisive. Moreover, it is 
difficult to circumscribe ordinary in comparison to extraordinary means. The 
condition of the patient is no criterion for deciding whether or not a method is 
ordinary. Giving antibiotics for pneumonia is ordinary and does not become 
extraordinary because the patient is mentally debilitated and needs a lot of nursing. 
Moreover, the development of modern medicine and technology causes shifts 
between the two types of methods; what was extraordinary yesterday is ordinary 
today. Finally, the place of treatment is a factor in determining whether a method is 
ordinary or not. What is ordinary in an academic hospital can be extraordinary in a 
nursing home and the nursing in the latter can mostly not be delivered by an 
academic hospital. 
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It can be concluded that the differentiations sometimes made in the concept of 
euthanasia as discussed above have no legal bearing. They do not provide the 
instrumentality to assess whether legally a given set of facts has to be defined as 
euthanasia or not (Leenen 1984 : 333 - 335; Weinfeld 1985 : 102; Helm 1984 : 20). 
1.3.3 SUICIDE 
Suicide is a term derived from the Latin suicidium meaning the taldng of one's own 
life. In the broadest sense it is applied to any voluntary act by which one causes 
one's own death. In the strictest moral sense it means an unlawful moral act, 
positive or negative, by which one directly causes one's own death. 
The concept of suicide can be interpreted in several ways. In the broad sense of the 
word, it is understood to mean anomalous kinds of death brought about by an 
unintentional interference of the subject with his life process whether by positive 
active self-participation or a negative passive attitude toward the dangers of life. In 
this sense, for example, the suicide is one who meets a premature death through an 
immoral act. In the narrow and strict sense on the other hand the suicide is one who 
intentionally and knowingly ends his life, who longs for death as such and is certain 
that his death will be brought about by his own action or failure to act. The 
swiftness of death is not the characteristic mark of the act, because one can also 
seek to die slowly and gradually. The negative passive attitude toward the dangers 
of life can similarly occur with suicidal purpose. As with every act of free will it 
depends on the intention (Masaryk 1970: 7). 
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Self-sacrifice is also a form of suicide. While suicide is morally condemned, 
self-sacrifice is considered to be the highest human virtue (Masaryk 1978 : 8). 
Self-scarifice may be done so that another individual may benefit. According to 
Hindu belief such an act may be considered dharmic. 
Of greater moral significance is the distinction between direct and indirect suicide. 
Suicide is direct when one has the intention of causing one's own death as a thing 
decried for its own sake (as when death is preferred to the meaninglessness of life or 
as a means to an end as when one hangs oneself to avoid prosecution or to provide 
one's heirs with insurance). 
Suicide is indirect when death itself is not desired either as a means or as an end but 
when it is simply foreseen as a likely consequence of an act, the immediate effect 
and purpose of which is something other than death (as when a man turns his car 
out of the way and over a precipice to avoid a collision with an oncoming school 
bus). 
1.3.4 ABORTION 
Abortion or miscarriage means the separation and expulsion of the contents of the 
pregnant uterus before the twenty eighth week of pregnancy. The frequency of 
abortion is not known but it is estimated that ten to fifteen percent of pregnancies 
end in abortion. The common time for abortion to occur is from the eighth to the 
thirteenth week of pregnancy. 
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The cause of natural abortion may be found in the mother or in the germ cells, or in 
some completely extraneous factor. As far as the mother is concerned, the most 
common cause is an abnormality of the hormonal balance which controls the cause 
of pregnancy. The main defeat is a lack of progesterone. This hormone is secreted 
by the corpus luteum in the early weeks of pregnancy and subsequently by the 
placenta. The function of progresterone is to ensure the safe embedding of the 
fertilized ovum in the mother's uterus (or womb) and then to ensure that the uterus 
does not start contracting until the time for labour is due. It is thus obvious why a 
defective supply of progesterone can result in abortion. 
Other natural causes of abortion include disturbances of endocrine glands or supply 
of hormones such as phyothyroidism or myxoedema and diabetes mellitus; high 
blood pressure; glomerulone phritis; and acute illness; congenital abnormalities of 
the uterus and any severe emotional disturbance (Thomson 1984 : 5). 
Two oft-quoted classical causes of abortion are syphilis and drugs. Syphilis is 
certainly a dangerous disease for a pregnant mother to have, but it is more likely to 
cause the death of the foetus after the twenty eighth week of pregnancy, and 
technically this is not an abortion. Several drugs have achieved a popular reputation 
as abortifacients, or inducers of abortion, but the reputation is usually fallacious as 
many a misled woman has found it is incredibly difficult to induce an abortion by 
means of drugs in a healthy pregnancy. This even applied to pills containing lead, 
though there is no doubt that lead can induce an abortion. 
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Any defect in the germ cells whether ovum or spermatozoon may lead to abortion if 
it is severe enough to cause gross malformation of the embryo. Finally reference 
must be made to criminally induced abortion (the aspect that is of great concern in 
this thesis). This may be attempted in a variety of ways, particularly the introduction 
of fluids or instruments into the uterus. It is a dangerous practice. This type of 
abortion is carried by unprofessionals known as "back street" abortions. As a result 
many women have died from sepsis (Thomson 1984 : 5). 
1.4 TEXTS AND INTERVIEWS 
A cross section of the Hindu population in the Durban area were interviewed, and 
consisted of Hindu priests, both old and relatively young, lawyers, doctors, Hindu 
academic scholars and housewives. Their views were compared with the Classical 
Texts (both Sruti and Smrti). Most of the Hindu lawyers and doctors were 
completely ignorant of scripture and Classical views on euthanasia, suicide and 
abortion. What was fascinating however, was that their views and values were 
rational and sound and similar to traditional Hindu views, that are not dogmatic. 
Hindu law and scripture had always taken into account changing circumstances. 
This shows that Hindus, irrespective of the era, think in a particular way, in keeping 
with local trends and situations. This shows that the Hindu religion does not have 
any binding rule, it is flexible and time and place play significant roles in Hindu 
ethics. 




Chapter Two deals with the classical background to the study of contemporary 
views. 
In Chapter Three an attempt has been made to understand euthanasia, suicide and 
abortion from a legal, medical, ethical aspect. 
Chapter Four deals with the contemporary views of the Durban Hindus on the 
phenomena in question and Chapter Five analyses and interprets views 
(contemporary) in terms of the Classical background, the influence of legal and 
medical ethics and the re-interpretation of karma and dharma (depending on 
situations and circumstances) in a society that is basically Hindu, but has undergone 
a great deal of Westernization. Chapter Six is the conclusion which sums up the 





The extreme debilitation of advanced old age and severe illness have plagued 
human beings whose awareness and self-definition encompass both the idea of 
death and the "marker events" that signal the dying process. Human beings the 
world over have tried to cope with the problem. Each individual tries to find a 
solution to the problem according to his own psychological and sociological make-
up. Religion has also played an increasing role, in trying to understand and provide 
a solution to the problem. The Hindu religion in particular has been extremely 
flexible in trying to understand the phenomenon. Heroically living out the natural 
life span despite suffering, suicide to eliminate the difficult dying process, and 
murder whether by compassionate or selfish motives have all been human responses 
to this phenomenon (Young 1989: 71). 
2.2 EUTHANASIA AND SUICIDE IN CLASSICAL INDIA 
The archaic meaning of euthanasia in classical India is the "freedom to leave", 
which permitted the sick and despondent to terminate their lives. An alternative 
working definition for this historical study is self-willed death with reference to the 
extreme debilitation of advanced old age and the seemingly terminal nature of 
disease. The Classical Indian view remained operant for a number of centuries 
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(unlike the discontinuity in the west regarding the practice and definition of 
euthanasia). A study of the Classical Indian view will be a major step in 
understanding the history of this phenomenon in India and a re-interpretation of 
this phenomenon amongst the Hindus in Durban, under the influence of 
Westernization and technology. 
The study of the phenomena euthanasia, suicide and abortion cannot be complete 
without studying the phenomenon death. A brief study of the concept death will be 
undertaken to give greater meaning to the phenomenon in question. The concept 
will be studied from the Indian philosophical view, in keeping with the topic in 
question. 
Death has been described as a central concern not only of Indian philosophy and 
religion but also of Indian sociology. Death is regarded as the single most polluting 
human experience. 
When one approaches the topic of death in the classical Indian context, one 
encounters three basic types of death: natural, unnatural (being killed) and 
self-willed (killing oneself). 
With reference to natural death one finds that there was a strong Brahmanical 
(Hindu) prescription to live a hundred years or at a least to the end of the natural 
life-span. The funeral or sraddha rites were performed for those who died a natural 
death. Those men who died naturally became the ancestors who were sustained 
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through the offerings, ostensibly until they were reborn (though the offerings also 
ensured that they became gods (Vzsvadeva) as part of the process, thereby creating a 
double buffer against the idea of death as annihilation). 
Unnatural death by being killed in battle, by murder or by accident was viewed as 
violent and not to be marked by sraddha. Such death, however, was not necessarily 
perceived negatively and that violent death, especially that of a warrior killed in 
battle, was religiously powerful, for it led to heaven or deification. 
Besides natural death and unnatural violent death, there also developed an 
acceptance of some forms of self-willed death. This category of self-willed death 
included three different types:-
2.2.1 TYPES OF DEATH 
2.2.1.1 MORS VOLUNTARIA HEROICA 
Mors voluntaria heroica was a form of suicide which was practised among warriors 
in ancient times. It was a way to avoid calamity and also when a warrior did not 
want to be captured by his enemy he resorted to mors voluntaria heroica. It was 
considered a courageous act (for if captured, a warrior could be enslaved, which was 
degrading and he could also be subjected to torture in order to release information). 
Consequently suicide in such circumstances was thought to result in enlightenment 
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or moksa. Suicide (self-willed death) by a woman attempting to escape rape or 
slavery by a conqueror was also considered a heroic act. It was also a way to allow 
peaceful succession to the throne. 
2.2.1.2 MORS VOLUNTARIA RELIGIOSA 
This was related both historically and conceptually to heroic self-willed death and 
emphasised the religious dimension (heaven, liberation or moksa: duty and social 
order based on religious principles). This type of suicide was found outside the 
warrior caste, but like mors voluntaria heroics was thought to lead to moksa. An 
example of this type of suicide was those who committed suicide, so as to avoid 
being sacrificial victims. The king had autocratic power, and he killed people 
(whom he desired) and they were considered as sacrificial victims. In order to avoid 
being such victims some committed suicide before they were captured and sacrificed 
(Young 1989 : 83). Another example of mors voluntaria religiosa was sati, where 
women committed suicide on the cremation fire of their husbands. The belief was 
that if women were cremated together with their husbands, they would gain moksa. 
This was an act of dharma whereby a person sacrificed her life to join her husband 
in the spiritual plane. 
2.2.1.3 PASSIONATE SELF-WILLED DEATH 
This type of suicide was different from the previous two types. It was prompted by 
passion, depression or uncontrollable circumstances. This type of suicide was 
prohibited for the circumstances under which it was committed, was not acceptable 
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as it was felt that it did not lead to moksa; being not on heroic or religious grounds. 
The degree of disapproval for this type of suicide is evident in the fact that sraddha 
(ceremonies) was not performed for those that committed suicide under such cir-
cumstances. Neither were such victims permitted cremation rites (Young 1989 : 74 ). 
The Amarakosa, which was written in the early Classical Period, places the category 
of death in the semantic domain (va18a) of the warriors (ksatriyas): after citing thirty 
terms for killing (va.dha), it gives ten terms for natural death (maran.a) and seven 
terms for dead (mrta) (Ramanathan 1971 in Young 1989 : 75). While there is no 
term for self-willed death in this text, reference to suicide, literally one who kills the 
self (atmahan. ), makes its textual appearance in the Upan.isads and early Buddhism 
and may be related to a critic of heroic, self-willed death, which was beginning to 
occur in Vedic society. Atmahatya and atmaghata become the technical terms for 
suicide by the late Classical Period. The technical terms for the category of heroic 
and religious self-willed death, however, do not emerge until the Indian vernacular 
languages with the compounds icchamaran.a and istamrtyu (literally death that is 
willed or desired); nonetheless, the concept, if not the technical term, exists by the 
time of the Mahabharata. It is said in the Mahabharata that Dhrtarastra, along with 
his wife, Gan.dhari, and his sister-in-law, Kunti, was performing austerities for six 
months during van.aprastha, the stage of life when they had retreated to the forest. 
Gandhari took only water and Kunti had fasted for a month. One day while they 
were sitting on the bank of the Gan.ga in the forest a fire broke out. Samjaya who 
was with them warned them of the advancing fire but they were so weakened and 
thin by their austerities (man.dapran.avicestitah) that they decided not to escape 
arguing that "uniting with the fire we will attain the final state". Samjaya says 
despondently "that this futile death by fire (vrthagnina) will be not willed evil 
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(anistah). The reply is that, for we who have voluntarily renounced our home, this 
death is not willed, that is it is willed or desired. Further, dying through fire, water 
or wind by a hermit is praised". They tell Samjaya that because he is not a hermit, 
he should escape the fire (Young 1989: 124). 
Dhrtarastra is reminded that he had excessive indulgence for his proud son 
Dwyodhana and paid court to those of wicked behaviour, which helped to instigate 
the great war. Because of such irresponsibility he must experience the fruit of his 
own actions and should not give way to grief. Moreover, indulgence in grief never 
wins wealth nor what is desired, much less salvation. Neither scriptures nor the 
dead approve of such tears. One should not mourn for dead warriors who have 
been slain in war, for youth, beauty, life, possessions, health and companionship are 
impermanent. All must die someday. Heroic death in battle ensures that the 
warrior will immediately gain fame and heaven. Others cannot attain heaven so 
speedily by sacrifices, gifts, asceticism or knowledge. Those ignorant people who 
suffer or meet with destruction as the consequence of their own actions will not 
attain the supreme goal (Young 1989: 124). 
What is interesting about this account is that it is the antecedent to the concept of 
self-willed death (ista-mrtyu) which is the Sanskrit equivalent of mors voluntaria 
heroica or religiosa and is viewed as legitimate for those who have become hermits 
or vanaprasthins. 
In the Mahaprasthanika Parva, the royal suvivors of the great war decide to retire 
from the world to seek merit. Plans are made for an orderly succession of rule. 
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Yudhisthira and his brothers offer oblations of water to the elders, perform the 
sraddhas for the deceased kin, feed the sages, bestow great gifts on the Brahmins 
and inform the citizens of their intention (samkalpa). Clad in the bark of trees, they 
perform the preliminary rituals, which are to bless them in the accomplishment of 
their goal, and begin their journey with their faces to the east, resolved to renounce 
the world with yogic discipline. They wander through various kingdoms. They head 
south, southwest and finally north. Their circumambulation of the earth completed, 
they behold the Himalayas and finally the grand peak of Mount Meru. The first to 
fall is the princess Yajnaseni, then Sahadev, Nakula, followed by Arjuna, Bhima, and 
finally Yudhisthira (Narasimhan 1965: 207). 
Given this evidence of the phenomenon of self-willed death, the heroic and religious 
dimensions of which will become apparent in this study, introduction of the 
categories of mors voluntaria religiosa as distinguished from suicide are valuable to 
facilitate the discussion of euthanasia. 
The present analysis necessitates a historical treatment to see how these categories 
developed and where the topic of euthanasia is to be situated in the more general 
discussion of self-willed death. 
Different historical periods had very different understanding of the natural life span 
and acceptability of heroic, voluntary death and religious self-willed death. To 
illumine these historical vicissitudes with specific reference to the topic of 
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euthanasia, it is necessary to understand not only the major shifts of the 
Brahmanical/Hindu views through the main epochs, but also how they related to 
and are informed by the dynamic interaction with Jainism and Buddhism. 
Katherine, K. Young (1989: 76) has made five general observations. 
1) Much sympathy was expressed in Classical India for euthanasia in the sense 
of "freedom to leave" by one suffering from an incurable disease or by one 
facing extreme old age. 
2) Accordingly euthanasia belonged to the category of self-willed death and was 
never formally viewed as mercy-killing of another person. Once there was a 
formal declaration of the intent to perform self-willed death, helping the 
person was allowed. The individual's voice and willpower to implement it 
was therefore mandatory when euthanasia was accepted in the premodern 
Indian context. 
3) The phenomenon of euthanasia was intimately related to the larger 
categories of heroic and self-willed death, which, in turn, were related to the 
yet broader context of violence and non-violence in Indian society and 
religion. 
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4) Although there was positive evaluation of euthanasia in classical Hinduism, 
strong criticism developed by the 10th century C.E.; which suggests that 
abuse occurred either of euthanasia proper or other forms of heroic and 
religious self-willed death to which it was closely associated, despite the 
attempt to define parameters. 
5) The Indian Penal Code, based on British Law at the time of the Raj, views 
suicide as a criminal act. Because suicide has been interpreted as inclusive of 
all forms of self-willed death, euthanasia became illegal with the advent of 
British Law in India. 
The Indian Penal Code on suicide was challenged by Justice T.K. Tukol (in Young 
1989 : 77) in a series of lectures to the L.D. Institute of Indology, which was 
published under the title Sallekhana is Not Suicide (1976). While commentators on 
the Indian Penal Code have included the case of religious fasting to death among 
the forms of suicide, Justice Tukol argued that such fasting to death (sallekhana; 
samadhimarana) is not suicide: 
upasarge durbhikse jarasi rujayam ca nihpratikare 
dharmaya tanuvimocanamahuh sallekhanamaryah 
The wise ones say that sallekhana is giving up the body when there is calamity 
(upasarga) suffering from famine (durbhiksa), old age and decay (jaras), painful 
disease (ruja) and incurable disease (nihpratikara) for the sake of dharma. 
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antarkriyadhikaranam tapah phalam sakaladarsinah stuvate 
tasmadyavadvibhavan samadhimarane prayatitavyam 
All systems of religion praise the result of austerities (tapas) which is control of 
mind and action; therefore one should try to attain dignity/ emancipation from 
existence (vibhava) in samadhimarana. 
These two verses (Ratna-Karandaka Sravakacara 22-23 text quoted by Tukol 1976: 
107; (translated by K. Young) describe the Jaina forms of voluntary death 
(sallekhana) as legitimate responses to debilitating old age and incurable disease. It 
is noted that other Indian religious systems have a similar method of death by 
austerities and meditation, presumably in the same circumstances which is dignified 
and salvific (Young 1989 : 77). 
Since this chapter deals with the historical background of the phenomenon in 
question it becomes necessary to examine the different periods and to see how life, 
death and moksa were viewed, in relation to euthanasia and suicide. 
2.2.2 LIFE AFFIRMATION AND THE ISSUE OF SELF-WILLED DEATH IN 
THE VEDIC PERIOD (ca. 1200 - 900 B.C.E.) 
The earliest view of Aryans in India can be summarised by just three words 
Prosperity, Progeny and Longevity. In the Rig Veda (the earliest of the texts) it is 
revealed that men perform sacrifices for the gods (deities) in return for good health, 
long life and progeny. The god Agni is requested to bless the worshipper with good 
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progeny and long life. Agni is called the universal protector of bodies and is 
addressed as the source of strength who will give abundant vitality and exemption 
from sickness and danger. The Lord Himself is praised as the imperishable life 
principle and theAsvins (the physician gods) are beseeched for good health. To live 
for hundred years was the ideal of every Aryan (O'Flaherty 1983: 99 - 100). 
Thus the prayer: "O gods, may we hear with our ears what is beneficial, may we see 
with our eyes what is good. With firm limbs and sound bodies having sung your 
praises, may we reach old age, our minds steadfast on god. May one hundred years 
await as wherein old age is assured, wherein sons will become fathers. May no harm 
be done to us in the midst of the course of life" (Geidner 1951, 114 in Young 1989: 
77 -78). 
Life was precarious on account of disease and war in the Vedic Period, and the life 
span was relatively short. The deities were invoked to protect the body, invigorate it 
with energy, provide it with sustenance, exempt it from disease, or, if necessary, heal 
it so that one may live the full term of life, which is one hundred years. The deities 
themselves were regarded as the imperishable life force, they can take the individual 
across the difficulties of life. The prayers described in the Atharvaveda are in 
continuity with those in the Rg. Veda, namely long life and health (Griffiths 1968: 
39, 48, 51, etc.). 
Thus, one finds in the Atharvaveda the following verse:- "Live thou, thriving a 
hundred autumns, a hundred winters and a hundred springs! May Indra, Agni, 
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Savitar, Brhaspati (grant) thee a hundred years! I have snatched him (from death) 
with an oblation that secures a life of a hundred years" (Bloomfield 1897 : 49). 
Old age was regarded as a blessing from the gods. Prayers for health and protection 
from disease and other misfortunes indicate that the body was viewed positively. So 
strong was the Vedic life affirmation that immortality was viewed as a continuity to 
the good, long life albeit in another realm (svarga ). Immortality itself was virtually a 
secondary interest. There was this continuous fear that Yama, the god of death, and 
his messengers would take someone away, and who that someone was remained a 
mystery, until such time was realised. Both the notion of premature death or 
relegation to the realm of Y ama cast a shadow on happiness and reflect that life is 
indeed precarious. But by and large, optimism through confidence in divine 
protection (through praise, ritual, sacrifice and charm as human actions to foster the 
god's goodwill) became the order of the day. The underlying feature of Vedic rituals 
was the concept longevity, and this is clearly evident in the Rg. Vedic text. The 
expression of the life principle at the core of existence is nuanced by salient features 
of Rg. Vedic society. 
Early Rg. Vedic society was an extension of the concept of family and kin, where 
religion and society immersed in each other and extended beyond the human realm 
(Young 1989: 78). This collectivity includes 1) all ancestors and 2) all deities who 
cross over to the human sphere and communicate by virtue of their 
anthropomorphism. Although these forces (ancestors and deities) communicated 
with the beings on earth, yet they retained their natural cosmic and super human 
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traits. Because of the deities' difference from the human collectivity, they are to be 
treated with respect, deference and as allies to ensure the maintenance of order 
(rla) and well-being, including a long, healthy life surrounded by kith and kin. 
In order to maintain this relationship sacrifice was in vogue. Sacrifice is primarily a 
way to forge a bond between humans and the deities, thereby forming a sacral 
relationship. This bonding ensured protection through life by the deities. As a 
result of this bonding death was annihilated and kept at bay. This was a gesture 
provided by the deities in return for sacrifice and praise. Some kind of a ''barter 
system" existed between the Vedic Aryans and the gods. 
This mutual relationship between the gods and humans provided the Vedic Aryan 
with an optimistic view of life, that is one hundred autumns, despite the 
precariousness of life and the relatively short life span. 
With such life affirmation which was related to the sacramentalization of life, one 
finds no discussion of suicide in the Veda (Young 1989 : 78 - 79). Although Vedic 
commentators are divided on the point whether Vedic injunction allowed self-
destruction, there is definite evidence from the hymns that human sacrifice was 
considered the best and that other forms were poor substitutes (Rao 1975: 231). 
2.2.3 LIFE AND VALUE IN THE BRAHMANIC PERIOD (ca. 900 • 500 B.C.E.) 
There is a shift of emphasis in values from the Rg. Vedic to the Brahmanic Period. 
Much of the Vedic energy was consumed by family concerns, the establishment of 
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dominion over the lands and the founding of new Aryan settlements. By the time of 
the texts of the Brahmanas there is a desire to control human life, society and 
cosmos. To be specific, control was extended in two directions. It was extended 
over the gods who were subjected to the will of the emerging priests and 
intelligentsia (the Brahmins who call themselves gods on earth, for they can 
guarantee the results of the system of sacrifice). Control was also extended over the 
non-Aryan inhabitants who were gradually integrated into the social order. Hence a 
hierarchy was created between the ruler and the ruled. Kingship and the 
rudimentary caste system make their appearance in this period. The creation of 
kingdoms and the federation of tribes was a relatively peaceful process, yet there is 
evidence in Jaina and Buddhist literature that this epoch in Indian history was 
fraught with violence. 
"However peaceful and harmless the srauta ritual may look, there can be no doubt 
about its violent origin in the heroic battle sacrifice epitomizing the warrior phase. 
Over the whole of the orderly an obsessively regulated Vedic ritual there still hangs 
the dark cloud of a heroically violent world where gods and asuras are forever 
fighting each other in endlessly recurring rounds of conflict" (Heesterman 1984 : 
125 in Young 1989 : 80). 
Hence it is necessary to understand the escalation of this violence at the time of the 
rise of kingdoms and the variety of reactions to it in the warriors milieu in order to 
appreciate the immediate context of 1) mors voluntaria heroica 2) the 
developement of suicide and non-violence and 3) the relationship of these to mors 
voluntaria religiosa and euthanasia. (Which began making their textual appearance 
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by the 6th century B.C.E). This aspect of extreme violence, including human 
sacrifice has been underestimated by historians in general and historians of religion 
in particular according to Young (1989: 80). 
During this period in Indian history one finds a transition not only from tribe to 
kingdom, but also the development of social hierarchy, in the form of caste 
distinction. When hierarchy is abused tyranny is born. Moreover "license is implicit 
in omnipotence", the two great licenses were "the sexual and the aggressive" and the 
early kings were expected to exercise both (Sagan 1985: 320). 
With reference to the latter, "a king was a king because he could kill" (Sagan 1985 : 
321), even though he could be the benevolent protector of the land. The presence 
of sacrifice in complex societies testifies both to aggression and to an attempt to be 
omnipotent by controlling life and death. The latter is symbolized par excellence 
by human sacrifice. There is evidence of this in the Brahmanas where offerings 
were made of one hundred and sixty six men at eleven posts (Keith 1971 (b): 347). 
However, Keith attributes this to priestly imagination, because there is lack of 
detail. Much evidence could have disappeared owing to re-editing of the texts (in 
the face of Buddhist and J aina critics) to eliminate details of human sacrifice, which 
took on a more symbolic meaning as it did in the Satapatha, Taittiriya and the Sutras. 
According to Keith a human sacrifice was done in order to achieve human success. 
The ideology embraced by the Vedic thinkers, perceives the other world as the realm 
of life itself and thus seeks access to that world as a means of renewing one's life. 
This world was characterised as a realm of death; in creating the cosmos it is said 
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that Prajapati "over [this world] created death who is the eater of men" (Satapatha 
Brahmana 10.1.3.1 in Tull 1989: 72). The way to life was through sacrifice: "A man 
being born, is a debt (ma) by his own self he is born to death and only when he 
sacrifices does he extract himself from death (Satapatha Brahmana 3.6.2.16 in Tull 
1989 : 72). Yet the mechanism of the sacrifice would seem to require the sacrificer 
to give up his own life to attain this renewal. According to Keith the "perfect form 
of sacrifice should be suicide" (Tull 1989 : 72; Eggeling 1979 : 165). 
Suicide or self-sacrifice does not appear in the Vedic texts as a ritual method. 
Although such an act might have fulfilled the theoretical demands of the sacrifice, 
its finality would have been contrary to the sacrifice's practical purpose; that is, the 
attainment of the goods of life from the other world. This attainment could not be 
realised through a single ritual event but required a lifetime of ritual performances 
(which is another way of sacrificing one's life). "A year should not pass without 
sacrificing; indeed the year is life and life is this immortal state which he bestows on 
his own self' (Satapatha Brahmana 11.7.1.3 in Tull 1989: 73). 
There was also the belief that immortality could be achieved if one lived for a 
hundred years. "Those who depart before the age of twenty, they become attached 
to the world of the days and nights; those who [depart] above twenty and below 
forty [become attached] to that [world of] the fortnight; those who [depart] above 
forty and below sixty [become attached] to that [world of] the months; those who 
[depart] above sixty and below eighty [become attached] to that [world of] the 
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seasons; those who [depart] above eighty and below hundred [become attached] to 
that [world of] the year. Now only that one who lives hundred years or more indeed 
attains the immortal state" (Satapatha Brahmana 10.2.6.8 in Tull 1989 : 73). 
At first in the Vedic Period five animals were sacrificed: man, horse, bull, sheep and 
goat. These five animals are said to represent all the animals (Tull 1989 : 83; 
Eggeling 1979 : 165). Animal sacrifice was further simplified in the Vedic Age. The 
ritualists proposed to slaughter only one animal in place of all five. They chose the 
goat for this role and thus they describe how the goat is equivalent to all the five 
sacrificial animals man, horse, bull, sheep and goat: 
"Regarding why he slaughters this animal: in this animal indeed exists the form of 
all animals. As it is hornless and beardless, so it has the form of a man for man is 
indeed hornless and beardless; as it is hornless and possesssed of long hair, so it has 
the form of a horse, for the horse is indeed hornless and possessed of long hair; as it 
has the form of a bull, for the bull is indeed eight hoofed; as its hoof is sheep like, 
so it has the form of the sheep; as it is a goat, so it [has the form] of a goat, now 
when that goat is slaughtered by him, indeed all the animals are slaughtered" (Tull 
1989 : 84; Eggeling 1979 : 165). It accomplishes the original purpose of the rite 
without too much bloodshed - the ritualists accept the sacrifice of a single goat as an 
alternative to the sacrifice of all the five animals (Tull 1989 : 84; Eggeling 1979 : 
165). Because of this explanation human sacrifice was no longer in vogue. Sacrifice, 
at one stage was associated with blood only. As time progressed the concept of 
sacrifice took on a more subtle appearance. 
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The texts were watered down to give "sacrifice" a more sublime connotation. An 
example will be used to demonstrate this change of meaning. The king removed 
himself from the seat of government gave up his power and withdrew to the forest to 
lead a life of a mendicant or ascetic. The performance of the human sacrifice on 
this occasion no doubt is to symbolize the king's sacrifice of himself for the sake of 
his son. The son, in turn, will perform rituals at the time of of his father's death to 
secure heaven for his father. 
Death in battle has been rewarded by most cultures, for there must be some 
compensation for male risk in battle beyond immediate material gain. "Warriors 
losing life in battle reap the same rewards that those who make gifts of a thousand 
cows in sacrifices secure" (Kane 1973: 58). Later texts indicate that death in battle is 
equated to participation in the Brahmanical sacrifice itself. Those that were killed 
in battle become pure by the destruction of their sins (Kane III 1973 : 58). 
If attainment of heaven was guaranteed by heroic death in battle or self-willed death 
to escape capture, rape and slavery, then according to this cultural logic, warriors 
who did not die in or because of battle despite a valiant career were not rewarded. 
It was a sinful act for a Ksatriya to die in his house from some disease; the ancient 
code of conduct for him is that he should meet death from steel. However, 
according to Young this insistence on death in battle seems unjust to those old 
warriors who had risked their lives on numerous occasions in battle and yet 
survived. Surely these people too deserved salvation (Young 1989 : 83). It is likely 
that the close association of mors voluntaria heroica towards the end of life (as a 
subsitute for death in battle) leading to the attainment of heaven or deification, in 
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turn, posited the seeds for the general connection of self-willed death and the 
religious goal, heaven or enlightenment, in the emergent religions of the Gangetic 
plain, hence the phenomenon of mors voluntaria religiosa. 
One common form of self-willed death, was death by fire, for the Vedic sacrificial 
cult was focused on the fire god (Agni). A sacrifice had a particular purpose, one 
had to give up something in order to obtain something. So also voluntary self-willed 
death became linked to a specific purpose: to obtain freedom (heaven or liberation) 
through an act of omnipotence, involving the sacrifice of the self. In that 
self-inflicted human sacrifice gave one omnipotence and the power over life itself. 
Although this power seemed negative power, nonetheless it could lead to the idea of 
liberation from violence. The extreme violence of the age provoked other reactions 
as well. One was non-violence. When a more non-violent self-sacrifice (such as 
fasting to death) was substituted for violent self-sacrifice, the goal remained the 
same. To many the more non-violent means seemed superior. If omnipotence 
through self-sacrifice was related to asceticism and withdrawal to the forest, as 
non-violent ways to escape the materialism and violence of the age, then such 
escapism was no longer a cowardly act to a warrior. Rather it was positively 
appropriated and converted into a religious path and goal epitomized by 
non-violence and a fast to death, which ensured heaven or liberation. 
In this way violence and non-violence were intimately related in that non-violence 
was to be substituted for violence to achieve the goal of omnipotence. Killing the 
self may have taken more courage and heroism than aggression directed outwards. 
In theAranyakas or the Forest Treatises, the sequel to the Brahmanas, one finds 
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both Ksatriyas and Brahmins withdrawing to the forest to practise asceticism (Young 
1989: 84). 
While such equivalences and substitutions surrounding the issue of self-willed death 
no doubt appealed to the Ksatriyas and some Brahmins, they must have appeared as 
forms of suicide to those Brahmins who supported the Vedic prescription of the 
natural life-span. 
2.2.4 THE UPANISADIC VIEW AND ADJUSTMENT OF THE VEDIC VALUE 
OF LONGEVI1Y (ca. 900- 500 B.C.E.) 
The new view presented in the Upanisads, which reflects integration of the 
challenges of the epoch, is based on a polarity between this - wordly suffering 
through death after death (punarmrtyu) later understood as birth after birth (the 
wheel of samsara) and the bliss of liberation (moksa), which transcends the human 
condition altogether. The rupture in existence is no longer the rupture of death 
caused by Yama, though this idea lingers. It is the rupture caused by the soul's 
disengagement from matter, nature, and body alike. This rupture is now viewed as 
categorically positive. Human life is no longer valued in its own right, more 
precisely for the sake of progeny, family, and material well-being, so central to 
Aryan thinking and identity in the Rg. Veda. However, human life is now viewed 
from two competing perspectives: human life as necessary for salvation, and the 
body as the cause of bondage. While the new theory of rebirth posits that the 
individual may have had or may have in the future other kinds of birth (for example 
as an animal) it is only in a human birth that an individual may seek enlightenment. 
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Hence, the value of human life is defined positively by the unique opportunity that it 
provides for the pursuit of salvation. Human status is a product of an individual's 
karma, a result of good actions in previous lives. Abuse of this human status leads 
to the accumulation of bad karma. The result may be loss of human status in the 
next life and with it opportunity for salvation, thus perpetuating the "bondage of 
rebirth" (samsara ). At the same time, human status is viewed negatively, for the 
body is the expression of bondage and suffering. Thus the meaning of human 
existence has shifted to instrumentality, that is embodiment as a means to obtain the 
supreme goal. There is this opposition of soul and body and a stress on individual 
responsibility for salvation (Young 1989 : 86). Through Yoga, comprising austerities 
and knowledge one can cheat Death of its prey. This leads to real transcendence 
and immortality, understood as attaining the Absolute (Brahman) and the True Self 
(atman ). Vedic sacrifices were designed to ward off death temporarily and to attain 
a full life span for men. A more total conquest of death was the goal in the 
philosophies of the Upanisads, Buddhism, and Jainism (Blackburn 1985 : 255). 
The Upanisads, considered as the end or culmination of the Veda, present this new 
view of human existence, though the older Vedic perspective is generally 
incorporated. For example, in Chandogya Upanisad (11. 2) the Gayatri Chant 
{which reflects the Vedic orientation and the breaths of the yogi, (which reflects the 
Upanisadic view) together ensure a long, prosperous life (the old Vedic ideal) 
(Radhakrishnan 1953 :375). 
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In Kausitaki Upanisad 4.8, it is said that the Upanisadic Brahman fulfills the Vedic 
goals of life such as longevity (Radhakrishnan 1953 : 786). When Brahman in the 
self is reverenced as the breath of life (asu), one "does not die before the time" 
(Kausitaki 4.13) (Radhakrishnan 1953 : 788). Therefore, the appreciation of 
longevity, which is related to the sacramentalization of life is often integrated into 
the Upanisadic perspective. 
While the Vedas emphasise the physical aspect of man and his relationship to God 
through the material, example, sacrifice; the Upanisads emphasise the spiritual 
aspect of man the soul or atman and the close resemblance it bears to Brahman or 
God Himself. Greater emphasis was placed on the importance of sacrifice as a 
means of appeasing the gods in return for good health and long life, in the Vedic 
Period. The Upanisadic Period emphasised the importance of yoga (which replaced 
sacrifice) as the protector and preserver of life and ultimately the conqueror of 
death. Pursuit of yoga, however, may be relegated to the last stage of life. Thus a 
long healthy life is necessary to ensure that there is sufficient time for the pursuit of 
yoga culminating in enlightenment. Through yoga, one conquers sickness, old age, 
and also death (Svetasvatara Upanisad 2.12; Radhakrishnan 1953: 722). 
The Upanisadic view, however, poses a tension between the Vedic view of a life span 
of one hundred years and the idea that action (karma) creates bondage. To 
overcome this it is argued that although the renouncer may desire to live a hundred 
years, karma will not bind him after he has achieved liberation. 
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Even while doing deeds here, 
One may desire to live a hundred years. 
Thus on thee - not otherwise than this is it -
The deed (Karma) adheres not on the man 
(Isa 2; Hume 1968: 362; Radhakrishnan 1953 : 569). 
Although the Upanisads like the Vedas emphasised that long life was necessary to 
attain salvation'} yet old age was viewed in a negative sense. "May I, who am the 
glory of the glories, not go to hoary and toothless, yea to toothless and hoary and 
driveling old age". Yea, may I not go to driveling old age. (Chandogya 8.14; Hume 
1968: 273; Radhakrishnan 1953: 511). 
Despite ambivalence over human life and the body, the Vedic respect for longevity 
and the natural life span remains the dominant Brahmanical attitude. This may be 
the reason for the following verse, which may be taken as condemning suicide, 
especially if suicide as a form of escape from violence is becoming common in 
society. 
Devilish (aswya) are those worlds called, 
With blind darkness (tamas) covered o'er. 
Unto them, on deceasing, go 
Whatever folk are slayers of the self 
(Isa 3; Hume 1968: 362; Radhakrishnan 1953 : 570). 
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In order to give the topic a more comprehensive outlook it becomes necessary to 
examine Jaina and Buddhist views on the phenomena in question. 
2.2.S EPIC LITERATURE (MAHABHARATA) (ca. 900 B.C.E.) 
The locus classicus for the desire to commit suicide is the example of old King 
Dhrtharastra in the epic Mahabharata. Dhrtarastra, overcome by grief as he faces 
the carnage of the great war and the slaughter of the kin (including his own sons), 
weeps uncontrollably, falls on the ground, laments, and resolves to go the long way 
that leads to the realm of Brahma. In other words, he wishes to die by the great 
journey (Mahaprasthana ), which involves wandering until extreme sorrow that has 
provoked the king to escape his trials by suicide. Vaisampayana rebukes such 
self-pity and lectures him sternly on the meaning of death. In the arguments to 
dissuade Dhrtarastra from committing suicide, one finds an endorsement of an 
appeal to the Ksatriya's duty. Kastriyas are to fight, for warriors who die in battle win 
fame and heaven. Such death is described as a quicker and therefore easier means 
to heaven than sacrifices, gifts, asceticism, or knowledge. According to Brahmin 
authors death in battle is an easy way to attain heaven. As a result the warriors 
were attracted back into the Brahmanical view of the state (those that were 
attracted to Buddhist and Jaina Philosophy) by discourageing asceticism, suicide 
(and self-willed death) and promoting a philosophy of action. 
While the definition of suicide seems to be all-embracing (any death as the 
consequence of one's own action), some Brahmin lawgivers, as well as authors of the 
epics make exceptions. If one who is very old (beyond seventy), one who cannot 
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observe the rules of bodily purification (owing to extreme weakness ... ), one who is 
so ill that no medical help can be given, kills oneself by throwing oneself from a 
precipice or into a fire or water or by fasting, mourning should be observed for one 
for three days and sraddha may be performed for one. " ... he who is suffering from 
serious illness cannot live, or who is very old, who has no desire left for the 
pleasures of any of the senses and who has carried out his tasks, may bring about his 
death at pleasure by resorting to Mahaprasthana, by entering fire or water or by 
falling from a precipice. By so doing he incurs no sin and his death is far better than 
tapas, and one should not desire to live vainly without being able to perform the 
duties laid down by the Sastra" (Kane 1974 2 : 926). 
Thus it can be seen that Brahmin authors accepted the practice of euthanasia (if one 
understands the pre-modern meaning of euthanasia to be a good death, that is, 
self-willed and self-accomplished as a way to deal with the problems of extreme old 
age and severe illness). 
Modern Western supporters of euthanasia argue that euthanasia should be allowed 
when one is no longer able to live with dignity and comfort and when the quality of 
life is intolerably undermined. Brahmin jurists have also sought to define biological, 
psychological and social limits for the phenomenon. This was necessitated by the 
considerable overlap between the desire to escape the difficulties of extreme illness 
and old age and the desire to commit suicide proper. For, not only are they both 
forms of self-willed death, they also may be prompted by extreme emotion, 
depression or uncontrollable circumstance (Young 1989 : 94 ). 
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Brahmin jurists proposed a number of constraints, in order to distinguish euthanasia 
from suicide. For example, either the illness cannot be treated and death is 
imminent or the condition of the aged person is such that there is no desire for 
pleasure. When social duties are finished it is natural to withdraw from life. The 
Brahmin authors of the legal texts also give a religious dimension to the context of 
euthanasia, which helps to distinguish it from suicide. Euthanasia may be 
performed when a person no longer can perform the rites of bodily purification, 
which may occur in the case of extreme illness or extreme old age. Because these 
duties are dharmic and required, the non performance of them, would ordinarily 
create demerit/sin (papa). Since the incapacitated person cannot perform 
mandatory, religious duties because of circumstances beyond control, it was 
necessary to create an exception to the general rule regarding required acts. Non 
performance of obligatory action by an incapacitated person is to be considered 
dharmic. If non performance of obligatory rituals is considered dharmic for an 
incapacitated person, then euthanasia, which is defined, in part, by the situation of 
incapacitation, may also be considered dharmic. If euthanasia is dharmic, then in 
Brahmani.cal terms, it is righteous and religious. If euthanasia is dharmic and 
therefore religious it belongs to the category of mors voluntaria religiosa and is 
definitively different from suicide. This was the logic of the times (Young 1989 : 
95). 
One important implication of this legal scope for euthanasia is that responsibility for 
self-willed death rests ostensibly with the individual. The Law of Karma is the key 
to understanding the issue for individual responsibility. It is important for an 
individual to consider the various criteria for euthanasia and to determine whether 
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the desire to die is legitimately a case of euthanasia or whether it is a case of suicide. 
The distinction is crucial, for the latter generates demerit or sin (papa) and leads to 
hell. While it was an individual responsibility to determine whether the desire to die 
is legitimate or not, the leaders of society were responsible for the larger issue of 
whether any kind of mors voluntaria religiosa should be legitimated. The decision 
was made on the basis of the scriptures, the practice of the good people, and societal 
conditions. There was a recognition of how human lives interconnected to 
determine the social order. Practices such as euthanasia were viewed critically in 
social terms so that the welfare of society was taken into consideration. Once this 
had been established, then an individual was free to choose actions that may be 
optional but must be dharmic, in that they contribute to the general good of society 
or at least do not obstruct it (Young 1989 : 96). 
During the Classical Period under consideration, when much of the smrti literature 
is composed, two additional considerations arise for Brahmins reflecting on issues 
such as euthanasia: The principle of ahimsa or non-injury to any living thing, and the 
concept of Samkalpa or intention. The principle of ahimsa (non-injury) which is 
accepted by Brahmins in this period for their own code of conduct - as a reaction to 
criticisms made against them to their earlier endorsement of violence, especially 
sacrificial violence. Once Brahmins accept ahimsa, then how can they consider 
euthanasia to be dharmic when it involves killing the self and killing the self is an 
obvious denial of the principle of non-injury? Arvind Sharma has argued in his 
article "The Religious Justification of War in Hinduism" (in Young 1989 : 96) the 
pursuit and protection of dharma provides the religious justification of war. 
Whereas non-injury to living beings was a sadharana-dharma (duty which applies to 
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all human beings irrespective of stage and station or caste in life), Ksatriyas had 
protection of dharma also as a special duty of their caste, a duty which belonged to 
the category of vamasrama-dharma (duty according to caste and stage of life). 
According to Sharma in case of conflict between vamasrama-dharma and sadhrana-
dharma (as in the case of the Ksatriyas) vamasrama-dharma which includes both 
defensive and aggressive warfare when dharma is obstructed - generally had 
precedence in Hinduism. 
Since killing in this situation is considered dharmic one may assume that the same 
logic was operant in the Brahmanica/. understanding of euthanasia. Accordingly, 
euthanasia as self-willed death no doubt was viewed by Brahmins as dharmic given 
the new ideology of non-violence, because euthanasia supports dharma (by allowing 
an exception to the general rule of dharma in special circumstances). On the 
grounds of logic, it is likely that euthanasia was reconciled with the principle of 
ahimsa. (Arguing on similar lines, some Brahmins argued that ritual sacrifice was 
also a legitimate exception to ahimsa) (Young 1989: 96). 
Besides the principle of ahimsa, which helps to define the limits of the phenomenon 
of euthanasia, another important restraint imposed on mors voluntaria religiosa 
was the idea of decision or resolve (samkalpa ). The idea of decision or resolve is 
first given religious significance in the context of Vedic ritual. The declaration of 
intent to perform a sacrifice is formalized (samkalpa ). So important was the 
pronouncement of intent that the ensuing action and even goal was but the 
automatic sequel of the resolve (with the qualification that the action be done 
properly). The resolve or will, therefore, generates a power and this will-power, so 
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to speak defines destiny. Over time, the concept of samkalpa extended beyond the 
sacrificial context to other types of religious practices, mors voluntaria religiosa 
being included (Young 1989: 97). 
The Mahabharata makes reference to the fast to death by one who has gone to the 
end of the Veda (one who is enlightened) and who is twice-born (dvija : a Brahmin, 
Ksatriya or Vaisya). 
2.2.6 THE BUDDHIST VIEW AND THE CONCEPT OF LIFE AND DEATH (ca. 
624 - 544 B.C.E.) 
Buddhism, too, had its roots in a reaction to the violence of the day. Buddha, who 
grew up among his own kin (the Sakyas) whose tribal territory was on the periphery 
of the Gangetic plain, which witnessed the rise of Kingdoms - was shocked when he 
first encountered the political violence by the Ksatriyas and the sacrificial violence 
by the Brahmins of the plains. Like the Jainas, Buddha gave a moralistic 
interpretation to non-violence, but sought a Middle Path. It was Buddha in 
particular, who promoted his message by castigating the sacrificial system of 
Brahmins. Moreover, he continually sought ways to solve disputes non-violently and 
to encourage warriors to lay down their arms and take up occupations that would 
not involve killing (Sinha 1986: 25 - 26 in Young 1989: 89). 
Buddha condemns suicide in no uncertain terms (self-willed death). In the Parajika, 
Buddha says: "A monk who preaches suicide, who tells man: "Do away with this 
wretched life, full of suffering and sin; death is better", in fact preaches murder, is a 
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murderer, is no longer a monk" (De la Vallee Poussin 1922 : 125). Because this 
remark is addressed to monks, one can conclude that Buddha also excludes any 
form of religious self-willed death and warns against pessimism even in the midst of 
the religious path. Since one of Buddhas five precepts is not to kill any living thing 
(ahimsa) the prohibition on suicide follows logically. Similarly, the idea of 
self-willed death at the time when one's end is near is discouraged, if not altogether 
prohibited. Buddha, on the contrary, encourages individuals to seek enlightenment 
as early as possible. If suffering becomes overwhelming, one may not be able to 
have the right mindfulness so necessary to realize the Four Noble Truths. Disciples 
of Buddha also contemplated suicide, when suffering was prolonged and enlighten-
ment was not forthcoming. Monks also contemplated suicide when they suffered 
from severe illness. 
In Samyutta IIl.123, (in Young 1989 : 90) it is told how Vakkali, who is ill and 
suffering from great pain, is comforted by Buddha. Buddha tells him that his death 
will be auspicious. Then the Monk utters one final time the profession of faith and 
kills himself by the sword. It is strange that Buddha condoned this act (because he 
believed in the philosophy of ahimsa) but he must have considered this case an 
exception (given his compassion and the severity of the disease). Even though 
Buddha considered the experience of suffering as potentially redemptive, he was 
known to be a good physician. Probably because of this pragmatic orientation, he 
was willing to entertain euthanasia in exceptional circumstances. His position on 
euthanasia was also made possible because life has instrumental value in his 
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teachings; he did not have to worry about the sanctity of life. Buddha viewed 
self-willed death as a kind of extremism and preferred to substitute meditation on 
death as the means to achieve omniscience and omnipotence. 
2.2.7 THE JAINA PHILOSOPHY OF LIFE AND DEATH (ca. 527 B.C.E.) 
Both Jainism and Buddhism share the premise of samsara and liberation. Samsara 
is bondage, and bondage is suffering, while enlightenment is transcendence of the 
human condition. As an early ascetic movement, Jainism makes a categorical 
imperative out of non-violence, however, the idea takes on moralistic overtones. 
And yet the Jaina idea of liberation as radical autonomy (Kaivalya) and the custom 
of fasting to death (sallekhana) remain close to the ideas of: 1) asceticism as 
withdrawal from violence, and 2) omnipotence as the ability to kill the self (Young 
1989: 88). 
Jainism is indeed the first religion to formalize and legitimatize the practice of mors 
voluntaria heroica, which was in vogue in the warrior and ascetic circles - as a kind 
of mors voluntaria religiosa. Jainism also seems to be the first Indian religion to 
associate mors voluntaria religiosa with euthanasia as a form of self-willed death at 
the time of "debilitating" old age or severe illness. 
The practice of sallekhana is described in the Acaranga. It is said that the wise 
should know that the time for death has come. If one falls sick in the midst of the 
fast, one should take food until well. One should not long for life and death. One 
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should die by the elimination of food. One should lie on the ground, rejoice in pain, 
and even if animals feed on one's flesh, one should not kill them, nor stir from the 
position (Acaranga 1.7.8. 1 - 10; Jacobi 1884, 74 - 76 in Young 1989: 88). 
However, a striking feature of the Jaina religion is not only that asceticism and 
mortification of the flesh have been taken to the ultimate conclusion but a religion 
which has, as a cardinal doctrine ahimsa or non-injury to any living creature -
including never killing an insect intentionally or unintentionally yet has an ideal: 
religious self-willed death. The rationale is that the virtually liberated person is 
beyond the opposition of life and death. The body will be eliminated anyway when 
the karmas are used up. A cognizance of imminent death together with perfect 
control and a peaceful means, which is gradual and mindful, is veritably the good 
death. That the almost enlightened one maintains ahimsa or non-injury to the very 
end or wild animals that eat away the flesh is considered a fulfillment of the 
religious code. Such was the attempt to reconcile the apparent contradiction 
between self-willed death and ahimsa given the internal logic of the religion. Thus, 
it may be argued that Jainism tried to harness the power of violent death through 
yogic control and fasting as a means to conquer totally death and samsara. 
More specifically, fasting to death (sallekhana) was given a religious meaning by 
understanding it to be the means of removing those karmas that remain even after 
ascetic purification, especially those that define the existence of the body itself or 
bondage. Sallekhana was to be done in a religious framework by monks and nuns 
and was to be controlled by a number of constraints, such as years of preparatory 
purification, meditation leading to true knowledge, and timing toward the end of 
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life. By associating the fast to death with salvation and governing the practice 
through certain constraints, sallekhana was distinguished from both mors voluntaria 
heroica and suicide proper. 
The purpose of sallekhana was ostensibly to eliminate the body for the purpose of 
eliminating bondage toward the end of the natural life span. Some monastics 
resorted to the practice earlier in life when faced by a seemingly incurable disease, 
even though the merits of doing so were debated in the early tradition. It was 
thought that the sick could not sustain the austerities involved in the controlled 
elimination of food (Young 1989 : 88 - 89). 
2.2.8 RELIGIOUS, SELF-WILLED DEATH IN HINDU SMRTITEXI'S (ca. 600 
B.C.E. • 500 C.E.) 
Suicide was severely condemned during this period. 
2.2.8.1 DHARMA SASTRAS 
The writers of the Dharmasastra generally condemn suicide and those who 
committed suicide were regarded as sinners. According to the Parasara IV. 1 - 2) if 
a man or woman were to hang himself or herself through extreme pride or extreme 
rage, through affliction or fear, he or she would fall into hell for sixty thousand 
years. No water is to be offered for the benefit of the souls of those who kill 
themselves. It was also declared that those who committed suicide did not reach 
70 
blissful worlds. No death rites should be performed for those who killed themselves 
(Kane 1974, 2: 924). The above discussion shows that a phenomenon of suicide was 
prevalent in the society at the time. 
The Brahmanical desire to live out the natural life span is most apparent in the 
theory of the four asramas which is expounded in the Dharmasastras. The idea of 
four distinct stages of life is grafted onto the ancient Vedic idea of the long good life. 
The ideal of a hundred years remains presumably to allow time for the stages of 
student-ship (Brahmacarya ), householdership (grhastha ), retirement to the forest 
(vanaprastha) and wandering alone (sannyasa). The old Vedic values of prosperity 
and progeny are incorporated into the stage of being a householder. The value of 
longevity is promoted in the concept of the full allotment of time needed to 
accomplish all goals. The prescriptions of the Aywvedic or medical texts are to be 
followed to ensure a long, healthy life (mentally as well as physically, through proper 
diet, exercise and discipline). The ideal of vanaprastha is an acknowledgement of 
the ascetics customary withdrawal to the forest and the Ksatriya custom of with-
drawal to provide for a peaceful succession. Moksa (or heaven) is incorporated as a 
goal for the last two stages of life (Young 1989 : 103). 
Despite Brahmanical reluctance to endorse self-willed death by a yogi,, in later times 
figures such as Jnanadeva (1275 - 96 C.E.; a Marathi Brahmin) buried themselves 
alive on attaining liberation. 
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Jnanadeva, according to tradition, voluntarily ended his life in his twenties along 
with his two brothers and sister. They felt "they had accomplished their mission in 
life" (Walker 1968 : 2 : 505 in Young 1989 : 103). Another case is that of the 
Kashmiri Abhinavagupta (10th - 11th century) (Pandey, 1963, 23 - 25). It is said 
that by the time Abhinavagupta started to write his Isvara Pratyabhijna Vivrti 
Vimarsini, he had attained liberation (jivanmukta ). The last scene of his earthly 
existence, upon the completion of his life's work, involved walking with twelve 
hundred disciples into the Bhairava Cave never to be seen again. Pandey visited 
this cave and discovered that one area was large enough to accommodate forty to 
fifty people. He concludes that it is plausible that Abhinvagupta went into the cave 
with some followers to take samadhi, "a natural termination of the earthly life of a 
person like Abhinvagupta" (Pandey 1963 : 25). 
2.2.8.2 BHAGAVAD-GITA 
The Bhagavad-Gita (17.6) however disapproves of starving of the body. Those who 
mindlessly starve the composite of elements which is situated in the body, know 
them to be of demonic resolve (Sivananda 1980: 183). 
While the Bhagavad-Gita does not address the issue of self-willed death directly, it 
does place great importance on one's thought at the time of death determining one's 
future state: 
Antakale ca mameva smaranmuktva kalevaram 
yah prayati sa madbhavam yati nastyatra samsayah 
(Gita 8.5; Sivananda 1980: 102). 
72 
And at the time of death, whoever leaves the body remembering me alone, he 
attains my being. There is no doubt about this. 
Yamyam vapi smaranbhavam tyajatyante kalevaram 
tamtamevaiti kaunteya sada tadbhavabhavitah 
(Gita 8.6; Sivananda 1980 : 102). 
Or also whatever state of being he thinks of when he gives up the body at the end, 
that very state he obtains, 0 Kaunteya, always becoming that being. 
The first verse suggests that meditation on God at the hour of death will lead to 
salvation. The second verse indicates that other thoughts will lead to rebirth, 
whether in lower heaven, or earth, or in hell. Full consciousness at the moment of 
death is extremely important. It is pivotal to one's destiny and may even hold the 
key to salvation. Because the Gita takes a stand against premature renunciation of 
action and severe asceticism leading to self-willed death, it substitutes a "mere 
thought" for the practice of self-willed death. In short, what one thinks at the 
moment of death, one becomes or attains (Young 1989 : 100). 
This thought, which accomplishes what is desired as samkalpa does become an 
attractive solution to maintain the natural life span. A thought is much easier than 
death and such substitution helps the Brahmins to compete with the ideology of 
self-willed death with its promise of attaining the ultimate goal. This idea became 
very popular in the bhakti tradition. One desired not only to think of God at the 
moment of death, but also to be at a holy place and to die there. 
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2.2.8.3 PURANAS 
During the Purani.c period suicide was permissible at sacred places or tirthas. The 
concept of tirtha is fully developed in the Hindu epics Dharmasastras, Puranas, and 
Agamas. Tirtha is associated with: 1) any water which is sacred by definition: 
rivers, lakes, falls, artificial tanks, and by extension any powerful feature of the 
landscape; 2) cross-roads and fords; 3) the place where the gods have crossed 
over to be present in this realm, that is, the temple; 4) the place to conquer or 
cross-over the daily problems of life, therefore the place to request boons from the 
deities to insure prosperity, posterity, and longevity; 5) the place to cross from one 
phase of life to another, that is, a place to perform the rites of passage (samskara); 
6) the place to cross from one life to the next, for example, the desire to die on the 
banks of the Ganga or at the tirtha or to perform the sraddha ceremonies there; 7) 
the place to cross to another loka, that is because of an excess of one's good merit 
(punya) a temporary, "vacation" in the paradise of heaven (svarga) or because of 
one's demerit (papa) a temporary "imprisonment" in hell (naraka ); and 8) the place 
to cross to liberation (moksa) (Sastri 1982: 271). 
Since tirtha is a place to cross over, it becomes a place for religious self-willed death. 
The Smrti literature of the Puranas and the Sthala-puranas eulogize the fame of holy 
places and mors voluntaria religiosa by praising how death there ensures heaven 
(Young 1983: 63 in Young 1989: 105). 
Ya gatiryogayuktasya samnyastasya manisinah 
Sa gatistyajatah pranan gangayamunasangame 
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akamo va sakamo va gangayam yo vipadyate 
sa mrto jayate svarge narakam ca na pasyati 
(Kurmapurana, 1.37.16.39; Deshpande 1990: 1495; Shastri 1982: 271). 
The goal which is obtained by the wise one - renounced immersed in meditation -
the same goal can be achieved by one who has abandoned life at the confluence of 
the [river] Ganga and Yamuna. Whoever perishes in the Ganga with desire or 
without desire conquers death in heaven and does not see hell. 
Jnanato jnanato vapi kamato pi va 
gangayam ca srto martyah svargam moksam ca vindati 
(Padmapurana srsti 60.65; Deshpande 1989 : 804 ). 
[Whether] Knowingly or even unknowingly, intentionally or even unintentionally, a 
mortal, having gone [to death] in the Ganga obtains Heaven and moksa. 
Srisaile santyajed deham brahmano dagdhakilbisah 
mucyate natra sandeho hyavimukte yatha subham 
(Shastri 1982 : 486). 
A Brahmin whose sins have been destroyed should abandon the body at Srisailam. 
Indeed, he is freed from the body here as atAvimukta (Benaras); there is no doubt 
about it. 
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It seems that the tirtha called Prayaga, situated at the confluence of the great 
Y amuna and Ganga rivers, was the ideal place for death by plunging into the sacred 
waters. Death here guaranteed immediate attainment of heaven. Similarly, the 
Ganga and Varanasi (Benaras) as the sacred river and holy city par excellence 
became places for such activity. The idea spread to other holy places, for the 
Sthala-puranas advertised the fruit (phala) of pilgrimage (tirthayatra) and how easy 
heaven or easy moksa was available to all (Deshpande 1990: 2631). 
2.2.8.4 BUDDHISM (NEW DEVELOPMENTS) 
There were new developments in Buddhism, regarding the practice of euthanasia. 
In the Kathavatthu 1.2 there is recorded the story of Godhika who no longer has the 
concentration to meditate on account of a painful disease. When he thought of 
killing himself by the sword, Mara, who represents the antithesis of Buddha and 
symbolises evil in the Pali Canon, approaches Buddha and says: 
"Your disciple wants to die; he has resolved to die. Prevent him. How could one of 
your disciples die when he is not yet an arhat?" But as it is explained in the 
Abhidharmakosavyakhya, Godhika reached arhatship just after he began cutting his 
throat. It is said: Those who take the sword are without regard for life; they achieve 
insight (vipassana) and reach ni1Vana. "Thus act the strong ones (dhira) they desire 
not life; having removed thirst and the root of thirst (that is, ignorance), Godhika is 
at rest" (De La Vallee Poussin 1922 : 26). The last passage suggests that the 
practice of religious, self-willed death is being accepted into the Buddhist milieu. 
76 
In Mahayana Buddhism between the 2nd and 6th centuries C.E. a new ideal type is 
popularised: the bodhisattva who vows not to have final enlightenment until all 
sentient creatures are saved. The bodhisattva dedicates his life to helping others. 
The supreme form of gift is none other than self-sacrifice, even a gift of his body to 
feed a starving animal who is a sentient creature who must be helped and ultimately 
saved. Such accounts found in the Jataka stories and Mahayana texts must have 
inspired Buddhist aspirants along the bodhisattva path to sacrifice themselves in 
imitation of the bodhisattva described in the texts (Young 1989 : 106). 
2.2.8.S MANU-SMRTI 
According to Manu (6.49), a mark of one who has attained liberation is that he is 
indifferent to everything: "Let him not desire to die, let him not desire to live; let 
him wait for [his appointed] time, as a servant [waits] for the payment of his wages" 
(Buhler 1984 : 207). But Manu (6. 31 - 32) says that the ascetic may die "fully 
determined and going straight on, in a north easterly direction, subsisting on water 
and air, until his body sinks to rest. A Brahmana, having eliminated his body by one 
of those modes practised by the great sages, is exalted in the world of Brahman, free 
from sorrow and fear" (Buhler 1984: 204). 
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According to Young (1989) the statements of Manu appear on the surface to be 
contradictory. On the one hand, the liberated one (jivanmukta) is to wait for his 
appointed time of death. On the other hand, he may will his death freely on one of 
the modes practised by the sages. It is possible to reconcile these two statements by 
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suggesting that Manu, in general, does not want the jivanmukta to terminate his life 
prematurely. In other words, self-willed death should ideally occur in old age when 
the natural time of death is approaching. 
Manu (6. 31) does allow a forest hermit suffering from incurable disease and unable 
to perform the duties of his order to start on the Great Journey (Mahaprastha-
nagamana: walking until death overcomes) (Young 1989: 101). 
2.2.9 PHILOSOPHICAL SYSTEMS (ca.100 B.C.E. -100 C.E.) 
2.2.9.1 PATANJALI (THE SAMKHYA SYSTEM) 
Patanja/.i (Yoga Sutras 3.21 in Young 1989 : 101) says that by control (samyama, 
inclusive of the last three limbs of yoga) over karma that is fast-in-fruition 
(sopakrama) and slow (nirupakrama) comes knowledge of death (aparantajnana). 
In other words the yogi understands karma to be of two kinds. With reference to the 
past karma or prarabdha, which will come to fruition in this life, he can have power 
over it through samyama. One of his powers, (vibhuti siddhi) is the ability to know, 
and more importantly, to determine the time of death. Accordingly, one of the eight 
siddhas enumerated by Patanja/.i is prakamya or the power of an irresistible will 
which enables one to obtain anything simply by desiring it. Another power is isitva 
(sovereignity) by which one can rule "over all things and enjoy unrivalled glory 
becoming like a God, and even create and destroy creatures, past, present and 
future" {Walker 1968 2 : 349 in Young 1989 : 102). A yogi can will to live or to 
detach his subtle body from his physical body. Consequently, he can temporarily 
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disappear or create the outward appearance of death and change bodies. The idea 
that a yogi, can know or determine the time of death suggests that he also has the 
power to voluntarily transmigrate. These siddhis, however, are to be distinguished 
from those powers that will put an end to the slow (nirupakrama) karmas, which will 
come to fruition only in future lives. Patanjali does not address directly the question 
of the self-willed death of the enlightened one, yet his discussion of samyama and 
the siddhis provides scope for extending the discussion to the context of one who is 
enlightened. For, in the final life when no slow karmas remain, ajivanmukta should 
be able to know or determine the time of death. He creates no new karmas and, as 
before, has power over the fast-moving (sopakrama) karmas. Consequently, he is 
able to determine the time of death. By knowing the time of death, he can 
determine death. And by determining death, he may make sure that the body is 
eliminated at the appropriate moment; this logic was derived by Patanjali (Prasada 
1978 : 221 - 222). 
In the case of a yogi, the idea of self-willed death generated considerable debate 
among Brahmin thinkers. They often disagreed regarding legitimation of this form 
of mors voluntaria religiosa. The idea that the enlightened one (jivanmukta) is 
passionless builds on the logic that the jivan-mukta is indifferent to life and death, 
either because there is no reason to will death or there is no reason not to will 
death. Theoretically, one is totally indifferent to the body, after enlightenment and 
indifferent to whether one lives or dies. Accordingly, the yogi, may or may not will 
death. A structural opposition develops between the idea of suicide as done by an 
individual out of passion and the self-willed death by an enlightened one who is 
completely beyond passion. Such a structural opposition creates firm boundaries to 
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the phenomenon of self-willed death by the ascetic. This, however, was not the case, 
for there was also the alternative view that there could be no final enlightenment 
until there was elimination of the karmas that defined the physical existence of the 
body. The body, in other words, was a constant reminder that final enlightment had 
not yet been achieved. A yogi, therefore, may choose to eliminate the body through 
self-willed death in order to attain enlightenment. 
There may have been several reasons for Brahmanical reluctance to endorse self-
willed death by a yogi. One of them was a desire to live out the natural life-span 
(hundred years), as advocated in the Rig Veda. Because a number of Brahmins may 
have become ascetics and were attracted to the idea of self-willed death, Brahmin 
thinkers may have been reluctant to endorse this form of mors voluntaria religiosa. 
Unlike the case of euthanasia - where extreme human suffering may be involved or 
the individual was virtually at the end of the natural life-span the self-willed death of 
an ascetic may have appeared to others as robbing life at its prime. If Brahmins and 
others were attracted to asceticism in early or middle age, their self-willed death 
may have been perceived as a loss for society, not to mention the families involved. 
Perhaps the practice of self-willed death was abused in that it became an easy way 
to attain enlightenment and bypassed years of asceticism and meditation. 
2.2.9.2 MIMAMSA 
According to Mimamsa, the idea of command (vidhi) is related to apwva or 
capability that always comes into existence as a result of action. If it is to be 
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understood that public declaration of intent (samkalpa) is similar to a command 
(vidhi) in that it is also viewed as a source of law, because samkalpa always relates to 
action and every action has productive force (bhavana) this action produces the 
capability (yogyata) in the agent to hold as his own the fruit declared by law as of 
that action. This capability which was absent before the action and has come into 
existence only as the result of that action is known as ''Apwva" in Mimamsa. This 
apwva rests in the agent of the action even after the overt act has perished, and 
continues to exist till the fruit of the action is realised .... This apurva rests in the 
agent, for the act also rests in him" (Deshpande 1971 : 154 in Young 1989 : 97). 
[One must act according to law not to obtain rewards but] "because my act will make 
me capable (adhikrta) for artha i.e. what is conducive to good or welfare. Thus the 
ultimate sanction of law is "Moral". The "codana" determines the validity, while 
"artha" determines the value of law (dharma). This is the nature of apurva according 
to the Mimamsa, which is the ultimate sanction of the rule of Dharma ( codana 
punarasambhah) (2.15). The rules of law exist because this apurva exists .... Every 
right or claim has to come into being as a result of duty fulfilled .... Hence it is, that 
Mimamsa juris prudence starts with the analysis of duty and not of right. 
To will death is so powerful that it can burn up bad karma and thereby expiate sin. 
It can produce good karma and thereby direct destiny, including a visit to heaven. 
And it can also influence the course of destiny by 1) eliminating all karmas that 
cause bondage thereby "triggering" salvation or 2) appealing to the Supreme Deity's 
grace to recognize this supreme self-sacrifice. Given the promise of these effects, 
one understands the importance of the intention (samkalpa ), which is so intimately 
related to the goal (artha) through the intervening idea of will power. This idea of 
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formal (and publicly announced) intention and the resultant will power helps to 
separate the phenomenon of mors voluntaria religiosa from suicide, done usually in 
private out of passion, depression, and emotional disturbance. 
2.2.9.3 SANKARA (ADVAITA) 
Sankara (188 - 838 C.E.) (in Young 1989: 102) for example argues, that one must 
live out one's life to allow the karmas to come to fruition. He implies that the 
moment of natural death signals the moment when there are no more karmas that 
create bondage. 
"We should understand that right knowledge is the cause which renders all actions 
impotent". But the action by which this body has been brought into existence will 
come as an end only when their effects will have been fully worked out; for, those 
actions have already commenced their effects. Thus wisdom can destroy only such 
actions as have not yet begun to produce their effects, whether they are actions done 
in this birth before the rise of knowledge and along with knowledge, or those done 
in the many previous births. (Samkaras commentary on Bhagavad Gita 4.31; Sastri 
1972 : 150 in Young 1989 : 102). 
2.2.10 JAINISM 
Jainism extended sallekhana to the laity, without the intermediary stage of 
mendicancy. Four different contexts for the fast to death are enumerated in the 
Jaina law books: 1) unavoidable calamity (upasarga), which includes captivity by an 
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enemy [and no doubt derives from the context of heroica mors voluntaria]; 2) 
great famine (durbhiksa); 3) old age (jara), especially when problems of disease, 
weakness, and senility start; and 4) severe illness (nihpratikararuja). There is a 
close association between religious, self-willed death and old age and severe disease 
in relation to euthanasia. 
In the Jaina context of euthanasia, sallekhana is carefully regulated. One should 
obtain forgiveness and give forgiveness. One is to make a formal vow 
(mahavratamarana) after discussing all sins with the preceptor. Once the vow is 
taken, the attention is to be focused on scripture. Meditation on the real nature of 
the self is to be done while one abstains gradually from food and water. At the very 
end, just before the soul departs from the body, the mantra namokar is to be 
repeated. The necessary involvement of the guru and the making of a formal vow by 
the lay person who is extremely ill is a change from ancient times when a Jaina 
mendicant could start the fast on his or her own. 
Between the 6th century B.C.E. and 10th century C.E. there was increasing 
prohibition against suicide at the same time that there was popularization of 
religious, self-willed death. This development affected Hinduism, Buddhism, and 
Jainism. 
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2.2.11 CRITICISMS OF RELIGIOUS, SELF-WILLED DEATH FROM THE lOTH 
CENTURY C.E. 
During this period to commit suicide by heroic means became fashion. Therefore 
lawgivers began to view death in such manner in a new light. The Hindu lawgiver, 
Gautama, had already opined "that no mourning need be observed for those who 
wilfully meet death by fasting or by cutting themselves off with a weapon, or by fire 
or poison or water or by hanging or by falling from a precipice" (Kane 1974 2 : 926). 
Since no sraddha ceremonies or mourning was to be done for someone who 
committed suicide proper, one may assume that Gautama classified the above ways 
of death which may also be means of mors voluntaria religiosa, as suicide. 
While there were attempts to bar religious, voluntary death on the basis of sruti, it 
was only in texts describing the Kalivarjyas (dated by Kane from the 10th century, 
C.E.) that one finds systematic prohibition of the practice. The Kalivarjyas are 
actions once authorized in sruti or smrti, which are discarded by the consensus of the 
good people in the Kali Age in order to guard people from the loss of dharma. In 
essence, they become a means to instigate reform. Significantly Mahaprasthana, or 
going on the Great Journey by an ascetic suffering from an incurable disease, and 
the religious voluntary death of very old people by falling into a fire or from a 
precipice (Kane 1974 : 3 : 939, 958 - 959; Narasimhan 1965 : 207) are now 
prohibited. The Suddhitattva holds the view that religious death is allowed in the 
Kaliyuga only to Sudras. Others, for example, Nilakantha in his commentary on the 
Mahabharata, argues that VanapaJVa 85.83 refers to natural death at Prayoga, not 
self-willed death (Young 1989 : 109). The Tirthaprakasa forbids only Brahmins from 
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performing religious death there. So strong is the debate over religious, voluntary 
death that those who do not forbid such death nonetheless place increasing 
restrictions on the practice. Kane notes that the Tristhalisetu forbids the act by one 
who must support his old parents or young wife and children or by a woman who is 
pregnant, has young children or has not received the permission of her husband 
(Kane 1974 4 : 609). 
2.2.12 ABUSE OF EUTHANASIA 
It seems as if the Kalivarjya prohibitions and the underlying debate point to a 
situation of abuse. Thus the question arises, was euthanasia prohibited simply 
because of its association with mors voluntaria religiosa or was it also subject to 
abuse. While euthanasia was based on an open option by the individual concerned 
outside pressures cannot be ruled out completely. Take for example, the religious 
idea of withdrawing to the forest (vanaprastha). Such withdrawal was ostensibly to 
allow a man and perhaps his wife to begin the quest for liberation proper after their 
royal or family duties were finished. But it may also be possible that they may have 
faced pressures from the family to leave home and delegate their authority and 
financial resources to the younger generation. Such social pressure with its political 
and economic dimension may have led to a sense of abandonment, rejection, and 
pessimism on the part of the elderly. This in turn, may have led to walking into fire 
or jumping from a cliff, more as a form of suicide than an act to attain the supreme 
goal. It is possible, then, that euthanasia was abused (Young 1989 : 109). Alberuni 
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observed (11th century C.E.) the Hindu custom of religious, voluntary death 
including euthanasia and noted that, despite a special law prohibiting Brahmins and 
Ksatriyas from the practice it was still done. 
"Note as regards the right of the body of the living, the Hindus would not think of 
burning it save in the case of a widow who chooses to follow her husband, or in the 
case of those who are tired of their life, who are distressed over some incurable 
disease of their body, some irremovable bodily defect, or old age and infirmity. This 
however, no man of distinction does, but only Vaeyas and Sudras, especially at those 
times which are prized as the most suitable for a man to acquire in them, for a 
future repetition of life, a better form and condition than that in which he happens 
to have been born and to live. Burning oneself is forbidden to Brahmans and 
Ksatriyas by a special law. Therefore these, if they want to kill themselves do so at 
the time of an eclipse in some other manner, or they hire somebody to drown them 
in the Ganges; keeping them under water till they are dead" (Sachau 1983 : 170 -
171). 
Despite the extended debate and the Kalivarjya prohibitions, the custom of dying at 
a tirtha had such textual support in the smrtis and was so supported by popular 
imagination that it proved difficult to eliminate. The debate reopened with the 
vociferous critiques of the Christian missionaries. Abbe J.A. Dubois, writing at the 
end of the 19th century offered this comment: "There are still fanatics to be found 
who solemnly bind themselves to commit suicide under the conviction that by the 
performance of the mad act they will ensure for themselves the immediate 
enjoyment of supreme blessedness" (Dubois 1959 : 521). 
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2.2.13 SAT/ 
The word sati literally means a "good woman" but conventionally refers to the act of 
sati, self-immolation of a woman on the funeral pyre of her husband or a woman 
who performs the act. Sati may be traced to a form of mors voluntaria heroica in 
the warrior circles in the Gangetic plain. The women who associated with warriors 
willed their death to avoid rape, capture, or death, especially when their husbands 
were captured or killed in battle. Gradually the practice extended beyond Ksatriya 
circles. By the time of the Mitaksara (14th century C.E. or later), sati was promoted 
as the ideal for all women. Such an act was considered dharmic because a woman is 
always "to follow her husband". Thus sati is the act of a woman joining the 
cremation of her husband. Moreover her action is considered religious, not suicidal, 
nor motivated by a desire to escape the plight of the inauspicious widow for a 
number of reasons. The result of her action is said to secure heaven immediately 
for herself and her husband. The orientation of a sati may be termed patiyoga, 
discipline for and union with (yoga) the husband/god (pati). For these reasons, it 
may be argued that sati belongs to the category of religious self-willed death. By the 
medieval period, it was considered, a "good death", even the ideal death, for a 
Hindu woman (Young 1989: 111). 
There were some, however, who opposed the practice of sati. Aspects of the debate 
over sati emerge in Vijnanesvaras commentary called the Mitaksara, on the 
Yajnavalkya Smrti. There were also objections to Sati. One objection raised is that 
the rule of sati does not apply to Brahmin widows. Another objection mentioned is 
that suicide is prohibited for both women and men because it involves "inordinate 
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love of enjoying heaven" which transgresses a prohibitory rule of law (which forbids 
suicide) (Vulyarnava 1974 : 168 in Young 1989 : 111). Finally, the objection is 
raised that one who wishes moksa should not die before the end of natural life, for 
the sake of attaining heaven, which is a temporary pleasure. 
2.2.14 CONCLUSION 
Mors voluntaria religiosa, over the years led to abuse. People committed suicide 
not because of any religious motive but as an easy way out of some suffering, e.g. 
sati, whereby a widow preferred to die on the hu~band's funeral pyre, rather than 
being abused or condemned by family members, which very often did happen in 
India. Even those in the V anaprastha Asrama, did not go to the forest of their own 
accord. Some did go because of religious reasons, others could have been pressured 
by family members, who were keen to take over their financial resources. 
In some cases although there were attempts to prevent abuse, abuse did occur. 
Accordingly euthanasia became a social issue and topic for debate. 
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2.3 ABORTION 
At present, the nature and moral status of the human unborn, considered in various 
contexts (genetic research, in vitro fertilization, abortion, surrogate motherhood) 
form a topic of intense discussion in the Western world. In India, however, these 
issues, for the most part are still below the surface. Abortion is to be understood as 
the deliberate effecting of a miscarriage, a deliberate termination of pregnancy. 
Abortion is to be distinguished from involuntary miscarriage. 
The Sanskrit terms for abortion and involuntary miscarriage are garbha, bhruna, 
hatya vadha. The former terms assume that a morally reprehensible killing (hatya) 
has taken place, rather than an ethically neutral evacuation, dislodging or excision. 
However the standard Sanskrit words for miscarriage refer simply to a falling or 
emission of the embryo (Lipner 1989 : 42). 
2.3.1 ABORTION: MORAL EVALUATION IN SRUTI 
The earlierst Sruti texts attest that the embryo in the womb deserves protection and 
that abortion is a morally intolerable act. In the Rg. Samhita (which embodies some 
of the earliest recorded canonical scriptures of the Hindus, dating possibly to before 
1200 B.C.E.) the deity Vzsnu is referred to as "protector of the child to be": (Rg. 
Samhita VII.36.9 in Lipner 1989 : 43; 62; O'Flaherty 1983 : 290 - 292). Pre-natal 
samskaras were performed for the well-being of the embryo or the developing foetus 
(Pandey 1969 : 49). The implication here is clearly that the embryo requires special 
protection because of its moral inviolability and physical vulnerability; this 
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protection is sought from Visnu who, from Vedic times to the present, has always 
been regarded as the special preserver of life and order. The Caraka Samhita, a 
classical medical text, indicates that Rg. Samhita X.184.1 was used to invoke Visnu 
in the ceremonies prior to conception. 
The Atharva Veda, too, expresses the same attitude towards the unborn child, with 
the added implication that abortion counts amongst the most heinous crimes. In 
VI.113.2 and VI.113.3 of the Atharva Veda one sees the horror of abortion. "Enter 
thou into the rays, into smoke, 0 Sin. Begone into the vapours and into the mists. 
Be lost in the foam of the rivers. While thou, 0 Pusan, wipe off (our misdeeds) on 
the slayer of the embryo (bhrunaghni)" (Bloomfield 1897 : 165). The Satapatha 
Brahmana (which belongs to a period after that of the Vedic hymns) invokes what is 
obviously the general view on human abortion when it condemns those who 
consume beef: "Such people have a bad reputation of the kind - He's extracted the 
embryo from the mother, He's an evil doer" (Lipner 1989 : 43 - 44 ). 
Even the Upanisads disapprove of abortion. The Brhadaranyaka Upanisad one of 
the oldest Upanisads 8 - 9th century B.C.E.) notes: "Here the father is no longer a 
father, the mother no longer a mother, the (post-mortem) worlds are no longer such 
worlds, the gods no longer gods, the Vedas no longer Vedas. The thief is no longer a 
thief, the slayer of the embryo (bhrunaha) no longer a slayer of the embryo, the 
Candala and the Paulkasa are no longer such nor are the Monk and the ascetic. 
Both merit and demerit cease to have effect, for then one has crossed over every 
concern of the heart" (IV.3.22 Radhakrishnan 1953 : 263). The Upanisad is 
referring to a state of awareness in which the most significant worldly relationships 
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and designations for the Hindu cease to have meaning. The slayer of the embryo 
(bhrunaha), a contrast to the most idealised members of society (the monk and the 
ascetic) is relegated to a position among the vilest, viz., the thief (especially the 
culprit who steals from a Brahmin) and the most contaminating outcasts. In other 
words abortion violates dharma the socio-religious order in a serious way. This 
implies that the living embryo enjoyed a special moral status in the eyes of the 
Hindu and was specially deserving of protection and respect. Indra in III.1 of 
Kausitald Upanisad says, "For him who knows me, his (post-mortem) world is not 
lost on account of any action not by stealing nor by abortion, nor by killing one's 
mother or father ... " (Radhakrishnan 1953 : 774). Here the text implicitly stresses 
that abortion (bhrunahatya) is a reprehenssible killing, for it is ranked alongside 
particularly heinous forms of murder. 
From the above, one can deduce that abortion from the earliest of times was 
regarded as an act of horror and viewed with the greatest of contempt. 
2.3.2 THE MORAL EVALUATION OF ABORTION IN THE SMRTI 
The Vzsnudharmasutra or Law Book of Visnu protects the pregnant woman (and 
especially the embryo) by equating the killing of either with one of the most serious 
offences a Hindu could commit, viz., the killing of a Brahmin. In Vzsnudharmasutra 
(Law Book of Visnu) XXXVl.1 reads: "Killing a ksatriya or a vaisya engaged in 
sacrifice, a menstruating woman, a pregnant woman ... (and) ... the embryo (even) of 
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a stranger ... is tantamount to killing a Brahmin" (Lipner 1989 : 45). The penance of 
killing a pregnant woman unintentionally is the same as that of unintentionally 
killing a Brahmin. 
In the same text, it is laid down that "the ferry-man or toll official who collects from 
a student (engaged in sacred study), a forest dweller (who has renounced worldly 
life), a religious mendicant, a pregnant woman, and one on pilgrimage (is to be 
fined) (Visnudharmasutra V.132 in Lipner 1989 : 64). The Mahabharata 
(XIIl.107.50 in Lipner 1989: 45; 64) also shows respect and protection of pregnant 
women in her delicate condition should be treated like a vessel brimful of oil 
(Sharma 1981 : 469). From these examples, the idea emerges that for the Hindus, 
pregnancy was a very special state and that the unborn had a moral status meriting 
protection. Therefore Hindu law givers legislated according to circumstances. The 
embryo of a caste Hindu (especially of a Brahmin) was more deserving of protection 
than the embryo of a slave, in the same way as the life of a virtuous person was 
deemed more valuable, for one reason or another, than the life of a rogue. Even in 
the case of a slave, abortion was regarded as punishable. In short abortion was an 
immoral act for all irrespective of one's standing in society. 
2.3.3 THE MAHABHARATA CONDEMNS ABORTION 
Abortion is regarded as an instance of extreme transgression. There are four 
contexts in the Mahabharata (Mbh) in which abortion is condemned. The Mbh 
(XII.86.26) says: 
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1. "If a king is intent upon the code of the (battle-field) but slays an envoy who 
speaks as he has been commanded - his ancestors incur (the crime of) 
abortion. 
2. Abortion is referred to indicate the great importance in which legitimate 
procreation was held in society of the day (towards the chief end of begetting 
a son, for weighing economic, social and religious reasons). 1.78.33. of the 
Mbh says: "He who does not accede, when importuned privately to a willing 
and available woman, is called a killer of the embryo by those wise in matters 
oflaw". 
3. 1.1.205 of the Mbh says: "There can be no doubt that the wise man, having 
heard this Veda of Krsna (Dvaipayana i.e. the Mbh) would shed even the 
crime of abortion". 
4. XII.56.31-2 says: "Bhisma advises Yudhisthira: 0 excellent one, the twice 
born (i.e. Brahmins) must be protected. Even if they are grave offenders you 
should only banish them from your dominions (harm them no further). Chief 
of all you should show mercy to the transgressors among them, even for 
slaying a Brahmin, violating the gurus bed, or killing an embryo (Lipner 1989 
: 46 - 47). 
The above contexts show clearly that abortion was regarded as a serious wrong. 
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Another story from the Mahabharata is that: "the powerful sage Vyasa once granted 
Gandhari (the wife of the king Dhrtarastra) a boon. Gandhari chose to have a 
hundred sons. In due course, she was made pregnant by the king and remained in 
this state for two years. Eventually and in despair no doubt, Gandhari - unbeknown 
to Dhrtarastra - aborted her womb with great effort, fainting with grief. A fleshy 
lump came out, compact as a ball of iron" which Gandhari sought to dispose of (Mbh 
1.107.11 - 12a in Lipner 1989 : 47; 65). Vyasa had seen it all by his yogic perception 
and literally flew to the rescue to thwart the natural consequences of Gandhari's act. 
First he upbraids her ("What's this you've wanted to do!": Kim idam te cildrsitam), 
then he commands that a hundred pots (kunda - not unlike the womb in shape) be 
quickly filled with ghee and that the ball of flesh be sprinkled with cool water. ''That 
doused ball then separated into a hundred parts, each an embryo no larger than a 
thumb-joint in size (Mbh 1.107.19). Each embryo was then deposited in one of the 
pots, and the pots were stored in a safe place. Having instructed Gandhari as to 
when the pots were to be broken for the 'delivery' of the children", Vyasa departed 
to continue his austerities. In time, Gandhari, got her hundred sons. According to 
Lipner this was the beginning of in vitro fertilization (Lipner 1989: 47). 
2.3.4 ABORTION: A MORAL AS WELL AS A SOCIAL CONCERN 
Abortion is placed among transgressions which have not only undesirable social 
consequences, but which also attract strong moral condemnation. Abortion is listed 
with drunkenness, incest and illicit miscegenation of the castes (which are social 
transgressions), it is also listed with unchastity, thieving, violating one's guru's bed 
and especially killing, killing one's father or mother, and killing in general. The 
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Mitaksara a commentary on the Yajnaval.kya Smrti forbids sati, an act with strong 
social overtones, to pregnant wives, implying thereby that the unborn have a moral 
status which must not be subjected to social demands. One cannot argue here that a 
stronger social need (producing children especially sons) takes precedence over a 
weaker social need (sati) (Lipner 1989 : 49). The Mitaksara does not say that 
pregnant women who already have the desired number or kind (that is males) of 
children may ascend the funeral pyre. Thus the unborn, in Classical Hindu tradition 
were accorded a moral status deserving of special protection and that abortion was 
generally reprehensible because thereby the integrity of the human person (of both 
victim and abortionist) was seriously violated. 
However, abortion was permitted by an authoritative classical text. This is the 
Susruta Samhita a seminal medical treatise of uncertain date (3 - 4th century C.E.) 
though reference is made to an original which may have been in existence two or 
three centuries before the Christian Era. In the "Cikitsasthana" of this work, in the 
section called "The Foetus Astray" (mudhgarbha), the eventuality of aborting the 
foetus is considered (Bhishagratna 1981: 404). The text begins by pointing out that 
"there is nothing as difficult as the delivery of a foetus astray in the womb, for here 
... the job must be done "by feel" ... by one hand, without injury to mother or foetus 
(if possible). nato' nyat kastamam asti yaya mudhagarbha salyoddharanam atra hi ... 
karma kartavyam sparsena ... ekahastena garbham garbhinim cahimsata 
(Bhishagratna 1981 : 404; Lipner 1989 : 65). The text continues: "If the foetus is 
alive, one should attempt to remove it from the womb of the mother (alive)". No 
doubt is left as to the ideal to be striven for: the safety of both mother and child. 
However, if the foetus is dead (mrte garbhe ), it may be removed by cutting and 
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dismembering, if necessary. The text then considers the situation in which the live 
foetus cannot be safely delivered. In this event, it forbids removal by surgery. "For 
if (the foetus) be cut one would harm both mother and her offspring". In an 
irredeemable situation, it is best to cause the miscarriage of the foetus, for no means 
must be neglected which can prevent the loss of the mother (Lipner 1989 : 66). 
Abortion then is the last recourse when it is clearly a question of weighing life 
against life - the life of the mother against that of the foetus. When the foetus is 
known to be defective, or damaged beyond repair, and there is no hope for a normal 
birth, surgical removal is prescribed. ... Craniotomic operations, involving the 
destruction and subsequent removal of the foetus, are prescribed in certain cases of 
this nature (Bhishagratna 1981: 405 - 407). 
In Classical times, the question of abortion and of the status of the unborn was 
invested with at least as much moral as well social significance. Traditional Hindu 
society condemned inter-marriage. One had to marry within the same caste. The 
offsprings of mixed caste (miscegenation) were referred to by special names. 
Anuloma status was given to offsprings where the father was of a "higher" caste than 
the mother, and pratiloma status was given to offsprings where the mother was of a 
higher caste than the father. The greater the caste disparity between the partners, 
the more reprehensible both union and offspring. Such children were generally at a 
great disadvantage in society, most of them being regarded as virtually impure or 
untouchable. Among the most despised of such offspring were the Candala (the 
child of a Brahmin mother and a Sudra father) and the Paulkasa (usually the child of 
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a ksatriya mother and a sudra father) (Lipner 1989 : 63). The situation was 
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complicated greatly by the fact that the offspring of pratiloma unions could 
themselves miscegenate, thus producing new categories of outcaste (Sheth 1987 : 
43). 
The aversion in which miscegenation in general was held in traditional Hindu 
society is evident from the popular texts. The Bhagavad Gita provides a good 
example. In the first chapter, the warrior Arjuna is recounting to his friend, Lord 
Krsna, the evil consequences of war: the social relationships, between the various 
clans become gravely upset. 
"When the clan is destroyed, the enduring clan-rules collapse. When rule collapses, 
disorder overtakes the whole clan. From the ascendency of disorder, Krsna, the 
clan-women are vitiated. When the women are vitiated, then miscegenation occurs. 
Miscegenation results in hell for the destroyers of the clan and for the clan itself -
for the ancestral fathers of such fall (from their heavens), their post (post-mortem) 
libations and offerings have lapsed. By these crimes of the clan destroyers - that is 
bringing about miscegenation - the eternal laws of the clan and of the race are 
abolished. Once the eternal clan-rules of the people are abolished, Krsna, one 
resides in hell eternal thus - have we heard" (Mbh Vl.2.40 - 44 in Lipner 1989: 51, 
66). 
Hence pratiloma persons were despised and condemned in society. According to 
Lipner no texts recommend that abortion be resorted to as an acceptable way out, 
either to avert an insufferable life for the pratiloma child to be or to safeguard the 
parents from ignominy (Lipner 1989: 66). On the contrary elaborate provision was 
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made in the law texts concerning the avocations and rules of life of pratiloma 
persons. Clearly their right to life in the face of adverse social consequences both 
for themselves and for their parents was recognised and safe-guarded. The same 
protection was extended to the embryo of an adulterous union. "In the event of 
adultery, purity (of the woman occurs) in her season (viz. during the menses, if she 
has not conceived. If she is with child, she is to be abandoned; (similarly) when a 
woman slays the embryo or her husband or (commits some other) grave 
transgression" (Yajnavalkya Smrti 1.72. in Lipner 1989 : 66). The juxtaposition of 
adultery and abortion does not exclude condemnation of the latter when it was the 
consequence of the former. 
2.3.S HUMAN BEING VERSUS HUMAN PERSON 
A distinction has to be made between the individual as a Human Being and the 
individual as a Human Person. According to moralists a human being is a member 
of the human species, but for various reasons is not yet a person - in fact may never 
be a person. The reasons may be: the lack of a recognisable human form (in the 
embryo/foetus); clear evidence (detected by mechanical devices) of insufficient 
(rather than abnormal) cerebral activity in some foetuses compared to cerebral 
activity, in other foetuses, which is accepted and established as pertaining to human 
persons at that stage of development. The moralists differ as to whether one or 
more of such reasons are sufficient to determine human personhood. Having 
established their satisfaction criteria, the Western moralists go on to affirm that 
abortion in the case of human beings is morally permissible for reasons which may 
not be valid when abortion of human persons is in question. In other words they 
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say that abortion in the early stages of pregnancy cannot be objected to morally with 
the same force as to abortion in the late stages of pregnancy. This is because in 
early pregnancy the human being has not yet developed - for one reason or another 
- into the human person with the latter's claim to a moral status qualitatively 
superior to that of the former (however "human person" may then be further 
defined) (Lipner 1989: 51 - 52). 
According to popular Hindu belief, the human person is a composite of two 
essentially disparate but intimately conjoined principles - spirit (atman, purusa). 
Spirit is essentially the locus of consciousness and bliss, and is impervious to 
substantial change; matter is essentially insentient, tending to diversification and 
change. Spirit and matter come together to produce the distinctive individual or 
human being. This union though finally dissoluble, is nevertheless a profound one 
and engenders the separate centres of self-awareness we experience ourselves to be. 
This experience is characterised by the congenital illusion which fails to distinguish 
between the "real" self that is the pure spirit and "false" or composite self (matter 
cum-spirit). Liberation, the human goal, about which the different schools have 
different views, necessarily consists in at least the internalised awareness of the 
distinction between the real self and the false self. So long as this enlightened 
knowledge is not attained each individual repeatedly dies and is physically reborn as 
a continuum of different personalities, each reborn individual beings determined as 
to the nature and life situation by the resultant of the continuun's past ego-centred 
karma (meritorious and unmeritorious action). This process of karma and rebirth is 
beginningless for each individual and may continue indefinitely. It is terminated by 
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enlightenment, and at death the enlightened soul is liberated from the wheel of 
rebirth (Lipner 1989: 52 - 53). 
Those who know the atman say that it is actionless, self-dependent, sovereign, all-
pervading, and omnipresent; that it has conscious control over the body (that is, is a 
ksetrajna) and witnesses its doings. Niskriyamca svatantram ca vasinam sarvagam 
vibhum vadanty atmanam atmajnah ksetrajnam saksinam tatha (Sharma 1981 : 421 -
422). Later the innerself (antaratman) of the human person is described as 
essentially "eternal, free from disease, free from old age, deathless, free from decay; 
it cannot be pierced, cut or agitated. It takes all forms, performs all actions, is 
unmanifest, beginningless, endless and immutable". 
In answer to how it is then that, in the human subject, the atman seems to manifest 
the contrary characteristics, viz. being a limited agent, mortal, dependent upon 
bodily functions, changeable, one is told that the false appearance of the atman 
results from the atman's union with matter (in the form of the body). The body, for 
its part, is described as the support of the conscious principle, constitutive of the 
totality of modifications of the five elements (which make up the matter), and 
maintaining the harmonious conjunctions (of its parts) (Lipner 1989: 67). 
"The five elements" are the fundamental forms of earth, water, fire, air and ether 
constitutive of prakrti or the material principle which unfolds from its subtle, 
unmanifest state into the material world as we experience it (Sharma 1981 : 428). 
Perhaps one may ask at what stage in the development of the foetus does the soul 
enter (the foetus). 
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2.3.6 ENSOULMENT AND CONSCIOUSNESS IN THE WOMB 
"Conception occurs when intercourse takes place in due season between a man of 
unimpaired semen and a woman whose generative organ (menstrual) blood and 
womb are unvitiated when in fact, in the event of intercouse thus described, the 
individual soul (jiva) descends into the union of semen and (menstrual) blood in the 
womb in keeping with the (karmically produced) psychic-disposition (of the 
embryonic matter) (Sharma 1981 : 428). This seems to mean that conception 
coincides with the "descent" or presence of the spirit in the womb - from the 
beginning the embryo is the spirit-matter composite that constitutes the human 
person. There seems to be no scope according to this seminal authority for drawing 
the distinction between human being and human person, with the implication that 
abortion at some early stage of pregnancy may be permissible (Lipner 1989 : 53 -
54). 
Another view, is that the soul unites with the embryo some time after conception. 
Here, it seems that grounds do exist for drawing a distinction between human being 
(the embryo before the union with the soul) and human person (the embryo after 
the union). This view is expressed in the Garbha Upanisad (circa 2nd - 3rd century 
C.E.?). This minor Upanisad according to Lipner (1989) is hardly recognised as an 
authority on such matters. According to the Garbha Upanisad the soul and embryo 
unite in the seventh month after conception. 
"As the result of the intercourse in due season, the embryo forms in the space of a 
night, within seven nights a bubble forms; in the period of a fortnight, there is a 
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lump and by a month this becomes hard. In two months the head develops, in three 
months the region of the feet, and in the fourth month the ankles stomach, the loins 
form. In the fifth month, the back and spine form; in the sixth month, nose, eyes, 
and ears develop. In the seventh month, (the foetus) is joined to the soul, and in the 
eighth month it is complete in every part" (Garbha Upanisad in Lipner 1989: 67). 
Thus from the above descriptions, one may conclude that abortion in the very early 
stages of pregnancy may be permissible, though the text does not state it explicitly. 
The V'zsnu Purana says: "An individual soul (jantu ), possessing a subtle body 
(sukumaratanu ), resides in his mother's womb (garbha ), which is imbued with 
various sorts of impurity (mala ). He stays there being folded in the membrane 
surrounding the foetus (ulba) .... He experiences severe pains .... ... tormented 
immensely by the foods his mother takes .... Incapable of extending (prasarana) or 
contracting (akuncana) his own limbs and reposing amidst a mud of faeces and 
urine, he is in every way incommoded. He is unable to breathe. Yet being endowed 
with consciousness (sacaitanya) and thus calling to memory many hundreds (of 
previous) births, he resides in his mother's womb with great pains, being bound by 
his previous deeds" (Lipner 1989 : 55). 
The Garbha Upanisad elaborates on one aspect of the painful experience: Now 
(when the foetus) is complete in every aspect, it remembers its past births. Action 
pertains to what is done and not done, and (the foetus) thinks upon its good and bad 
deeds. Having surveyed (previous births) from thousands of different wombs (it 
thinks): "Thus have I enjoyed various foods and suckled various teats. Again and 
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again both the living and the dead are reborn. Alas! I am sunk in this ocean of 
sorrow and see no remedy. Whatever I've done good or bad for those about me - I 
alone must suffer the consequences, for they've gone on their way suffering the 
fruits (of their own deeds). If ever I escape the womb I'll study the samkhyayoga 
which destroys evil and confers the reward of liberation. If ever I escape the womb 
I'll abandon myself to Siva who destroys evil and confers the reward of liberation" 
(Garbha Upanisad in Lipner 1989: 55). The above quotations show that the Hindus 
believed that there is consciousness in the womb. 
The Susruta Samhita is more specific as to when consciousness develops in the 
womb: "In the first month (after conception) the embryo is formed, in the second ... 
there results a compact mass. If this is globular (pinda ), its a male, if longish pesi its 
a female .... In the third month, five protuberances appear for the hands, legs and 
head. While the division of the other bodily limbs and sections is hardly visible 
(suksma ). In the fourth month, the division of these other limbs and sections 
appears clearly while awareness as a distinct category ( cetanadhatu) manifests itself 
in relation to, the appearance of the foetus heart .... Also in the fourth month, the 
foetus expresses desires in respect of sense object .... In the fifth month the co-
ordinating sense (manas) becomes more aware, and in the sixth the intellect 
(buddhi) is manifest. In the seventh month, the division of the bodily limbs and 
sections is more defined; in the eighth month the life force (ojas) concentrates .... In 
one or other of the ninth, tenth, eleventh or twelfth months birth takes place or else 
(the pregnancy) is void" (Bhishagratna 1981 : 137 - 139). Cognisance should be 
taken of the fact that in its development the embryo does not undergo a quantum 
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leap, passing from one kind of human moral status (human being) to another 
(human person). 
On the contrary, the language here is in terms of progressive manifestation of a 
personhood previously only latent rather than origination of personhood ab initio. 
The Susruta Samhita confirms this conclusion, when after describing the 
development of the foetus, it observes in the face of opposing views that the foetus 
undergoes an all-round (rather than sporadic) development from the very beginning. 
For its part, the Caraka Samhita implies that the conscious principle is active in the 
fertilized egg, directing its growth, right from conception. Thus the moral status 
remains the same irrespective of the stage of development of the foetus/embryo 
(Sharma 1981 : 421 - 422). Hence in the traditional context, there is no scope for a 
debate on abortion. The overriding evidence of the classical texts as a whole speaks 
in favour of according the status of human personhood to the unborn throughout 
pregnancy, with consequent implications for (the impermissibility of) abortion 
except in extreme circumstances as discussed earlier (Lipner 1989: 56). 
2.3. 7 KARMA AND REBIRTH 
Another reason which made abortion unacceptable in traditional Hinduism was the 
belief in karma and rebirth. This belief was firmly implanted in the Hindu psyche 
from very early times and had far-reaching consequences for Hindu practice. It 
militated against abortion, in that abortion could be regarded as thwarting the 
unfolding of the karma of both the unborn and the perpetrators of the act. The 
unbom's karma matures through its pre-natal and post-natal experiences, and 
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abortion unnaturally terminates the possibility of this maturation. Abortion thus 
gravely affected the outworking of a person's destiny, the more so since it is 
generally believed that it was as a human being that one could act most effectively 
to achieve liberation from rebirth. In theory, the different versions of the rebirth 
belief allowed for a person's rebirth on the one hand, in animal and plant form on 
the other, as celestials or gods (devas). In practice, however, the various texts 
including the theological treatises of thinkers like Samkara, Ramanuja, and Madhva 
are preoccupied with the nature, ethics and destiny of the human person and imply 
that a qualitative distinction exists between human and (at least) animal and 
vegetative life. A corollary of this implication, usually taken for granted and not 
given due philosophical analysis, is that it is in its human form that the soul can most 
effectively seek liberation (Lipner 1989 : 69). 
Why could not abortion be permissible as itself (unwittingly) predetermined by 
karma? The Hindus countered this objection by maintaining that the experience of 
free choice was not an illusion, that the Law of Karma did not abrogate the laws of 
dharma, the right living in accordance with freedom and responsibility. In other 
words deliberate abortion as a free act violates dharma and as such, is 
reprehensible. In Hindu tradition, the real distinction between "timely" and 
"untimely" death was recognised (Lipner 1989 : 57). 
2.3.8 THE EMBRYO: A SYMBOL OF LIFE 
The embryo in the womb was sacrosanct because it was a potent symbol of a 
dominant motif regulating the traditional Hindu view of life - that of birth, 
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regeneration, new life, immortality. The theme of the primeval egg of creation from 
which the world of plurality emerges is a popular one in Hindu folklore. "When all 
this (universe) was originally darkness unillumined covered on all sides by obscurity, 
the Great Egg arose, the sole imperishable seed of creatures. They say that at the 
beginning of an age this is the great, divine cause, and that on which (it rests) is 
revealed as the true Light, the eternal Brahman" (Mbh. 1.1. 27 - 28 in Lipner 1989 : 
69). There are a number of variants of this image of the egg of creation in the 
scriptural texts. The Satapatha Brahmana says that in certain rituals the initiate was 
compared to or associated with an embryo, no doubt because the latter was 
suggestive of new birth or life. In the light of these symbolisms abortion was 
condemned in traditional Hinduism (Lipner 1989 : 58). 
2.3.9 SOCIAL AND RELIGIOUS REASONS 
A more practical reason for safeguarding the life of the embryo stemmed from the 
social and religious need to produce, especially male offspring. Hindu society being 
in the main patriarchal, male progeny in particular were necessary not only to 
maintain social and economic stability (a proper functioning of the caste system) 
but also for religious purposes (the performance of the priestly and domestic ritual, 
especially the sraddha rite to ensure that deceased parents entered a satisfactory 
post-mortem existence). Production of children was a public duty, rather than a 
purely individual expression of parental rights and choices. One of the traditional 
debts the householder owed society was maintaining society's numbers by 
continuing the line in accordance with dharma. It would be unHindu, therefore, to 
regard procreation and concomitant issues (such as abortion) as a private concern of 
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matter (or family) alone. Therefore in the light of the above abortion was 
condemned. 
2.3.10 AHIMSA 
The influence of the principle of ahimsa or non-injury in Hindu tradition was an 
important factor militating against the performance of abortion. Although the 
Bhagavad Gita supports just war undertaken out of selfless duty, it still exerts a 
powerful influence on the Hindu mind with reference to particularly vulnerable 
forms of life, such as the embryo. 
2.3.11 CONCLUSION 
Thus one may conclude from earliest times, especially in the formative Classical 
Period, both in canonical and colloborative orthodox Hindu literature, abortion (viz. 
deliberately caused miscarriage as opposed to involuntary miscarriage) at any stage 
of pregnancy, has been morally condemned as violating the personal integrity of the 
unborn, unless it was a question of preserving the mother's life. No other reason, 
social or otherwise, seems to have been allowed to override this viewpoint. 
Modem India, a secular democracy, permits abortion by law, under certain 
circumstances. It is a law availed by some. The issues relating to the moral status of 
the unborn and abortion have neither been aired nor properly identified in Indian 
minds and literature according to Lipner. In public the topic is by and large taboo. 
Illegal abortionists in the back street or the bush continue to ply their trade often 
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with dire consequences for their customers. The question of abortion and the moral 
status of the unborn is yet to be addressed (Lipner 1989: 61). 
The views of the Durban Hindus who were interviewed were influenced by many 
factors. Religious belief was only one of the factors that influenced their views. 
Their views to a large extent were influenced by legal and medical ethics. 
Therefore, the next chapter concerns itself with the legal and medical ethics that 
govern the phenomena in question. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
LEGAL, MEDICAL, ETHICAL CONTEXT 
3.1 INTRODUCTION 
Professional medical ethics do not stand separate from the law. Medical ethics are 
intrinsically interwoven with and have a continuous influence on the doctor-patient 
relationship. What the rules of medical ethics demand of a physician, will at the 
same time and to a large extent also be the legal obligation that has to be fulfilled. 
It is in the medical professional field much more than in any other social 
relationship between men that ethical considerations are inextricably linked with 
considerations of a legal nature, and this seems to be true for all times. However, in 
Classical India legal and medical ethics were closely linked with religious 
injunctions. The law of the country was in the scripture itself. In modern Western 
societies, the law and religion are distinct from each other. This is because modern 
societies are very cosmopolitan in nature. In South Africa (Durban in particular), if 
the law of the country were based on scripture, then it would be a disaster because 
of the diversity in culture and religion. 
However, once a profession is established and recognised as having its own, 
protected position of autonomous freedom, it is likely to have a dynamic of its own, 
developing new ideas or activities which may only vaguely reflect the established 
ethical principles that the great majority of medical professionals and society would 
probably subscribe to. 
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It is certainly true that any duty which may be owed by the physician to his patient is 
not the duty which is imposed on him by the Hippocratic Oath, or by any code of 
professional ethics which may be prescribed by the medical profession or the 
medical association of which he or she is a member and it is equally true that the 
medical profession cannot lay down the law in regard to it. However, it still 
becomes necessary for the law and for society and also for the courts if called upon 
to take cognizance of established codes of medical ethics not as professionals would 
perhaps wish, as conclusive evidence as to the legal duty or legally acceptable 
standards, but in order to understand from what educational professional 
background and ethical commitment physicians normally proceed when exercising 
their profession on patients. It is, therefore, important to ask what set of moral 
obligations the doctor or physician has towards his patient and to himself in addition 
to operating within a framework of legal and medical ethics (Giesen, 1988: 669). 
It is in the sense of moral obligations as perceived by the profession, of course, that 
traditional medical ethics tends to be depicted in the various national and 
international codes of medical ethics and enforced by the respective professional 
bodies, e.g., the General Medical Council to which the individual professional 
belongs. The starting point for an inquiry into this background always was, (often is) 
and probably would be the Hippocratic Oath which, as tradition has it, goes back 
directly to the father of medicine, Hippocrates, and by tradition is one of the most 
important oaths administered to new arrivals to the profession. There the aspiring 
physician swears by the ancient gods and goddesses that, "I solemnly swear to place 
my life in the service of mankind. I will practise my profession conscientiously and 
with dignity. The preservation and restoration of the health of my patient will be 
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the overriding principle of my actions. I will honour all secrets with which I am 
entrusted. I will do everything in my power to uphold the honour and noble 
tradition of the medical profession and will not discriminate in the execution of my 
medical duties on groups of religion, nationality, political affiliation or social 
position. I will respect every human life from the moment of conception and even 
under duress will not use my medical skills in any way which contradicts the 
demands of humanity. I will show my teachers and colleagues all the respect that is 
due to them. I swear all the foregoing solemnly upon my honour. While I continue 
to keep this Oath unviolated, may it be granted to me to enjoy life and to the 
practice of the Art, respected by all men, in all times. But should I trespass and 
violate this Oath, may the reverse be my lot." (Giesen 1988: 671). 
Thus the Hippocratic Oath becomes the basis of the medical ethics of all the 
World's Medical Associations. It is only used as a basis, but it cannot be applied in 
toto as can be seen later in the thesis. The Hippocratic Oath has to be modified 
from time to time to suit changing circumstances and situations. Hindu doctors who 
were interviewed also felt that the Hippocratic Oath cannot be applied directly but 
it has to be modified from time to time. 
Human beings throughout the world are the same irrespective of their nationality, 
race, colour or creed, therefore medical or legal issues concerning their biological 
existence ought to tally. One's moral obligation towards human beings especially, 
from the point of view of the physician or doctor, should be the same irrespective of 
in which (what) part of the world he or she operates (functions). In this chapter 
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reference will be made to the British and American legal and medical ethics 
concerning euthanasia, suicide and abortion. Euthanasia, suicide and abortion have 
become universal problems, hence a concern for all mankind. 
3.2 EUTHANASIA 
As a result of the dramatic advances made in medical technology, the question of 
euthanasia has received increased attention in the recent years. While the problem 
itself is an ancient one, rooted in the conflict between the duty to relieve suffering 
and the duty to preserve human life, it has assumed, however, new proportions with 
the advent of modern medicine. Decisions to determine the time and the 
circumstances of one's dying have become both more frequent and more complex in 
view of the capacity of modern medical science to sustain biological life almost 
indefinitely by artificial means. 
The new technological capacity poses serious moral issues, concerning the quality of 
life that can be maintained through the employment of such technology. It also 
raises far reaching questions regarding the cost of terminal medical care, the rights 
of the patient, the need for an updated definition of death, and the allocation of 
scarce medical resources. These and related issues have important implications in 
the field of law as well as of medicine. They pertain to the rights of an individual 
and of the welfare of society. Thus Hindu dharma concerns itself not only with the 
individual in question but takes into account the society and cosmology in general. 
Therefore in Classical Hinduism, suicide was recommended to the physically and 
mentally incapacitated individual. 
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Euthanasia in the broad sense of that term raises problems which cut across a 
number of interrelated fields. Hence, any adequate approach to such problems 
needs to include insights from each of these perspectives (that is moral, medical and 
legal). Decisions related to the election of death are not simply medical decisions in 
the technical sense; they are also choices which are deeply influenced by religious, 
moral, legal and economic considerations. Medical decisions are made within the 
framework of legislation that defines the responsibility of the physician to the 
patient in terms of law and establishes public policy with regard both to the quality 
and to the general availability of health care services. 
Decisions relating to the use of "extraor~inary" procedures for maintaining life are 
I 
severely limited by the economic resourc~s available to the patient and the patient's 
family as well as by the resources that a~e at the disposal of the physician through 
various agencies. In addition to the medibal, legal and economic factors, euthanasia 
i 
also involves fundamental ethics, relating, to the nature and limits of the physician's 
i 
responsibility to his patient, the rights of the patient and the responsibility of the 
patient's family as well as that of society in the care of the dying. The moral 
! 
dimensions of euthanasia do not exist ~longside the medical, the legal and the 
i 
economic dimensions, rather, the formeri
1
so permeate and condition the latter that 
i 
even these cannot be adequately perceif ed unless they are understood also in a 




3.2.1 LEGAL AND ETHICAL ASPECTS 
According to Glanville Williams, "Under the present law, voluntary euthanasia 
would, except in certain circumstances, be regarded as suicide in the patient who 
consents and murder in the doctor who administers; even on a lenient view most 
lawyers would say it could not be less than manslaughter in the doctor, the 
punishment for which according to the jurisdiction and the degree of manslaughter, 
can be anything up to imprisonment for life (Glanville Williams in Trowell 1973 : 
34 ). If the doctor gave the fatal injection, the doctor was a murderer, for his hand 
committed the deed. 
"But it remains the fact, and it remains the law, that no doctor nor any man, no more 
in the case of the dying than of the healthy, has the right deliberately to cut the 
thread of life" (Trowell 1973 : 35). 
Any deliberate, planned substantial shortening of a patient's life could be regarded 
as murder. Thus if someone had a recurrence of cancer, but was expected to live 
several months, and a narcotic drug was given, either as a single large lethal 
injection, or in very rapidly rising doses (the amounts given being far in excess of 
that required to control the pain in this particular patient), so that as a result of the 
large amount of drugs the patient died within a few hours or days the charge would 
be one of murder (Trowell 1973 : 36). 
Throughout life it is part of one's human predicament that one cannot exercise full 
control over the accidents that may maim one for life and the diseases which may 
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cause disability and death. Careful thought can decrease accidents and diseases. 
One cannot opt out of pain and distress as they are part of life. One can only hope 
for death like life to be painless, but one cannot demand it at all costs (Trowell 1973 
: 120). ''To conclude: the question whether a person has a right to die has a smirking 
insincerity concealed in its euphemistic phraseology: Right sounds a noble 
sentiment, the right to die calls to mind those who die for their country or for their 
political faith or for their ideals. It is the stuff of warriors and martyrs. But the right 
to die, when applied to sick persons, is something fundamentally different, and it 
conceals the fact that it is really an argument about whether one has a right to get 
someone else to do the killing; and that someone is the doctor who will cast a cloak 
of respectability, if not anonymity over the whole act" (Trowell 1973 : 125). Thus 
from the dawn of history to the present day, all peoples of whatever race, religion 
and political outlook have always felt the greatest horror, if not repugnance, in 
killing someone else (Trowell 1973 : 125). 
3.2.2 MEDICAL OBJECTIONS 
Before discussing the ethical basis of the patient's alleged "right to die", it is 
essential to weigh the reasons which forbid for all time and in all circumstances the 
patient's medical practitioner from any association with legalised voluntary 
euthanasia. The doctor who looks after a patient must never be associated with 
euthanasia and the patient must know this. The six points which follow do not rest 
on religious beliefs, however, important or unimportant one may consider these to 
be; they rest on facts and attitudes which are built into the doctor-patient relation-
ship; especially as it is seen in the care for the enfeebled, the elderly and the dying. 
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First of all, it is seldom certain beyond any reasonable doubt, that the patient will 
not subsequently change his mind and cancel his request for euthanasia. Have other 
drugs, other doctors, other nurses been tried? Perhaps they will be more skilful in 
relieving the pain and the patient will find life worth living. There are institutions in 
which there is almost always success in alleviating the pain and distress of terminal 
diseases; there would be change of mind if the patient was transferred. 
Psychiatrists who have observed patients during terminal stages of fatal illness stress 
the changing moods vacillating between denial and acceptance changing between 
hope and despair. 
Secondly, even if the nearest of kin and the closest relatives have agreed to the 
euthanasia and discussed it with the patient, bereavement brings such emotional 
trauma that those who are left are often full of recrimination, guilt and anger. 
These feelings are even at present often directed against the doctor. The relatives 
may consider that they never gave consent to the euthanasia. They may spread 
dangerous malicious gossip; they may take legal proceedings especially in the light 
of the findings reported at the post-mortem examination. 
Thirdly, the doctor knows more clearly than anyone else that any decision about 
euthanasia must be based on a firm statement of the diseases present. From his 
student days he has attended too many autopsies where even the most eminent 
consultants were confounded. Yet he dares not disclose to the patient and the 
relatives the measure of his uncertainty without undermining confidence. Perhaps 
he has to name the diseases present on some written report; if this is not done the 
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relatives may give an unbalanced account of the medical indications for euthanasia. 
If this is done then diseases stated to be present during life can be checked against 
those found at any autopsy and written in the death certificate. 
Fourthly, even if all the medical facts are correctly known, the doctor can never be 
certain that the external circumstances which are the basis of the choice for 
euthanasia will not change. A decision to die is always taken against a social 
background of certain circumstances and the most unpredictable events may occur, 
perhaps when it is too late to reverse the decision about euthanasia. 
Fifthly, in practical terms the doctor is the last person to administer euthanasia. He 
has become mentally conditioned by reason of long habits; he cannot regard the 
matter impartially or consider the issue fairly or perform the act calmly. His 
professional training has been channelled into the protection of life and the 
enrichment of its quality. He has an inbred respect for human life speaking of the 
sanctity of life. This is the ultimate basis of the only creed that most doctors 
understand. 
He has acted as counsel for the defence of the life of his patient, he cannot easily 
reverse his role and become prosecutor for the sentence of death. He cannot sit 
calmly in judgement on this schizophrenic split in his own personality and his role 
acting as judge and summing up the evidence for and against the termination of life, 
and as jury giving the verdict and even acting as executioner. He cannot be 
prosecutor, defender, judge, jury and executioner all in one person. He will polarize 
to one role or the other. It will be a sad day for many of his patients if he polarizes 
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too easily towards termination. Every doctor in general practice has a score or more 
incurable patients on his books, consuming to little purpose his time, ability and 
patience. Some doctors are naturally pessimists, some have morbid minds, and 
some develop insanity. It would be a dishonourable day for any doctor if a crop of 
unexpected euthanasias were the first sign of commencing insanity. The press and 
television would not be slow to publicise the news. 
Sixthly, the whole basis of medical practice is built on a position of trust. There has 
been an agreement to be a patient and an agreement to be the doctor, but this is 
more than a contract. One reaches round for some other word, signifying a deep 
and abiding trust between the two parties. Patient and doctor have covenanted to 
keep faith for better for worse in sickness and in health, till the gates of death do 
them part. Herein lies the heart of the euthanasia problem. 
If any country should ever be so unwise as to enact legislation on voluntary 
euthanasia, these six weighty reasons, which rest on no foundation of religion or 
private system of ethics, demand that the patient's own doctor and any consultant or 
specialist with whom this doctor may confer, must stand for all time and in all 
circumstances completely outside any question of euthanasia. They must never be 
even a party to advising the patient, let alone facilitating, his legalised application 
for assisted suicide. Doctors, all persons designated as doctors, must be completely 
excluded from the role of the person who terminates life. The public must know this 
for all time and for all places and for all circumstances (Trowell 1973 : 126 - 130). 
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But Hindu doctors in Durban feel that it is the doctor who should decide whether 
euthanasia should be administered or not since it is the doctor more than any legal 
or religious authority that knows the physical body of the patient. 
3.2.3 MERCY-DYING VERSUS MERCY-KILLING 
A distinction should be made between taking a life and letting one die. The former 
may be wrong, whereas the latter in the same situation need not be wrong. For 
example, to withdraw the medication from the terminal patient and to allow him to 
die naturally need not be a moral wrong. In some cases where the individual and or 
loved ones consent - this may be the most merciful thing to do. If an illness, indeed, 
is incurable and the individual is being kept alive only by a machine, then pulling the 
plug may be an act of mercy. 
This is not to say that a doctor should give medicine or perform an operation to 
speed death that could very well be murder. But this position does imply that 
mercifully permitting the sufferer to die is morally right whereas precipitating his or 
her death is not. Medicine should be given to relieve suffering but not to hasten 
death. If, however, the lack of medicine or machine can lessen suffering by allowing 
death to occur sooner, then why should one be morally bound to perpetuate the 
patient's suffering by artificial means. In brief killing involves taking the life of 
another whereas natural dying does not; it is merely "letting one die". A man is 
responsible for the former, but God is responsible for the latter. A conflict arises 
between a lawyer and a doctor; a lawyer might be termed a legal moralist, but a 
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doctor is a compassionate being who undergoes trauma and stress while the patient 
suffers physically. This was a reason that was put forth by many of the Hindu 
doctors who were interviewed in the Durban area. 
However, when both God and medical science have been given ample opportunity 
to cure the disease and yet it appears beyond all reasonable doubt that this patient 
will have little more than a "vegetable" type of existence, then one may conclude 
that God wants him to die a natural death. The basic moral principle behind this 
conclusion is that one ought not to perpetuate an inhumanity while futilely waiting 
for a miracle. Hoping for a cure while the patient is undergoing suffering cannot be 
regarded as a merciful act and hence it is not morally justifiable. Waiting without 
reasonable expectation for grace is not a justifiable basis for refusing to allow mercy 
to do its work. Hindu doctors who were interviewed felt that they were agents of the 
Lord, and as agents they should help God to attain the end in the shortest time 
possible. Hence, there is a need for a re-interpretation of the Hippocratic Oath 
where one acts for the good of the patient and not preserve life at all costs. 
There is another overall moral principle at work here. The obligation of humans to 
perpetuate it if it is no longer a human life in any significant sense of that word. As 
a matter of fact, it is morally wrong to perpetuate an inhumanity. If a monstrously 
deformed baby dies naturally it should be considered an act of divine mercy. A 
doctor should not feel morally obligated to resuscitate a monster or human 
"vegetable". Just as the moral command is not to take a human life so one's duty is 
only to perpetuate a human life (Geisler 1976: 12 - 14). 
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Proponents of euthanasia will attack as insignificant the distinction between killing 
and letting die. The distinction certainly makes no difference in many cases for 
example homicide by omission of care which one has a legal duty to provide is as 
much homicide as a killing by a positive performance. However, the law does 
distinguish between acts of omission to which one is not legally obligated - here 
there is no crime even if the omission results in preventable death and acts of 
commission. The basis of this distinction is not irrational, since everyone can 
forbear to kill others, and demanding this forbearance provides a great deal of 
protection for each individual's share of the good life (Grisez et al 1979 : 226). 
There also is the practical consideration that if one omits to save another, the other 
may survive even so, perhaps with the aid of some third party; while if one kills 
another, alternative possibilities for preserving life are eliminated at a stroke. 
3.2.4 ACTIVE EUTHANASIA 
Proponents of active euthanasia believe that persons should be able to determine 
how and when they die, and that if they need assistance, the physician, although not 
legally obligated, may be morally justified in providing it. As seen in the previous 
chapter Classical Hinduism supported active euthanasia at the request of the 
patient. This argument is based on an assumption of the supremacy of human 
dignity, free will, and the exercise of choice. It assumes that it is morally 
permissible, and even sometimes obligatory to violate laws against mercy killing in 
the interest of the individual freedom and the compassionate relief of suffering. 
Respect for personal autonomy supports allowing a physician to hasten a death in 
response to a patient's explicit request in well-defined circumstances. These 
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circumstances would be present when the patient had made an informed and 
competent decision and death was clearly imminent and inevitable regardless of the 
physician's intervention. In this context, the act of mercy killing is best viewed not 
as causing a death but as slightly hastening it (Meier et al 1983 : 295 - 296). 
However, exercise of the right to request a mercy killing is limited because it 
depends upon the participation of another agent. The principles of informed 
consent for example are intended to protect persons from interventions they do not 
want, but they do not apply equally to the converse - that persons have a right to any 
intervention they desire. In fact, the profession of medicine is charged by law with 
dispensing its services only to those who, according to the best professional 
judgement, truly need those services (by virtue of their physical or mental 
disorders). For example, patients do not have a right to controlled drugs simply on 
demand. The patient's right to decide must be considered together with the 
physician's own judgement and autonomy. A health professional who has moral 
objections to assisting a terminally ill patient to die is justified in refusing treatment. 
A person wanting to put an end to his life with the help of another person, was 
acceptable in Classical Hinduism. The person who was assisting the sick and 
diseased to end his life, was performing a dharmic act. 
Thus the autonomy argument may justify an act of mercy killing only on these 
conditions: 
1) when the fully informed patient refuses therapy or requests a mercy killing; 
2) when death is imminent; and 
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3) when the physician agrees that what the patient requests is in that patient's 
best interest (Meier et al 1983 : 295 - 296; Calaluca et al 1984 : 158). 
3.2.5 PASSIVE EUTHANASIA 
In order to adopt that approach in which treatment of the patient is controlled by 
the desire to help him die well, rather than to fruitless efforts to maintain his life, 
the conclusion must have been reached that the process of dying is really all that the 
medical profession can anticipate for the patient. This must be accepted as a 
necessary ultimate stage in every personal existence, and not as a failure of the 
medical profession. Having adopted this position or stand does not mean that the 
patient must therefore die, as though God's healing activity were somehow 
discounted as a possibility, but simply that from the perspective of human medicine, 
no ultimate restoration of health is possible. 
The desire to aid in dying well as opposed to keeping alive by all means possible, 
changes drastically the types of treatment decided on. So many of the techniques 
for prolonging life in the case of terminal illness have the effect of sustaining 
biological life, but of destroying personal life. Instead of being sustained in a 
friendly atmosphere surrounded by those whom the patient loves and cares for the 
patient is isolated in a sterile hospital room separated from any personal contact 
except that of the busy impersonal technicians and is subjected to drugs and medical 
apparatus with its tubes, needles, catheters and other such devices, which reduce the 
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patient to a biological mass incapable of dignity, self-expression or personal 
relationships (Bube 1982: 32). Hindu philosophers and Durban Hindus in general 
who were interviewed do not approve of this mode of dying. 
To help the patient to die well, one must know and respect what the patient wishes. 
At this crucial stage, the biological and the personal must not be separated. A 
misguided reverence for biological life that leads one to go to all lengths to preserve 
it, may actually be involving one in an assault on a person. 
This process of helping the patient to die well by respecting his wishes and not 
necessarily invoking extraordinary measures to sustain life at all costs is called 
"passive euthanasia". It is called "euthanasia" because specific measures are not 
used to prolong life; it is called "passive" because specific measures are not used to 
shorten life. Such a distinction overlooks the fact that when measures are not used 
to prolong life, this in itself is a measure used to shorten life. Attempts therefore to 
make a sharp demarcation between "passive" and "active" euthanasia may be 
inappropriate. 
If a terminal condition is diagnosed before the patient has entered into extended 
technological treatment, his decision not to enter this treatment or the decision of 
others on his behalf, is regarded as an example of passive euthanasia within the 
rights of the patient. If, however, the patient has already been under treatment 
using extraordinary drugs and or machine involvement at the time when the 
terminal condition is diagnosed subsequent "pulling the plug" may be regarded as a 
case of active euthanasia, with the patient being open to the charge of suicide or 
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those who made the decision on his behalf being open to the charge of homicide. 
There appears to be no fundamental moral difference between these two types of 
action, and although the latter will undoubtedly have generally more psychological 
complications; other reasons for considering it less acceptable than the former 
seem unfounded (Bube 1982: 33). 
Another major grey region between passive and active euthanasia is that involving 
the giving of drugs to remove or reduce pain in the case of terminal illness when it is 
known that the biological effects of the drugs will actively shorten life. Again the 
distinction between maintaining biological life and sustaining personal life is a 
crucial one, although it is not claimed that it will always be easy to make. 
Particularly incongruous would be the refusal to grant use of a pain-relieving drug 
because it was addictive. If care for the person as a whole, that is, relieving severe 
pain and permitting personal experience, can be promoted by the use of a drug 
which has life-shortening properties, there should be no moral sanctions against it if 
chosen by the patient according to Slater 1973 (in Marcinek 1981 : 130; Calaluca et 
al 1984 : 158). 
3.2.6 ACTIVE VERSUS PASSIVE MEANS 
The nature of a second party's acts distinguishes active euthanasia from passive 
euthanasia. Passive euthanasia caused by an act of omission has been approved 
judicially in both voluntary and involuntary cases. Although unplugging a respirator 
and switching off a dialysis machine are arguably acts of commission an increasing 
number of judges and commentators have accepted these acts as permissible passive 
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euthanasia in both voluntary and involuntary settings. Although these authorities 
purport to respect the patient's "right to die", they limit that right to a patient's right 
to die naturally. 
Focusing on the distinction between a second party's active or passive involvement 
obscures the more important distinction between voluntary and involuntary 
euthanasia. The law should rest upon the decision-maker's status and not upon the 
degree of second party assistance. In voluntary cases the only relevant legal concern 
should be whether the terminally ill patient has made an informed and competent 
decision. It is legally inconsistent to honour a terminal patient's request that life 
support equipment be removed but to deny a similarly situated patient's request for 
' 
an immediate and painless end merely because a second party's active assistance is 
needed to implement the latter request. Prohibiting a second party from helping a 
patient commit self-euthanasia by imposing legal sanctions on that party is 
effectively equivalent to denying the patient the right to make the decision in the 
first place (Wolhandler 1984 366 - 367). 
Although many doctors might be willing to assist a terminally ill patient commit 
self-euthanasia once the patient has made an informed and competent decision to 
do so, laws criminalizing active assistance in suicide deter them from providing such 
assistance. But in Classical Hinduism outside assistance was permissible if a person 
wished to put an end to his or her life because of some incurable disease or illness. 
Furthermore, the potential for criminal prosecution inhibits doctors from engaging 
in a free and open exchange of information about euthanasia with their terminal 
patients. The vast majority of terminal patients are inadequately informed about 
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the euthanasia option and are thus prevented from exercising their right of 
self-determination as protected by the constitutional right to privacy (Stehbens 1986 
: 190; Calaluca, 1984 : 156). 
3.2.7 VOLUNTARINESS 
Voluntary euthanasia is performed with the informed consent or at the informed 
request of a legally competent patient. A terminal patient's rational decision to 
commit suicide is an exercise of free will. In the related area of a patient's right to 
refuse treatment where the patient's life is at stake courts have defined legal 
competence as the mental ability to make a rational decision, which includes the 
ability to perceive, appreciate all relevant facts and to reach a rational judgement 
upon such facts (Wolhandler 1984 : 366 -367). In the euthanasia context, legal 
competence is the incurable's ability to understand that in requesting active 
euthanasia he is choosing death over life. Only clear and convincing evidence 
should suffice for finding of an incurable's competence. 
3.2.8 VOLUNTARY ACTIVE EUTHANASIA: THE DEBATE 
Objections to voluntary euthanasia are based on both religious and non-religious 
grounds. Yale Kamisar has raised the major non-religious objections to euthanasia. 
He argues that the risks of abuse outweigh the benefits that would accrue to a small 
number of terminal patients. Kamisar identifies two major risks of euthanasia 
(Wolhandler 1984: 377). 
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The first perceived risk is commonly known as the "wedge theory". Its proponents 
contend that once society accepts that life can be terminated because of its poor 
quality there is no rational way to limit euthanasia and prevent its abuse. According 
to this theory voluntary euthanasia is just the thin edge of a wedge that once in 
place, will be driven deeply into our society. Kamisar concludes that legalized 
voluntary euthanasia inevitably would lead to legalized involuntary euthanasia 
because it is impossible to draw a rational distinction between those who seek to die 
because they are a burden to themselves and those whom society would kill because 
they are a burden to others. Put simply the legalization of voluntary euthanasia will 
encourage or promote involuntary euthanasia. On this view the mortality of the first 
step "rests" in part on what the second step is likely to be. 
Glanville Williams believes that the wedge theory is not as persuasive as Kamisar 
and its other proponents suggest. He contends that courts can establish workable 
guidelines that permit the free exercise of the right to self-determination and also 
protect against the abuses Kamisar fears. Although establishing such guidelines 
may be difficult the cases clearly justifying active voluntary euthanasia can be 
defined. Relief should not be denied in these clear cases merely because of 
difficulties in distinguishing between the less clear cases which fall closer to the line 
separating justifiable from unjustifiable euthanasia (Wolhandler 1984 377 - 378). 
Although courts and legislators must proceed cautiously in euthanasia matters, this 
caution does not compel Kamisar's conclusion that no line can be drawn that will 
protect the innocent and help the competent terminally ill. 
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Kamisar's second perceived risk is the potential for abuse or mistake in allowing 
euthanasia. Abuse can most easily occur in establishing voluntariness. Kamisar is 
concerned that unscrupulous doctors, nurses or family members may coerce a 
weakened patient, for any number of improper reasons, into consenting to 
euthanasia that does not reflect the patient's true intent. Family members may not 
be entirely rational, during the latter stages of the patient's illness, and may not keep 
the patients best interest firmly in mind. Kamisar would forbid all forms of 
euthanasia because of the inevitable uncertainty surrounding a patient's true 
desires. Kamisar fails to consider, however, that courts often make determinations 
about a person's state of mind or true intentions (Wolhandler, 1984 : 378). 
Related to the problem of abuse is the problem of mistake. A doctor may 
incorrectly diagnose a patient as terminal. A decision to administer euthanasia 
based on an incorrect prognoses would be a tragic error. In addition even if a 
patient is incorrectly diagnosed as terminal some relief or a full cure may become 
available before the patient's natural death. Such medical discoveries are usually 
foreseeable, however, and doctors working with terminal illnesses generally are 
appraised for developing experimental treatments. An informed patient would have 
full notice of a potential cure. The risk of an incorrect diagnosis or the possibility of 
a relevant medical breakthrough are factors that an informed patient should 
consider when deciding on euthanasia (Wolhandler 1984 : 378 - 379). 
Kamisar finds that the risks of mistake and abuse of involuntary euthanasia 
outweigh the benefits of "easing pain" for a small group. The balancing of these 
concerns against the benefits of a quick painless death, however, should properly be 
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reserved for the individual patient. The right to privacy demands no less; 
government should not interfere with a terminal patient's assessment of his personal 
situation and his subsequent decision concerning euthanasia in the absence of 
legitimate state interests. The law should impose safeguards ensuring that terminal 
patients, have access to adequate information with which to assess their alternatives 
and that they are free from coercion in making their decision. The legal system 
should minimize the risks and abuses associated with involuntary euthanasia. 
However, in cases involving a competent terminal patient the right to privacy 
doctrine demands that the patient not be precluded from seeking and securing the 
assistance of others in committing self-euthanasia. Only patients with access to the 
necessary information and assistance can make a meaningful choice (Muldoon et al 
1982: 44 - 47). 
3.2.9 VOLUNTARY ACTIVE EUTHANASIA : SOME PRACTICAL 
GUIDELINES 
In certain circumstances, assisting a competent terminally ill patient in 
implementing his voluntary, informed decision to commit suicide (voluntary 
euthanasia) should not be subject to criminal sanctions. Exempting those who assist 
the suicide of a terminally ill patient from sanctions will often be necessary to 
protect the patient's right to privacy in making this very personal decision. The 
following are suggested legal guidelines for dealing with voluntary active euthanasia. 
To avoid criminal liability, those assisting a competent terminally ill patient commit 
suicide should be required to demonstrate satisfactory compliance with these guide 
lines. 
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1. The patient must be terminally ill. For a patient to be deemed terminal, two 
independent corroborative medical opinions must agree that the patient has 
less than six months to live. In termination of treatment cases, courts and 
hospitals successfully use the standard safeguard of verifying prognoses 
through two independent medical opinions. 
2. The decision must be voluntary. A patient's decision in favour of euthanasia 
is only voluntary if made free of coercion. The patient's motive for making 
his decision is irrelevant. Many factors including pain, debilitation emotional 
and financial burden on loved ones, and the quality of his remaining life may 
affect a terminal patient's euthanasia decision. For example a patient may 
choose to die· in order to spare his family the trauma of watching him 
reduced to a suffering vegetable. Although the euthanasia decision may be 
made for the benefit of others, it is nevertheless the patient's own choice. 
The patient should request voluntary euthanasia by signing a request form in 
the presence of two witnesses not otherwise involved with the patient. 
Second parties may discuss the euthanasia alternative with a terminal patient 
but if they request that the patient consent to euthanasia a presumption of 
involuntariness could arise. A candid exchange of information about 
alternative means of dying particularly between a doctor and the terminal 
patient, will ensure that the patient's decision is fully informed as well as 
voluntary. Doctors should carefully document all information exchanges as 
evidence of voluntariness. 
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3. The patient must be legally competent. Two independent psychiatric 
opinions must confirm that patient's competence. Euthanasia involving an 
incompetent patient is involuntary and in such cases the state interests in 
avoiding abuses weigh more heavily against the patient's right to privacy than 
they do in the case of a legally competent patient (Wolhandler, 1984 : 381). 
Individuals fearful of being left incapacitated and without legal competence 
to terminate their lives may prepare living wills. 
4) The patient's decision must be informed. A patient should be aware of the 
stages of degeneration accompanying his illness, the likelihood of temporary 
or permanent remission, the possibility of recovery, and any other medically 
relevant information. Full disclosure is essential to the unfettered exercise of 
the right to self-determination. Each disclosure provides a terminal patient 
more time to consider his limited options carefully before his thought process 
becomes inhibited by pain-relieving drugs. During this time period, the 
patient may want to participate in support group discussions with other 
patients who have suffered serious illness and contemplated euthanasia but 
have since recovered (Wolhandler 1984: 382). 
5. To further evidence voluntariness the doctor must prescribe the least active 
means to effectuate death. Because a fully informed request by a competent 
terminal patient for assistance in the act of self-euthanasia is presumptively 
acceptable, the burden should normally rest on a prosecutor to demonstrate 
that the euthanasia choice was improperly honoured by a physician. A 
132 
person more capable of causing his own painless death needs less active 
second party participation. Thus, the use of a more active method when less 
active means are available suggests improper conduct by the doctor. 
If the above five conditions are satisfied, doctors and the judicial system should 
honour a terminal patient's decision regarding the time and manner of his death 
(Wolhandler 1984 : 380 - 382). 
3.2.10 ORDINARY VERSUS EXTRAORDINARY TREATMENT 
It is the accepted rule that a doctor has the duty to administer ordinary means to 
preserve life, but there is no duty to administer extraordinary means. The logical 
question then becomes: What criteria should the physician use in deciding when to 
withhold life-prolonging treatment. In 1957, Pope Pius XII felt it necessary to 
address this issue in a speech before the International Congress of 
Anaesthesiologists. 
... Man has the right and duty in the case of serious illness to take the necessary 
treatment for the preservation of life and health. But normally one is held to use 
only ordinary means - according to the circumstances of persons, places, times and 
cultures - that is to say means that do not involve any great burden for oneself or 
another (Calaluca et al 1984 : 158). 
The primary consideration, therefore is whether the treatment offers a reasonable 
hope of benefit. All medicines and treatments should be those that can be obtained 
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and used without excessive expense, pain, or inconvenience. To justify continuance 
of treatment, there should be a reasonable belief that the patient will be restored to 
health or to some degree of normal functioning. Extraordinary means are 
considered those which do not involve these factors. Admittedly, the standards set 
forth for determining what constitutes ordinary medical treatment are vague. 
However, they have directed decision-makers to consider such factors as the 
patient's condition, the availability and effectiveness of remedies, and the financial 
and emotional cost to the family (Calaluca et al 1984: 158). 
3.2.11 WHO HAS THE RIGHT TO DECIDE? 
The definitions of death might be philosophical, medical, physiological, ethical, 
theological or phenomenological. Who is to control the manner and timing of death 
in its formal sense is who is to decide when to terminate treatment and when to 
begin the other actions and procedures that were previously regarded as depending 
on the occurrence of death. Who has the right to decide? And equally important, 
who does not have the right to decide? The whole idea of rights is based into a legal 
question. Ethical issues concerning life and death are thought to hinge on rights 
such as right to life, the right to die, the right to be treated , the right to refuse 
treatment, the right to decide when to turn off the respirator (Brock, 1979: 131). A 
number of questions may be asked about any alleged right. Firstly who are parties 
in the relationship? 
Secondly, what kind of performances or forbearance is required of the right owner? 
Here one may provisionally distinguish between positive rights, rights that require 
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positive acts of some sort or other and negative rights, that require non-performance 
e.g. non-interference. The question of whether a right is positive or negative 
becomes relevant to the issue of euthanasia when we ask what sort of performance 
or non-performance is required by the alleged right to life or the alleged right to die. 
Do they require positive acts of one sort or other, or do they require only 
forbearances, e.g. the abstention from killing or the abstention from treatment. 
This is in reference to one. Following tradition it is useful to distinguish between 
rights held against a particular person or group and rights held against everyone, 
"that is rights that are said to avail against the whole world". These are usually 
called rights in personam, rights that imposed duties on specific persons and the 
rights in rem, rights that impose duties on everyone. Right owners are groups of 
persons who might be called "people" or society and they may be said to have "ideal 
rights" (Ladd, 1979: 131). 
Thirdly, a number of questions arise about the formal properties of an alleged right. 
How and when can it be exercised? Can it be waived or not? Can one exercise the 
right of another person on his behalf, as a proxy? Is the right in question a prima 
facie right or is it an absolute right in the sense that it can never be overridden? In 
connection with the formal properties of a right, one must also be told what other 
secondary rights follow from it, such as the right to compel others to comply or the 
right to reparation for violations of a right. 
Finally, anyone who asserts that there is a right must be prepared to furnish as to 
where the right came from : that is one must be able to provide its basis . Right may 
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arise out of contracts (or promises) out of positions and roles, out of conditions and 
circumstances, and out of various acts of oneself or of others. Theologians maintain 
that some rights, example the right to life, were given to man by God; natural rights 
are supposed to stem from the rational social animal. Liberal philosophers often 
suppose that rights are based on interests of one sort or another. Still others 
maintain that rights are based on needs. Unless the proponent of a right is able 
satisfactorily to answer this question about the source or basis of the right his claim 
that there is such a right either in general or in a specific instance, must be rejected. 
The burden of proof rests on the proponent of the right to show that there is such a 
right by showing where it comes from (Ladd, 1979 : 131 - 132). 
3.2.U INDIRECT EUTHANASIA 
The notion "indirect euthanasia" is used when the pain killing measures 
administered by a doctor result in the shortening of the patient's life. The aim, 
however, is not to terminate life, but to alleviate the patient's suffering. For 
administering such a pain killer the informed consent of the patient is needed. If 
the patient cannot express his will, it may be presumed that he has consented to 
such pain-killing measure as every reasonable patient would want. The 
administration of the pain-alleviating method can be qualified as an act with double 
effect, the unavoidable shortening of life, but according to the aim of it, which is to 
combat the pain of which the patient is suffering. Many medical acts and drugs have 
side effects, but nobody will define them from the viewpoint of these side-effects. 
The same is true for pain-killing (Leenen 1984 : 336). 
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Euthanasia can be voluntary but indirect. The choice might be made either in situ 
or long in advance of a terminal illness, example by exacting a promise that if and 
when the "bare bodkin" or potion cannot be self-administered somebody will do it 
for the patient. In this case the patient gives to others - physicians, lawyers, family, 
friends - the discretion to end it all as and when the situation requires, if the patient 
becomes comatose or too dysfunctioned to make the decision pro forma ... (Fletcher 
1973: 673). 
3.2.13 DIRECT EUTHANASIA 
Euthanasia may be direct but involuntary. This is the form in which a simple 
mercy-killing is done on a patient's behalf without his present or past request. An 
example would be when an idiot is given a fatal dose or the death of a child in the 
worst stages of Tay-Sachs disease is speeded up, or when a man trapped inextricably 
in a blazing fire is shot to end his suffering, or a shutdown is ordered on a patient 
deep in a mindless condition, irreversibly, perhaps due to an injury or an infection or 
some biological breakdown. It is in this form, as directly involuntary, that the 
problem has reached the courts in legal charges and indictments. 
According to Fletcher (1973) Uruguay is the only country that allows it. Article 37 
of the Codiga Penal specifically states that although it is a "crime" the courts are 
authorized to forego any penalty. In time the world will follow suit. Laws in 
Colombia and in the Soviet Union ... are similar to Uruguay's but in their codes 
freedom from punishment is exceptional rather than normative. In Italy, Germany 
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and Switzerland the law provides for a reduction of penalties when it is done upon 
the patient's request ... (Fletcher, 1973 : 673). 
Euthanasia might be both indirect and involuntary. This is the "letting the patient 
go" tactic which is taking place every day in the hospitals. Nothing is done for the 
patient positively to release him from the tragic condition (besides making him 
comfortable), and what is done negatively is decided for him rather than in response 
to his request. 
Ethically speaking, this indirect involuntary form of euthanasia is manifestedly 
superficial morally timid, and evasive of the real issue. Fletcher says, "it is harder 
morally to justify letting somebody die a slow and ugly death dehumanized, than it is 
to justify helping him to avoid it". (Fletcher 1973: 673). 
3.2.14 TERMINATION OF A MEDICALLY POINTLESS TREATMENT 
Medical treatment is justified by its sense; the means used must be proportional to 
the aim sought to be achieved. If the situation arises that continuation of a 
treatment is medically pointless then medicines capacity to heal or to help has come 
to an end. This can be the case when a cure is no longer possible, no improvement 
of the medical condition can result from medical acts and when available means are 
unproportional for instance when they merely prolong dying. The doctor is then 
entitled to end the medical treatment. Law is restricted to what is within the field of 
human control and nobody is bound to do the impossible. Accordingly, when 
medicine is powerless to heal or improve then it has to recognize that it is empty 
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handed and has to stop treating the patient. This falls beyond the professional 
competence of the doctor. When treatment has become medically pointless, the 
patient has to be informed and the normal care and sedation of pain has to be 
administered. If communication with the patient, because of his condition is not 
possible, the patient can of course not be informed (Leenen 1984 : 336). 
3.2.15 REFUSAL OF MEDICAL TREATMENT 
No patient may be treated without his consent and it is his right to refuse and to 
withdraw the given consent. This can result in the death of the patient. Sometimes 
doctors are of the opinion that in such cases they commit euthanasia by omitting to 
act. This opinion, however, has no legal basis: the doctor· is not even allowed to 
treat. Sometimes the patient is put under pressure, even denied his presence in the 
hospital if the patient refuses treatment. Such pressures are against the law. The 
patient has the right to refuse and after refusing is entitled to normal care. Because 
of the contractual relationship between the doctor, hospital and patient it would be 
a breach of contract, in some countries also a criminal act, if normal medical and 
nursing care would be withdrawn (Leenen 1984: 337). Because of civil and criminal 
liability the doctor is entitled to ask from the patient a written statement containing 
his refusal. 
3.2.16 EUTHANASIA OF DEFECTIVE NEWBORNS 
While one may empathize with the parents of a defective infant one cannot at the 
same time ignore the fact that the innocent life of an untreated child is involved. 
139 
Such an infant, irrespective of it condition, is a person with a right to life, a right that 
is the basis of one's social order and legal system (Robertson 1975 : 216). One 
ought to consider the plight of the child more than the plight of the parent. Hindu 
philosophy explains the situation through the Law of Karma. The fact that the 
parent has to take responsibility for the child also becomes his dharma (duty). 
According to Hindu philosophy one cannot escape the Law of Karma and dharma. 
If one tries to do this, then one is hindering one's own spiritual development. 
Handicapped children too need love and care. If these children are neglected and 
rejected by their parents, there will be no one else to protect or even articulate their 
interests. From the infant's perspective withdrawing care would appear to be a 
serious infringement of a basic right. 
According to Robertson the courts have not yet ruled directly on the criminal 
liability of persons who refuse ordinary life-saving medical care for defective infants, 
under traditional principles of criminal law, the omission of such care by parents, 
physicians and nurses creates criminal liability (Robertson 1975 : 217). The crimes 
committed may include murder, involuntary manslaughter, conspiracy and child 
abuse or neglect . 
3.2.16.1 THE PARENT'S DU1Y TO THE DEFECTIVE INFANT 
Parents no doubt have a legal and moral duty to provide care, including medical 
assistance to a helpless minor child, irrespective of its condition. The fact that the 
parent is responsible for bringing the child into the world, the parent should be 
responsible for the child's well-being. 
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The parental duty of care also arises when a lawfully aborted viable foetus dies 
because medical care is withheld after removal from the mother's body (Robertson 
1975 : 218 - 219). Although a mother has not yet been prosecuted for such omission 
her duty to care for the live abortus can be found on two grounds. First, if the infant 
is alive after removal, a human being has been born and the parental duty to 
provide medical care attaches, until parental rights and obligations are terminated. 
Second, even if the direct parental duty is inapplicable, the mother has a legal duty 
to act on the theory that one who places another in peril, however innocently, is 
liable legally. While after delivery the mother can reasonably be expected to do 
very little one reasonably can expect steps to assume care of the infant to be taken 
before birth. If a woman is fully informed of the alternative outcomes of a late-term 
abortion by hysterectomy, including the possibility of a live abortus, she would be 
under a duty to assure that the child would be cared for. At the minimum she 
cannot request pre-operatively that the infant be refused treatment and allowed be 
to die. 
Horan has outlined nine ethical propositions with regard to the defective newborn 
(Horan 1977 (a) : 198 - 199). They are:-
1. Every baby born poses a moral value which entitles it to the medical and 
social care necessary to effect its well-being. 
2. Parents bear the principal moral responsibility for the well-being of their new 
born infant. 
141 
3. Physicians have the duty to take medical measures conducive to the well-
being of the baby in proportion to the fiduciary relationships to the parents. 
4. The state has an interest in the proper fulfillment of responsibilities and 
duties regarding the well-being of the infant, as well as an interest in ensuring 
an equitable apportionment of limited resources among its citizens. 
5. The responsibility of the parents, the duty of the physician and the interests 
of the state are conditioned by the medico-moral principle, "do no harm 
without expecting compensating benefit for the patient". 
6. Life preserving intervention should be understood as doing harm to an 
infant, who cannot survive infancy or will live in intractable pain, or cannot 
participate even minimally in human experience. 
7. If the court is called upon to resolve disagreements between parents and 
physicians about medical care, prognosis about quality of life for the infant 
should weigh heavily in the decision as to whether or not to order life-saving 
intervention. 
8. If an infant is charged beyond medical intervention and if it is judged that its 
continued brief life will be marked by pain or discomfort, it is permissible to 
hasten death by means consonant with the moral value of the infant and the 
duty of the physician. 
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9. In cases of limited availability of neonatal intensive care it is ethical to 
terminate therapy for an infant with poor prognosis in order to provide care 
for an infant with a much better prognosis. 
The propositions put forward by Horan are sound and logical. One has to weigh the 
situation carefully, before making a decision. Sometimes it might be in the infant's 
best interest, if it is just left untreated rather to subject it to some complicated 
surgery. The end result may be futile. Doctors in the Durban area who were 
interviewed said that medical care should not be denied to children with mental 
impairment (e.g. the Downs Syndrome). One doctor said that if a normal infant 
with duodenal atresia needs corrective surgery then the same should apply to an 
infant who happens to have Downs Syndrome. There is a difference between 
mental and physical impairment. Most of the people who were interviewed agreed 
that children with mental impairments should not be denied corrective surgery. 
Physically they would be able to lead a better life if corrective surgery is performed 
(e.g. duodenal atresia). Foot argues that everyone irrespective of his or her 
condition has a right to life and medical care (Foot 1979 : 37). This argument can 
be viewed in a different dimension as well. It is judged better for an irreversibly 
dying infant to be cradled in the arms of loving parents than to expire while fully 
connected to some rescue technology that can only prolong dying. Rickham (1969) 
and Taub (1982) have also said that painful decisions have to be made concerning 
surgery with defective newborns. Both parents and physicians have to decide as to 
what is best for the infant concerned (Rickham 1969: 251; Taub 1982: 5 - 7). 
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Therefore parents, physicians and nursery care providers have to make sensible 
decisions. Competent individuals who may be in the same plight as the helpless 
infant have the right to refuse life-prolonging treatment, so it is on this basis that 
Western scholars on this subject argue that it could be morally acceptable for one 
person to refuse life-prolonging treatment for an incompetent person, in this case an 
infant, as long as the grounds for refusal are all expressions of the patient's best 
interest. These are painful decisions but nevertheless, they are made in the best 
interest of the infant. Hindu dharma deals with duties that have not only short term 
results but also take into account long term consequences. Killing or letting die may 
be allowed if it is done in the patient's best interests or to society in general. 
3.2.16.2 INTOLERABLE LIFE 
Children born with severe physical and mental impairment will lead a life that will 
be intolerable. Some Hindus argue that these children even when they grow up will 
not be aware of their mental or physical condition; hence one cannot say that they 
are leading an intolerable life. Their life or rather their condition will be intolerable 
to their parents or those who provide care for them. Caring for such children, who 
will become adults some day is agonising itself. Those who are of sound mind and 
body suffer more because of their level of consciousness. Those who are impaired 
do not have this level of consciousness, they are not aware of themselves and the 
outside world in which they exist. Therefore one cannot say that their life is 
intolerable. People who are associated with these defective infants (parents and 
other care-givers) do so because of their karmic action. Karma is individual, group 
and collective. It is also their dharma to look after these children. Dharma is also 
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individual, group and collective. However, the concepts of karma and dharma have 
been re-interpreted. Many argue that because of their defects, these infants should 
not be subjected to any extraordinary care. By introducing extraordinary measures, 
one is prolonging the life of such infants. Death in Hinduism is not looked upon as 
an evil occurrence, but a blessing, an event that liberates the soul from its bondage. 
Death will be a blessing for such children. The soul can find a new healthier body. 
It is through the physical body that the soul is able to evolve spiritually. Defective 
infants cannot perform action (karma), hence they cannot develop spiritually. It 
may seem cruel to allow these infants to die, but it can also be considered dharmic 
for one is liberating the soul and giving it a chance to evolve spiritually. 
As much as one would object to active euthanasia in the defective newborn, one 
would welcome passive euthanasia or "letting die" However, those who are 
engaging in such acts are not aware of the spiritual consequences. People resorting 
to passive euthanasia (of defective newborns, even adults who lack quality of life) 
are doing so not because of the reasons outlined above, but because of other 
reasons, that do not concern the welfare of the individual. The reasons given by 
physicians were:- the maintenance of a defective baby will drain the resources of its 
family and health care institutions. Resources of both family and community could 
be used for other purposes. Among these legitimate purposes is the protection and 
preservation of other people who now or may in the future live in its family or 
community (Smith 1974 : 40 - 41). No amount of extra or palliative surgery will 
remove the child's mongolism and so this drain will continue no matter what is 
done. His death is the only alternative to living with the problem. This verdict may 
be well known to parents, physicians and any relevant legal authorities. Thus the 
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baby represents a serious threat to lives, a threat which cannot be removed in any 
other way. Once this verdict is impartially pronounced, an act destroying the child is 
justifiable infanticide rather than murder. 
Others argue that euthanasia is not the only answer to this kind of problem. There 
are many ways in which the family can be saved, short of the death of the baby. The 
child can be institutionalised. Those in the legal profession feel that it is the "life" 
that is in question and not the quality of life. There might be cases where there are 
defective newborns where the parents are missing, and decisions are left to the 
physician and society. This deserted baby will not only lack the advantages of a 
home but he will also represent an unusually serious drain on society's resources. 
Who decides for this baby? Many argue that euthanasia is the answer to this 
problem; others disagree on the basis that there might not be anyone willing to take 
responsibility for such an infant. Nobody will even want to adopt such an infant. 
Making a decision for such an infant is no easy task. 
3.2.16.3 RATIONALIZATIONS 
Proponents of euthanasia have put forth many rationalizations for its use with 
persons who have severe disabilities. Some arguments focus on the good to society 
of "allowing" disabled individuals to die. For example at a time when care in a 
special care nursery can cost thousands of dollars, questions are increasingly being 
asked about withholding treatment from some infants on the grounds that providing 
it is excessive in cost. Other arguments for euthanasia centre on the good to the 
individuals families of "allowing" the family member to die. Fletcher has proposed 
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that the plight of the family should be heavily considered in deciding upon whether 
to treat an infant with severe disabilities. However, the most persuasive of the 
rationalizations for euthanasia and the most convincing appeal is for the good of the 
individuals themselves. Rationales that allude to the good of the individuals can be 
particularly appealing to those who are parents, professionals and friends of persons 
with disabilities. We are not easily convinced that euthanasia is the right practice 
when we are told that it costs society too much to serve people with severe 
handicaps or that it costs families too much in time, energy and finances to raise 
children with severe disabilities. But we find ourselves questioning our own beliefs 
about euthanasia when we are told that it is really the best alternative for 
handicapped persons themselves. Unless we are clear in our own position about the 
absolute worth of each life, we can be readily drawn into agreeing that individuals 
with severe handicaps would be better off dead (Lusthaus 1985 (a): 87 - 88). 
Thus it is imperative to look at the rationalizations that are put forward to justify 
euthanasia of handicapped persons "for their own good" and to consider some 
refutations of these rationales. 
RATIONALIZATION 1 : THE INDMDUALS ARE NOT "REALLY" PEOPLE 
In the first rationalization it is proposed that the individuals in question are not 
"really" people, and therefore they would be better off dead than to exist as a 
nebulous species of non persons. 
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Central to this argument according to Robertson (1975) is the notion that some 
offspring of man and woman are human and that some are not. Conception and 
birth by human parents does not automatically endow one with personhood .... 
Some other characteristic or feature must be present in the organism for it to be 
vested with personhood (Robertson 1975: 247). 
What are the characteristics that are required for humaneness? Intelligence is an 
important component. Proponents of this point of view say that if an individual 
lacks a certain level of intelligence he or she is not really a person. Another 
Western writer on the subject asks, "Whether class five (profound mental 
retardation) can be regarded as being humanly alive in the sense in which he usually 
understands these words (Robertson 1975 : 251). Joseph Fletcher (1975) also 
reflected this point of view when in all seriousness he claimed that any individual of 
the species Homo sapiens who falls below the I.Q. 40 mark in a Standard Stanford 
Binet Test ... is unquestionably a person; below 20 mark not a person. Fletcher 
wrote that a father who gave instructions to withhold medical treatment for his son 
with Downs Syndrome should feel no guilt for guilt is only relevant when wrong is 
done to a person. According to Fletcher a Downs is not a person. 
Other characteristics that are thought to be required for humanhood are a sense of 
self-consciousness and the ability to have human relationships. Whatever the 
characteristic the individuals in question are not considered "really" people unless 
they have an adequate amount of the feature. An infant, although born of a human, 
but who cannot relate to other human beings (have certain values and norms and 
form relationships) are not regarded as persons. 
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However, the above point can be refuted and all persons as fully human is that 
abuse is typically imposed on those defined as subhuman. Robertson, a lawyer, 
argued that all persons must be considered persons because of the dangers inherent 
in calling some persons non-human. All human offspring are human. In this 
position, it is argued that all offspring of human parents are human no matter what 
limitation the offspring may have. "According to this view" said Robertson "human 
parentage is a necessary and sufficient condition for personhood, whatever the 
characteristics of the offspring" (Robertson 1975 : 247). The offspring of a man and 
a woman is a human, and no other criteria must be used to measure humaness. 
According to Robertson it is unethical to question anyone's humanity (Robertson 
1975 : 247 - 248). Reasoning of this nature can lead to abuse and mistreatment of 
the mentally retarded. 
A second argument for defining all persons as fully human and fully entitled to life 
is also not easily understood. How is one to determine the cut off point? In the 
Nazi euthanasia programme, the criteria for who was human changed rapidly and 
became increasingly global. The victims began with those who were severely 
impaired and grew to include those with odd-shaped ears and very dark hair 
(Lusthaus 1985 (a) : 89). 
A third argument for refuting the rationales for involuntary euthanasia is based on 
religious convictions as well as moral beliefs. This argument was stated by Paul 
Ramsey who said that no human feature is required in order to provide humaneness 
because the newborn possesses humanhood of irreducible dignity as a free gift of 
God. Robertson said that "All creatures are sacred containing a spark of the divine 
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and should be so regarded" (Robertson 1975 : 213). Gustafson agreed that "the 
intrinsic value or rights of a human being are not qualified by any given person's 
intelligence or capacities or productivity ... rather they are constituted by the very 
existence of the human being ... " (Gustafson 1973: 553). 
Paul Ramsey a Christian theologian had this to say regarding the involuntary 
euthanasia of children with handicaps: 
"Ordinarily, the neglected infants are not born dying. They are only born defective 
and in need of help. The question whether no treatment is the indicated treatment 
cannot legitimately be raised", as God does not support persecution (Ramsey in 
Gustafson 1973 : 556). 
Gustafson also appealed to unifying principles of religious belief systems in arguing 
against involuntary euthanasia of infants with handicaps. He cited a central theme 
of Old and New Testaments. "You shall love your neighbour as yourself' (Lev. 
19.18) and "Love your neighbour as yourself' (Matt 22: 39) and "Each of you must 
regard not his own interests but the other mans" (1 Cor. 10: 24). Gustafson argued 
eloquently that to be "human is to have a vocation, a calling, and the calling of each 
of us is "to be for others" at least as much as "to be for ourselves" (Gustafson 1973: 
556). 
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RATIONALIZATION 2 : THE INDMDUALS LACK QUALI'IY OF LIFE 
In this rationalization it is proposed that the individuals lack a necessary quality of 
life, and therefore they would be better off dead than to exist in a meaningless life, 
often with suffering and sorrow. 
Central to this argument is the notion that someone can judge whether another 
individual can experience meaning in his or her life. First proponents of this point 
of view typically express their opinion on what makes life have value, meaning and 
worth. What is the quality of life that is considered necessary for a meaningful 
existence? Several factors are usually used in trying to make a determination of the 
quality of someone's life. These include the severity of the individual's disability 
including the prognosis for development and or prediction of future suffering, the 
stress or demands on the individual's family and the cost to society of supporting the 
individual. 
Quality of life depends on the degree of the child's retardation or physical handicap, 
the disturbance his life would cause to his family and the resources available in 
society to assure him of a meaningful life. Numerous value judgements determine 
the standard for adequate quality, the doctor's original diagnosis of the child's 
potential the parent's commitment and expectations for their child, and the general 
attitude of the society towards unprofitable numbers. 
Using the quality of life as a basis for deciding who should live and die is very 
common. A quality of life ethic has been advocated by many physicians who think 
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that it should replace a sanctity of life ethic. For example potential quality of life 
was found to be the most important factor among physicians in making decisions 
about whether to treat infants with Downs Syndrome. Quality of life has also been 
advocated as a basis for ethical and legal standards about whether to treat infants 
with disabilities. At its heart, the quality of life view depends on the value that is put 
on someone's life. The value of the person is judged to be relative to the predicted 
quality of his or her life (Gustafson). It is thought that lives that are not worthwhile 
which are seen to have no worth to self, family or society can be legitimately 
terminated. The above reasons can be refuted, and other reasons can be posited to 
make all persons worth to life regardless of their alleged quality of life. 
One argument against the quality of life rationalization is based on the impossibility 
of defining quality of life. How is one to determine as to what comprises quality? 
How does one know whether there is adequate quality in life for it to be worthwhile, 
or for a person to be considered worthwhile? It is not ethical to make judgements 
on other people's life and say that their life is not worthwhile. Is it ethical for 
parents, physicians and society to assume that a child with severe handicaps would 
rather be dead? A study was carried out in America in which a large number of 
children with severe impairments due to thalidomide were questioned (Robertson 
1975 : 254 ). The study indicated that the children "do indeed value their lives, that 
they are glad they were born that they look forward to the future with hope and 
anticipation". 
Robertson also puts forth a similar argument, when he asks how could a "proxy" 
accurately conclude that someone with severe handicaps would not want to live. 
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Would a "person with different wants, needs and interests, if able to speak, agree 
that such a life were worse than death" (Robertson 1975 : 254). How can someone 
else say, he questioned, that a child with an I.Q. of 20 would rather be dead, than 
live the life he is living? He warned that the "proxy" making this judgement is 
probably not a disinterested party but one who would be responsible for the person's 
care, and he questioned who is being spared in the decision to withhold treatment. 
He argued that we cannot judge the meaning or worth that is inherent in life even 
when life is severely restricted. Life and life alone, whatever, its limitations might 
be of sufficient worth to the defective (Robertson 1975 : 254). The interest of the 
caretakers is being safeguarded, when euthanasia is recommended for defective 
newborns. Euthanasia, for such reasons, according to Hindu philosophy, will be 
regarded as adharmic. 
Another difficulty with the quality of life perspective lies in the likelihood that 
persons making quality of life predictions about individuals with severe disabilities 
may hold unduly pessimistic ideas about their ability to grow, develop and enjoy life. 
This issue has been visible in the debates over the euthanasia of infants born with 
spina bifida. Lorber is an outspoken proponent of the selective non-treatment of 
infants whom he has designated as too handicapped to have a good developmental 
prognosis. In 1973 he reported that his hospital did not treat twenty five of the thirty 
seven newborns with spina bifida born during a twenty one month period because 
their conditions were too severe according to his clinical criteria. All died within 
nine months. In contrast Zackary is convinced that many paediatricians engaging in 
selective non treatment of spina bifida in infants are unduly pessimistic about the 
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future awaiting such infants. He indicated that these children are often depicted as 
living completely miserable and unhappy lives but he has not found this to be the 
case for the children with spina bitida whom he had treated (Robertson 1975: 254). 
Differing opinions about the potential development of persons with spina bitida 
became acutely apparent in April 1982, when an infant in this condition was denied 
treatment and apparently was being starved allegedly because of the physician's and 
parent's pessimistic predictions about the future quality of the child's life. The 
Spina Bitida Association of America assumed an advocacy rule in this case by 
publicly calling for "treatment of this baby and of every infant born with spina 
bitida" because ninety percent of children born with this condition today grow up to 
live normal healthy lives (Robertson 1975 : 254 ). 
Garland also classifies children in the intensive care nursery into 3 categories: (1) 
those who must be treated; (2) those who at the parent's discretion may either be 
treated or allowed to die and (3) those who should be allowed to die (Garland 1977 
: 15). 
3.2.17 THE EUTHANASIA DEBATE : A SOUTH AFRICAN VIEW 
Based on religious or ethical grounds one finds the notion of mercy-killing 
unacceptable. According to Bernard Ficarra, the euthanasia issue is part of the 
conflict between two systems of thought: the system which recognises its obligation 
to God and His Law, and the other system which claims that man need have no 
higher motive than the gratification of his own desires. Ficarra accuses the 
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proponents of mercy killing of "flirting with moral insanity". When one adopts 
euthanasia in any form, he says, one is on the path back to the jungle (Strauss, 1991 : 
336-337). 
Modem South African criminal law is unequivocal in its rejection of active 
euthanasia. One should consider the following cases that have come before the 
courts: 
State vs de Bellocq (1968). The accused's three week old baby was diagnosed to 
have toxoplasmosis which in effect meant that the child would be physically and 
mentally incapacitated and not live for any length of time. She was charged with 
murder subsequent to her drowning the child. In finding her guilty of murder the 
court found extenuating circumstances to be present and no effective sentence was 
imposed on her (South African Law Reports, 1975 (3) SA 538 (T) Duncan et al 1975 
(3) 538 - 539). 
State vs Hartman (1975). The accused, a medical practitioner caused the death of 
his eighty-seven year old father who was terminally ill and in a critical state by 
administering an overdose of drugs. Dr. Hartman was convicted of murder and 
sentenced to one year imprisonment. However, he was to be detained only until the 
rising of the court and the balance of the sentence was suspended for one year, 
subject to the condition that during that period the accused was not to commit an 
offence involving the intentional infliction of bodily injury (1975 (3) SA 532 (C) 
Duncan et al 1975 (3) : 532 - 537). 
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State v McBride (1979). The accused killed his wife whom he believed to be dying 
of cancer. He attempted to shoot himself thereafter but was prevented from doing 
so. The court found him not guilty on account of his mental illness (1979 (4) SA 313 
(W) Barnett et al 1979: 313 - 324). 
3.2.17.1 THE "LIVING WILL" AND THE "RIGHT TO DIE" 
The modern physician has to a large extent become master over life and death. 
What might have been regarded as a hopeless case a few decades ago, may now be 
viewed as a still treatable case. The doctor has at his disposal techniques and 
instruments which belonged to the realm of science fiction not so long ago. 
Therefore the voluntary euthanasia movement which has adherents in many 
countries, represents a concrete expression of the attitude that the patient should 
have the conclusive say on whether or not he should be the subject of life-prolonging 
procedures a decision which, on account of the circumstances of a terminal patient, 
is frequently taken by the doctor or the patient's next of kin. 
It is significant that medical men and nurses have played an active role in the 
voluntary euthanasia movement. The South African Living Will Society (its 
acronym is SAVES) was founded in 1974 by a nursing sister, Mrs. Sylvia Kean. Its 
current president is Professor Harry Grant-Whyte. The Society's membership in 
this country has grown steadily and in 1991 exceeded twenty thousand. 
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The society distributes the so-called "Living Will" for execution by its members. The 
document contains a declaration directed to the signatory's family and physicians 
that reads as follows: "If the time comes when I can no longer take part in decisions 
for my own future, let this declaration stand as the testament to my wishes. If there 
is no reasonable prospect of my recovery from physical illness or impairment 
expected to cause me severe distress or to render me incapable of rational existence, 
I request that I be allowed to die and not be kept alive by artificial means and that I 
receive whatever quantity of drugs may be required to keep me free from pain or 
distress even if the moment of death is hastened". 
One may ask whether the Living Will is a legally valid document? 
The Living Will is not a will in the technical testamentary sense of the word. 
Legally it is a declaration in which a person in anticipando by way of an advance 
directive refuses medical attention in the form of being kept alive by artificial 
means. 
In principle every person is legally entitled to refuse medical attention, even if it has 
the effect of expediting his death. In this sense the individual has a "right to die". 
All that is required is that the declarant at the time when making his refusal known 
is compos mentis. The declaration remains valid even though the declarant may at 
a later stage become non compos mentis as a result of physical or mental illness, or 
for any other reason. Strauss says, "if a man in a concrete situation, where it is 
proposed that he should immediately be subjected to a particular form of treatment, 
is entitled to refuse that treatment, there is no reason why he would not be entitled 
to express a "standing" refusal at any earlier stage". Such a refusal, if properly 
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recorded, would then stand until revoked by the person who has made it. It should 
be seen as nothing but a statement to the following effect: "I am stating here and 
now that I am not consenting to medical procedure X being performed upon me, 
should this at any stage be proposed". Naturally such a statement remains freely 
revocable, but unless revoked remains legally effective (Strauss, 1991: 344 - 345). 
Doctors and hospital staff must respect the declarant's statement of refusal. Should 
a doctor disregard it and keep the patient alive by artificial means, the doctor will be 
technically guilty of an assault, both from the point of view of civil law and criminal 
law. According to Annas et al (Strauss 1984 : 388), the Living Will is "a legal 
statement of the patient's; there is no public policy against the terminally ill patient 
refusing treatment". This statement, made in the American context is just as valid 
for South African law, according to Strauss. 
It is immaterial what the signatory's motive is, be it fear of prolonging his suffering 
when terminally ill or critically injured, a desire to spare his next of kin the agony of 
watching him over a long drawn period of illness, or a desire to save his estate the 
major expense involved in lengthy treatment in a hospital's intensive care unit. 
If a doctor or a hospital staff were to disregard the fact that a terminal patient has 
signed a Living Will, nothing much can be done about enforcing the patients' rights, 
unless someone, e.g. a relative, were to intercede on behalf of the patient. Should 
there be such a disregard, the court may be approached for appointment of a 
curator ad litem for the patient, in order to bring an application for an interdict 
against the doctor. 
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As regards the part of the Living Will in which the patient requests that "I receive 
whatever quantity of drugs may be required to keep me free from pain or distress 
even if the moment of death is hastened", the situation is not without problems in 
South African law (Strauss 1991 : 344 - 345). According to a South African 
judgement to hasten death is in fact to cause it. In R versus Makali 1950 (1) SA 340 
(N) the court declared: ''The true enquiry is whether the deceased would have died 
when he did but for the accused's unlawful act. If this enquiry gives an affirmative 
answer the accused is responsible for the death because he caused it to take place 
when it did that is to say because he hastened it". 
That stipulation of Living Will which expresses the patient's desire to receive 
whatever quantity of drugs may be required to keep him free from pain or distress, 
even if his death is hastened, therefore, seems to be legally unassailable. As long as 
the doctor acts in good faith using the usual pain-relieving substances, in reasonable 
quantities with the intent to relieve pain and not to kill there will be no question of 
criminal or civil liability on his part (Strauss 1984 : 389 - 390). 
3.2.17.2 THE TERMINALLY ILL -A SOUTH AFRICAN NEW LEGAL 
PERSPECTIVE 
New laws officially recognising the "living will" - the right of terminally ill patients to 
be taken off life-support machines have been proposed by the South African Law 
Commission. In a new report, the commission makes suggestions for legislation and 
asks for public comment on the proposals. 
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The commission stresses it is considering "passive" euthanasia only; that is, stopping 
treatment which prolongs life or giving pain-relieving drugs to make a dying patient 
comfortable even if this has the indirect effect of hastening death. No changes have 
been proposed to the legal ban on "active" euthanasia - a practice outlawed in most 
countries and one most South Africans appear to oppose. 
One commission says there are a number of problems associated with the living will. 
While the rights of patients to refuse treatment must be respected, arrangements 
must also be made for situations in which the patient can no longer communicate. 
There is also a conflict between the tendency of many medical professionals to try to 
prolong life for as long as possible, while the priority for most people is to be 
allowed to die with dignity and without pain. Doctors fear if they do respect 
patient's wishes not to have their lives prolonged, they could be exposed to legal 
action. At the same time, doctors should not be obliged to act against their 
consciences. 
The legal situation is changing with the courts recently beginning to soften their 
attitude to passive euthanasia. Some have agreed to allow doctors to switch off 
machines keeping patients alive artificially once it becomes clear that there is no 
hope of recovery because the patient is in an "irreversible, persistent vegetative 
state". 
Faced with these and other problems the commission suggests the confusion would 
best be resolved if parliament passed new laws clearly setting out when the artificial 
preservation of life can be stopped. The draft laws propose that anyone over 
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eighteen can make a ''written directive" that, if they should ever suffer from a 
terminal illness, all medical treatment should be stopped except that needed to ease 
suffering. The draft also says that anyone can sign a power of attorney appointing 
someone as an agent to take decisions about ending treatment if they themselves 
cannot do so. 
If there is no living will anyone with a personal interest could ask a court to order 
that all medical treatment except pain control be stopped. Doctors may only allow 
the living will instructions if they are convinced the person is suffering intolerably 
and will not recover, or if the patient is "brain dead". At least one other uninvolved 
doctor must confirm these conditions have been met. The doctor must also be 
satisfied that the living will is authentic. If the family is opposed to his following the 
Living Will instructions, he should not do so unless there is a court order. 
If there is no "written directive" the chief medical officer at the hospital may permit 
treatment to be stopped. However, doctors would not be obliged to do anything 
they felt conflicted with their consciences or ethics. The proposed law states that 
stopping treatment would not be unlawful just because it would contribute to the 
patient's death, but it also says clearly that it cannot be used to cause the death of 
someone who is not terminally ill (Sunday Times 27 /2/94). 
Hindus in general support euthanasia if and when the circumstances arise that 
euthanasia seem to be the only option. Most Hindus disapprove of artificial life 
support systems. The laws regarding euthanasia might be subject to alteration in the 
new South Africa and these laws will also affect the Hindus. 
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3.3 SUICIDE 
As a form of human behaviour suicide is probably as ancient as man himself. 
Suicide has been practised for thousands of years in primitive and historic societies, 
but the antiquity of the phenomenon has been associated with a wide diversity of 
attitudes and feelings in the judgement of suicidal behaviour. Societal responses to 
the act of self-destruction can be viewed as a spectrum ranging from outright 
condemnation on the one hand through mild disapproval to acceptance and 
incorporation into the socio-cultural system on the other. But, just as societies vary 
in their reactions to suicide, so attitudes within a society have changed in the course 
of time. 
History provides perspective for present views of suicide. An historical approach 
makes it possible to see suicide in different temporal contexts, and try to understand 
the meaning it has for people of varying backgrounds and experiences. Moreover, 
by examining suicide not simply as a medical or psychological phenomenon, but 
rather as an element in a process of social change over time, it is possible to study it 
in relation to various facets of a population or a society (Perlin 1975 : 3 - 4). 
Perhaps it might be appropriate to ask the question as to whether suicide 
(self-destruction) is becoming a problem to society, or is there something drastically 
wrong in society itself that man is finding a solution in suicide and suicide alone as a 
means of solving his problem. 
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3.3.1 THE MORALI1Y AND RATIONALI1Y OF SUICIDE 
Among the problems that have been regarded as good and sufficient reasons for 
ending life, one finds in addition to serious illness the following: some event that has 
made a person feel ashamed or lose his prestige and status; reduction from 
affluence to poverty; the loss of a limb or of physical beauty; the loss of sexual 
capacity; some event that makes it seem impossible to achieve things by which one 
sets store; loss of a loved one; disappointment in love; the infirmities of increasing 
age. However, one cannot deny that such things can be serious blows to a person's 
prospects of happiness. 
Feelings of being unwanted and unneeded affect all age and population groups, and 
if these feelings coming from significant other people are strong enough and global 
enough, they can present sufficient stress to result in suicidal death (Pretzel 1972 : 
40). 
The ability to cope with stress is a more difficult quality to measure or to describe. 
When feelings of self-esteem are high, when there have been enough positive inter-
personal experiences in one's past that he feels worthwhile as a person, he will 
normally be able to deal with most stress in an appropriate and competent way and 
not feel that his basic worth as a human being is in jeopardy. When one has not had 
the benefit of these early feeling and caring experiences, however, or for some 
reason has been unable to incorporate them and build on them, he will be left with 
grave uncertainty about his own self-worth and will be more likely to collapse under 
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the force of continued severe stress not having the personality reserves to cope with 
the struggle. When this happens, he may be overwhelmed and become suicidal. 
Erik Erikson talks about this quality of self-esteem as coming from infancy, and he 
refers to it as being a basic trust in life. Most suicidal people have strong feelings of 
alienation and isolation, and these often seem to develop early in life if he has 
suffered what Erikson calls bad mothering. If he has been the victim of a broken 
home, either from death or divorce, and especially if he had to tolerate the suicide 
of a parent, this failure of basic trust can be acute (Pretzel 1972: 40 - 41). 
The normal suicidal individual will think of several different alternatives and will 
consider these for some time finally making a selection. The development of the 
suicidal plan is a critical stage in the build up toward death and may open the door 
to a suicidal rehearsal or suicide attempt (Pretzel 1972 : 43). This build up to 
suicide may take months or years. It serves two functions: to make the victim more 
comfortable with the thought of killing himself and to provide a warning for those 
who care about him. The myth that those who talk about suicide seldom do it, has 
been proved both erroneous and dangerous. Suicidal communications are an 
integral part of the build up toward suicide and should be taken very seriously. 
Although not all depressed people are suicidal and not all suicides are depressed, 
yet depression is a common factor in many suicides. The feelings of depression 
include feelings of incompetence and failure. 
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The prohibition of suicide or self-killing, can be looked upon as a matter of natural 
aversion, primitive, superstition, religious belief or philosophical argument; but 
there has always been a current of liberarian opinion which has succeeded in 
removing most of the penal sanctions against suicide. Suicide differs from 
euthanasia in that the latter is either an assisted suicide or a killing by another for 
humanitarian reasons and by merciful means generally with the consent of the 
person killed, in which case it is referred to specifically as voluntary euthanasia 
(Edwards 1967 : 43). Hindu philosophy also offers an explanation regarding the 
soul of those who commit suicide. 
Hinduism maintains that the soul inhabits many bodies on its journey through the 
cosmos until it reaches its final destiny. Souls are to be found in all living beings 
which being essentially equal are all only different through karma. The shell or 
integument of subtle and gross matter imprisons the soul which leads to successive 
rebirths in different types of bodies. Although the emphasis is on the freeing of the 
soul from matter, suicide is not prescribed to rid the imprisoned soul from this state 
of affairs. 
There are however various circumstances which may justify the taking of his own life 
by a person. Suicide as a form of expiation appears first as permissible in the Laws 
of Mallu. In cases where suicide has been committed not for this purpose but 
merely to end one's present existence, the Law of Mllllu states that "Libations of 
water shall not be offered to those who neglect the prescribed rites, and may be said 
to have been born in vain to those born in consequence of an illegal mixture of the 
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castes to those who are ascetic (of heretical sects) and to those who have committed 
suicide" (Buhler 1984: 89). 
A person is allowed to end his life in certain circumstances, for example when such a 
person is contaminated with an incurable disease which if it spreads, will be harmful 
to the whole community. A person who experiences unbearable pain and thus 
excessive suffering, may jump from a mountain, drown himself or enter a fire. 
A sanyassi who has renounced everything to live a life in solitude and meditation 
may not return to his wife and ordinary life. If he does live with his wife again, the 
only means of expiation is suicide for him and his wife, this could be done by any 
means as he has broken his promise. He and his wife must commit suicide together. 
The attitudes of primitive societies to suicide and voluntary euthanasia vary greatly. 
Often suicide is acceptable, and even when it is not, it may be tolerated, or indeed 
expected when incurable disease or old age become a burden upon both individual 
and society. 
3.3.2 DEONTOLOGICAL ARGUMENTS 
Deontological arguments asserted that suicide is wrong, not because it produces 
adverse consequences but because in itself it violates the meaning and purpose of 
human life and destroys the dignity of human nature. According to this kind of 
argument it is not the results of the action that make it wrong, but something about 
its very nature. 
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Suicide is often thought to be cowardly. But is suicide always cowardly? For 
example a mother may take her own life rather than leave her family destitute from 
providing her medical care. While one might deplore the conditions that led to such 
destitution and perhaps even judge the action wrong, it hardly seems to be an 
example of cowardice. The ardent opponent of suicide Immanuel Kant, rejected the 
argument that suicide is cowardly: "Even right thinking people declaim against 
suicide on wrong lines. They say it is arrogant cowardice. But instances of suicide 
of great heroism exist. If by 'cowardice' is meant moral cowardice, that is, shirking 
one's duties and responsibilities - then not all acts of suicide appear to be cowardly" 
(Lebacqz et al 1977 : 681 - 682). 
Kant argued that suicide is a contradiction, because one destroys the very self that 
one wishes to save from pain or suffering. Kant held that humans ought to act freely 
and rationally and that to take one's life subverts human freedom and thus the 
possibility of acting according to the moral law. That is since suicide is logically 
contradictory, it cannot be willed as a universal law or maxim for human action and 
thus fails the first test for the morality of human action that one must be willing to 
have the maximum of one's action become a universal law. 
It is argued that life is a gift from God and that therefore since God has given it only 
God may take it away. As Kant expressed it, "Human beings are sentinels on earth 
and may not leave their posts until relieved by another beneficent hand" (Lebacqz 
et al 1977 : 684 - 685). To kill oneself is therefore to act against God's purposes for 
human life, and in this way to violate the meaning of human life. If a specific 
injunction from God is needed in order to show that suicide is wrong, it is 
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sometimes thought that the sixth commandment "Thou shalt not kill" provides such 
an injunction. Suicide is always wrong, therefore, because it violates a specific 
commandment from God. 
The argument that suicide is always wrong rests on the general duty to preserve 
human life. The prohibition of suicide is a derivative from this general duty. One 
can claim that the sanctity of human life is such that it should never be directly 
taken, whether by self or by others. Suicide is wrong, therefore, because it violates 
the sanctity of human life. According to the traditional theist, God is a personal all 
powerful being, a sovereign who rules over his creation. Hence, man is merely the 
custodian of life, not its master .... It is man's duty to accept the decisions of God, 
not to pass judgements on them. If God has created and bestowed life upon man, it 
does not fall within the right of man to destroy it. Man is not absolutely master of 
his own life and body. He does not have dominum over it, but holds it in trust for 
God's purposes (Kohl 1974 : 5). However, suicide may be permissible in certain 
cases. 
3.3.2.1 VOLUNTARY EUTHANASIA 
There are certain circumstances in which normal obligations of covenant fidelity 
cease because their fulfillment is impossible. Under certain life circumstances such 
as terminal illness accompanied by great pain, it may be impossible to fulfill normal 
covenant obligations to one's family and friends. If so these obligations cease and 
thus the right to dispose of one's life is not contravened by any restraining duties 
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(Lebacqz et al 1977 : 690). In these circumstances, the right to suicide cannot be 
defeated because the circumstances themselves defeat the possibility of fulfilling any 
obligation to the other. 
3.3.2.2 COVENANTAL SUICIDE 
If the first instance in which suicide is morally justifiable is that in which covenantal 
obligations have to be fulfilled. Suicide need not be covenant-breaking; it can be 
covenant affirming. There are two types of convenants affirming suicide: the first is 
the "suicide pact" or joint suicide in which marriage partners, close friends, or others 
who live in covenantal relationship bind themselves "even unto death". The second 
is the "self-sacrificial" suicide of one who chooses to die rather than to burden one's 
family or friends (for example one who kills oneself rather than deplete resources 
with expensive medical treatment affirms the covenant with one's family in so 
doing). Whether any particular instance of "covenantal" suicide is justifiable 
depends on the extent to which it fulfills rather than violates other covenantal 
obligations. An act of suicide which fosters some covenants at the expense of others 
might still be wrong. But in cases where the act does not violate the prima facie 
duty of covenant fidelity, it is not prima facie wrong (Lebacqz et al 1977: 691). 
3.3.2.3 SYMBOLIC PROTEST 
In the first two instances of justifiable suicide, the suicide was not judged to be 
wrong either because the duty of covenant fidelity ceased or because it was 
supported by suicide. But there may be cases where the suicide appears to violate 
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covenants but may yet be justifiable. Lebacqz et al say that there might be one such 
as that of suicide as "symbolic protest". Suicide is occasionally used as an act of 
symbolic protest against great evil and injustice, for example, against war or 
imprisonment and is meant to support in a radical fashion respect for persons 
generally. Classical Hindus also committed suicide for similar reasons. 
In such cases suicides appear to violate one's immediate obligations of covenant 
fidelity, since family and friends may be abandoned in order to make symbolic 
protest. However, the intention of the act is to protect those institutions and 
structures which undermine the very conditions that make human life and covenant 
fidelity possible. When suicide as symbolic protest provides a significant 
contribution to the struggle against forces which would destroy the freedom of 
others, taking one's own life can be at root an affirmation of the dignity of persons. 
We might say that in this form of suicide, the individual aligns himself or herself 
with more basic loyalties than those to family and friends - namely the community of 
moral agents. The need to struggle for justice may in circumstances be more 
compelling than obligations to one's immediate family and friends. Viewed within 
the perspective of justice, therefore, there are at least two instances in which suicide 
may be right: those in which prima facie obligations of covenant fidelity cease to 
exist, those in which the suicide fulfills prima facie obligations of covenant fidelity 
are superseded by demands of justice on a larger scale (Lebacqz et al 1977: 691 -
692). 
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3.3.3 SUICIDE AND THE SOUTH AFRICAN LAW 
Suicide is not a crime in South Africa, but a person, who aids and abets another to 
commit suicide and in so doing kills that other, is guilty of murder, even though the 
suicide is jointly responsible for his or her own death. 
The actus reus of the crime consists in causing the death of another human being. 
One unusual way of causing death and thus committing the crime deserves special 
mention. That is where somebody instigates, assists or puts another in a position to 
commit suicide, as in the so called "Suicide Pact" cases. In certain circumstances this 
can amount to causing death and therefore to murder. The mere fact that the last 
act of the person committing suicide is his or her own voluntary act does not 
necessarily mean that the chain of causality, beginning with the instigator's conduct, 
is broken (Joubert 1981 : 227). 
An accomplice's liability depends upon his own action; he is not vicariously liable. 
For instance, a person who intervenes and assists in an offence at a late stage, 
although he is liable for his own acts, does not, unless he assists in pursuance of a 
previous agreement, become criminally liable for what took place before his 
intervention. Before a person can be liable as accomplice it must be proved that he 
participated in or assisted the perpetrator in the commission of an offence (Joubert 
1981: 229). 
Consider the case the State vs Gordon 1962 (4). SA 727 N. 
The accused, a twenty seven year old married Indian male school teacher concluded 
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a suicide pact with his unmarried lover as a result of domestic problems arising from 
their relationship. The accused supplied the deceased with fifteen Noludar and 
eight of Phanandorm tablets which she consumed at the same time that the accused 
consumed an equal number of identical tablets. The deceased died as a result 
hereof, whereas the accused survived and subsequently attempted to drown himself 
but was prevented from doing so. The accused was charged with murder on the 
basis that he supplied the tablets to the deceased knowing that she would ingest 
them to cause her death. The court acquitted the accused finding that the deceased 
took the tablets herself and that the final act brought about her death (Duncan et al 
1962 (4): 727 - 731). 
State vs Hibbert 1979 (4) SA 
The deceased stated in an argument with her husband, the accused, that she might 
as well commit suicide as the result of their marital discord. When the deceased 
indicated that she would shoot herself, the accused loaded and assembled his rifle 
which he handed to the deceased. She shot herself in the forehead. The accused 
was convicted of murder on the basis that he had the intention to kill the deceased 
in that he was reckless as to the consequences of his conduct (Barnett et al 1979 (4) 
: 717 - 723). 
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3.4 ABORTION 
Abortion is a complicated problem, a source of social and legal discord, moral 
uncertainty, medical and psychiatric confusion, and personal anguish. There is 
scarcely a nation in the world which believes it has discovered the perfect solution to 
the legal, social and medical problems of abortion. Neither is there any religious 
group in the world most of whose members are in agreement on the moral issue of 
abortion. 
Only on one point there seems to be some global consensus: the medical danger of 
backstreet abortions. However, there are many who think that abortion is moral or 
immoral. The matter becomes yet more complicated when the problem is reduced 
to philosophico-theological question, "When does life begin?" Many proponents of 
abortion on demand see the question only in terms of feminine and civil rights: 
giving to women the full right to decide for themselves whether to terminate or 
complete a pregnancy. But the issues are not disposed of so easily. Abortion is at 
once a moral, medical, legal, sociological, philosophical, demographic and 
psychological problem, not readily amenable to one-dimensional thinking. 
It is a moral problem because it raises the question of the nature and control of 
incipient human life. It is a medical problem because the doctor is the person 
normally called upon to perform an abortion; both his conscience and his medical 
skills "come into play". It is a legal problem because it raises the question of the 
extent to which society should concern itself with unborn life, with motherhood, with 
family life, with public control of the medical profession. It is a sociological 
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problem because, as Edwin M. Schur (Callahan 1970: 1) has pointed out, it touches 
on "woman's role in our social system, family organisation and disorganisation, 
national demographic policy, and the role of informal and formal sanctions". It is a 
demographic problem because, at one level, it raises the question of whether 
abortion provides a useful, desirable and legitimate method of population control 
where such control is needed. At another level, there is the fact that, for good or ill, 
it is already being so used in many parts of the world. It is a psychological problem 
because, in one way or the other, the attitude of human beings toward conception, 
pregnancy, birth and child rearing touches deep-rooted drives, instincts, emotions 
and taboos (Callahan 1970 : 1 - 2). 
The fact that there seem so few real options available in abortion decisions, rather 
than simplifying the problem, actually seems to complicate it. A woman may decide 
to have an abortion or not to have an abortion; there is no third way. So, too, a 
doctor may decide to perform an abortion or not to perform an abortion. Society 
can decide to allow abortion on demand or request, prohibit it altogether or allow 
abortion under certain specified legal conditions. It is not easy to imagine a fourth 
possibility. The narrow range of choices confronting both the individual and society 
means that however elaborate and complex the reasoning which points to one or 
another solution there are very few final options available (Callahan 1970: 3). 
3.4.1 INFANTICIDE AND ABORTION: A MATTER OF CONVENIENCE 
Ancient testimony strongly points to a diverse range of publicly admitted reasons for 
the justification of either infanticide or abortion. 
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The typical reasons, according to Carrick (Carrick 1985: 102 - 103) include: 
1) the desire to preserve what some women viewed as their sexual as opposed to 
their maternal beauty; 
2) the desire to avoid the inconvenience and loss of freedom occasioned by 
caring for very young children; 
3) the desire to avoid poverty occasioned by the added material costs of child 
care; 
4) the related desire to limit competition for scarce resources by limiting the 
size of their community's population; 
5) the desire to have male offspring based on perceived military and economic 
advantages; 
6) the desire to protect the women from a life-threatening, difficult pregnancy; 
7) the desire to rid society of future citizens who because they were born weak 
or defective are considered to be a worthless burden to themselves or society; 
8) the desire to conceal adultery and the desire to protect one's family or estate 
from a child of doubtful legitimacy. 
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3.4.2 THE MODERN DEBATE 
3.4.2.1 THE STATUS OF THE FOETUS 
The factual question is: In the reproductive process, at what point does the human 
individual originate? In other words, as human life is passed on in a continuous 
process where do the individual lives of the parents end and where does the 
individual life of the offspring begin? Western scholars argue that a foetus cannot 
be regarded as a human being or a person because it cannot exercise a "right". 
Generally the person is considered to be the subject of rights and once it is admitted 
that a person exists, there will be a very broad consensus that he has at least a prima 
facie right to continued life , since this right is more fundamental than any other 
(Grisez 1972: 273). 
Others, including Hindus. argue that a soul is present from the moment of 
conception. Once conception has taken place, then the zygote or embryo begins 
developing and bears the resemblence of a human being. If a foetus belongs to the 
category "Homo sapiens" it must be a human being. Since there is no qualitative 
difference between the embryo at the moment of conception and at the moment of 
quickening, the embryo must be considered a human being (Kohl 1974: 29 - 30). 
All persons or human beings pass through the foetal stage. If all foetuses were 
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destroyed because they did not have any rights and since they were not regarded as 
persons, then human beings and persons would become extinct. Therefore, it is not 
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logical to conclude that foetuses can be aborted on the grounds that they are not 
persons and do not have rights. 
According to Tooley the foetus inside a human mother is a human life (Tooley 1972 
: 56). Others maintain that foetuses, at least up to a certain point, are not human 
beings. Even philosophers are led astray by this usage. Thus Wertheimer says 
"except for monstrosities, every member of our species is indubitably a person, a 
human being at the very latest at birth" (Wertheimer 1973 : 34). Is it really 
indubitable that newborn babies are persons? Or is this a wild contention? Very 
early in its development the foetus acquires human characteristics. By the tenth 
week for example it already has a face, arms and legs, fingers and toes; it has 
internal organs and brain activity is detectable. 
Tooley says that a person should have certain properties in order to claim a serious 
right to life. These include: 
1. The capacity to envisage a future for oneself, and to have desires about one's 
future states. In order for something to have a right to life it must either now 
possess, or have possessed at sometime in the past, the capacity to 
understand what it would be like for it to continue to exist, together with the 
capacity to have desires about its future states. 
2. Being a self. In order for something to have a right to life it must now be, or 
have been at some time in the past, conscious, continuing subject of 
experiences and other mental states. 
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3. The capacity to have a concept of a self. In order for something to have a 
right to life it must either now possess, or have previously possessed the 
capacity to have the concept of a self, that is the concept of a continuing 
subject of experiences and other mental states. 
4. Self-consciousness. In order for something to have a right to life it must now 
be the case, or it must have been the case at some time in the past, that the 
organism possesses the concept of a self as a continuing subject of 
experiences and other mental states, that it is such an entity, and that it 
believes that it is such an entity. 
5. The capacity for self-consciousness. In order for something to have a serious 
right to life it must either now possess, or have previously possessed the 
capacity for self consciousness (Tooley 1972 : 59 - 60). 
3.4.3 ARGUMENTS IN FAVOUR OF AND AGAINST ABORTION 
The most popular arguments in support of abortion are rape, incest and a deformed 
child. There is a great deal of public sympathy in support of abortion for the above 
reasons. However, research shows that most of the abortion that takes place is due 
to socio-economic reasons. Abortion for socio-economic reasons received the 
lowest rate of approval by those who were interviewed (especially amongst the 
conservative and the elderly). They felt that people should act more responsibly, 
since there was a variety of ways of preventing pregnancy. 
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However, in addition to the above reasons in support of and against abortion, 
people have resorted to other arguments, some seem technical, others philosophical. 
Some maintain that some contraceptions are abortifacient, therefore they argued 
that although contraceptions were used to prevent pregnancy, in its more scientific 
analysis contraceptions were in fact causing abortions. 
Garrett Hardin, an ardent proponent of abortion, has argued that nothing of great 
value is destroyed. He compares the genetic information contained in the fertilised 
ovum to a set of blueprints for a structure. By analogy he argues that the 
destruction of the zygote is no more destruction of a human being than the 
destruction of blueprints for a fifty thousand dollar house. He admits only to two 
deficiencies in the analogy. One that the DNA of the first cell was replicated in 
every cell of the body. But to him this is an insignificant fact since hundreds of 
DNAs are destroyed when one is brushing the teeth (Hardin 1968 (a) : 250). 
However the difference between the fertilized ovum and the blueprint is that the 
former is alive and the latter is not. The fertilized ovum is in active interchange 
with its environment in the developmental process, the blueprints have no such 
dynamism. The fertilized ovum does not contain a model of the articulated 
structure as if there were in two dimensional prototypes of all the parts and organs 
of the body. Blueprints do not contain such a model. For this reason the blueprints 
in no sense become part of the house; they remain outside it. The fertilized ovum, 
however, is in vital continuity with the developed individual. A human being grows 
while a house is built (Grisez 1972: 276). It is strange that Hardin, a biologist does 
not observe this difference. What is aborted even by the prevention of implantation 
is not a fertilized ovum but an already developing individual. The conclusion that 
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Hardin is really interested in is that the fertilized ovum should not be regarded as a 
person, with a right to life. However, he does not say this implicity, but uses a rather 
confused analogy. 
According to Ashley Montagu life begins, not at birth, but at conception. This 
means that a developing child is alive not only in the sense that he is composed of 
living tissues, but also in the sense that from the moment of his conception, "things 
happen to him" (Grisez 1972: 277). Furthermore, when things happen to him even 
though he may be only two weeks' old, and he looks more like a creature from 
another world than a human being, and his birth date is eight and a half months in 
the future he reacts. Inspite of his newness and his appearance, he is a living, 
striving human being from the very beginning. 
However, when an opponent of abortion cites this book (a book published for 
pregnant women by Montagu ), Montagu responds that the embryo, foetus and 
newborn of the human species, in point of fact, do not really become functioning 
human until humanised in the human socialization process. Humanity is an 
achievement not an endowment. 
Montagu declared that he favoured abortion whenever the child's "fulfillment as a 
healthy human being" would be in any way "menaced" or would in any way "menace" 
the mother's health or society's at large. Obviously, this criterion of personality 
opens the door to infanticide as well as to abortion. This also implies that those 
who regard themselves as humanized and socialized would be justified in doing 
away with any group that they did not consider "functionally human" if the existence 
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of that group menaced society or if its own "fulfillment" were menaced. But if any 
degree of humanization, whatever is to be counted as sufficient to constitute a 
person, then the foetus already is a person for Montagu himself shows in his book 
such factors as a pregnant mother's emotional states and her work schedule do 
influence the temperament and behaviour patterns of the child. Even before birth a 
human being is never an individual isolated from the patterns of culture. Because 
the mind and body are not distinct entities, but only aspects of a unified human 
being, socialization is a psychosomatic process. Because the embryo develops an 
interaction with the maternal organism socialization has its beginnings in the most 
fundamental modes of biological communication. 
Some might argue that although socialization begins before birth the process is not 
completed until subtler forms of communication such as language, can have their 
effect. Undoubtedly, it is true that "functional humanity" is not completely attained 
before birth. But in referring to it as an "achievement not an endowment", Montagu 
suggests what is in fact false - namely, that at some point socialization is complete 
(Grisez 1972 : 278). In truth "functional humanity" is always more or less 
unachieved. One goes through life trying to become what one may be, yet even 
one's whole life together falls short of what it might have been. A single lifetime is 
not sufficient to achieve what one sets out to achieve, therefore in Hindu philosophy 
there is this concept of rebirth or reincarnation whereby an individual is given a 
chance to achieve his goals and this achievement is closely tied up with the law of 
kanna and dharma. Human life is a process and not a product. 
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To reason as Montagu does implies that human development is like the construction 
of an automobile. It becomes an automobile only at the end of the production line 
when someone can actually drive it. But a human being has a variety of abilities, 
some of which are lost as life passes. Grisez says that one shoud not romanticize 
childhood to the extent of supposing that the best years of one's life is the earliest 
one, but one should not romanticize the "functional humanity" which is achieved by 
"socialization" so much as to deprive infancy and even life before birth of all human 
quality (Grisez 1972: 278 - 279). 
Montagu, an anthropologist, and Hardin, a biologist, have flaws in their analogies. 
The potentiality of life is not fulfilled by an extrinsic agent bringing together already 
existing components, but by self-actuation. Both Montagu and Hardin look upon 
the unborn as not persons, but mere objects. Hindus look upon the foetus as a 
person in the making. 
3.4.4 ABORTION: LEGAL AND MEDICAL IMPLICATIONS (THE 
SOUTH AFRICAN VIEW) 
Abortion may be procured by a medical practitioner only for the following reasons: 
1. Where the continued pregnancy endangers the life of the woman. 
2. Where the continued pregnancy constitutes a serious threat to the woman's 
physical health 
3. Where the continued pregnancy constitutes a serious threat to the woman's 
mental health, and is of such a nature as to create the danger of permanent 
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damage to her mental health, and the abortion is necessary to ensure her 
mental health. 
4. Where there exists a serious risk that the child to be born will suffer from a 
physical or mental defect of such a nature that he will be irreparably 
seriously handicapped. 
5. Where the foetus was conceived in consequence of rape. 
6. Where the foetus was conceived in incest (Strauss 1984: 227). 
An abortion not falling within these provisions, constitutes a criminal offence and is 
punishable by a fine not exceeding R5000 and/ or imprisonment not exceeding five 
years. 
What is the legal position of a doctor who performs a hysterectomy on a pregnant 
woman and destroys the foetus in the process? If the doctor knew that the woman 
was pregnant and performed the operation in circumstances where there was no 
urgency, without complying with the provisions of the Act, the doctor may be found 
guilty under the Act. In performing the operation the doctor indirectly destroyed 
the foetus. Even if one of the six legal indications were present, the pregnancy may 
not be terminated before the certification requirements in terms of the Act have 
been met. If the doctor had no idea that the woman was pregnant and did not 
forsee that possibility, he cannot be found guilty of the crime. Intent to terminate a 
pregnancy by killing the foetus is an element of the crime. A bona flde but mistaken 
belief that the accused was lawfully entitled to procure an abortion would constitute 




A difficult problem may arise where it is established that a woman is pregnant with 
twins and medical tests indicate that one of the foetuses is decidedly deformed or 
defective to the extent that it may lawfully be aborted by virtue of the fourth 
indication mentioned above (or earlier). Its abortion will, however expose the other 
foetus to the risk of also being killed. The doctor would not incur liability for the 
death of the healthy foetus, provided he has complied with the certification 
requirements in respect of termination of the life of the defective foetus, and has 
exercised reasonable care in endeavouring not to harm the healthy foetus. (Strauss 
1991 : 208 - 209). 
One of the first reported cases decided under the Act was State v Kruger (1976 (3) 
SA 290 (0) in (Strauss 1991 : 209). The accused was convicted by a regional 
magistrate on a number of charges of abortion, attempted abortion, statutory 
"pimping" and rape. It appeared that the accused had recklessly used an enema 
apparatus, and in some cases a car wheel pump fitted with a home-made nozzle to 
inject an irritating reed fluid into the wombs of pregnant women. He charged fees 
of R150 or more per "case". Some of his "patients" addressed him as "Doctor". 
On appeal, the question arose whether the common-law crime of abortion still 
existed or had been substituted by the Abortion Act. If the common-law offence 
still existed, the court could in the imposition of punishment merely be guided by 
the penalities prescribed in the Act; if the Act substituted the common law offence, 
however, the court was bound to give effect to the prescribed penalities. Mr. Justice 
Erasmus held that the Act had substituted the common law offence. It was 
significant, the judge observed, that the penalty clause of the Act also referred to 
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persons other than medical practitioners. He further ruled that for the purposes of 
a conviction in terms of the Act it was sufficient if there was evidence from which it 
could be inferred that the foetus was living, irrespective of how long the woman had 
been pregnant. Even where the product of conception is medically still known as an 
embryo, it consistutes a foetus for the purposes of the Act. 
It does not mean that the common law defence of necessity in life and death 
emergencies was abolished because the Act now states that abortion may be 
procured only in the circumstances described in section 3, i.e. the six indications 
outlined earlier. 
State vs Collop (1979 (4)). 
In an appeal against convictions on four counts of contravening S2 of Act 2 of 1975, 
and sentence six months' imprisonment on each, the court confirmed the conviction 
and sentence on one count as it was satisfied on the medical evidence that the foetus 
concerned was a live foetus, but allowed the appeal on the other counts, as the court 
was not satisfied that an admission by the appellant that she had interfered with the 
pregnancies in such counts so that the pregnancies were terminated clearly included 
an admission that the foetuses aborted were living at the time of the abortion 
(Barnett et al 1979 (4): 381). 
All the laws regarding abortion may be subject to alteration in the new South Africa. 
185 
3.4.5 THE ADVANTAGES OF LEGALIZING ABORTION 
The number of illegal abortions in the country would be reduced. This had 
implications for maternal health and would reduce the pressure on medical 
resources required for treating complications arising from illegal abortions. 
The provision of legal abortions would make it possible for women to have access to 
medically safe and painless procedures by trained medical personnel in clinical 
settings. 
Legal abortions provided a back up for contraceptive failure or omission to use 
contraception. The availability of legal abortions strengthened the credibility of 
contraceptive protection and promoted reinforced or initiated contraceptive 
practice, which ultimately reduced the need for abortions. Legal abortion proved to 
be safe with less risk and had been preferred to illegal abortions. Legalised 
abortions had advantages in terminating unwanted and or illegitimate pregnancies 
in high risk groups, such as adolescents. This in turn had social implications for 
instance in preventing the disruption of school and college careers, undesirable 
forced marriages and even suicides. 
Abortion could help women avoid three other types of high risk pregnancy should 
these women become pregnant through lack of contraception or failure of a 
method: pregnancies after the age of thirty five, pregnancies after four or more 
children, and pregnancies that were spaced less than two years apart. 
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The psychological consequences of abortion were determined primarily by the 
circumstances affecting the availability of abortion. Where abortions were illegal, 
perceived as immoral, unsafe or otherwise stigmatized abortion might have a 
negative impact. If abortion was offered legally it would be more likely that the 
abortion experience would be neutral or even positive. 
By making legal abortion services available through a family planning programme to 
all who needed them, legalised abortion had an equalizing function. Where 
abortion was illegal, the poor often had no recourse except to terminate a pregnancy 
themselves or had to bear an unwanted child. Affluent women could afford to 
travel elsewhere to obtain a legal abortion. Where abortion was legal and available, 
facilities were accessible and standards were set by the government, it was the poor 
who had benefited the most. 
Legalised abortion and accessible abortion services enabled all women, but 
especially the poor, to avert a substantial number of unwanted births allowing them 
to maintain whatever family size they deemed economically and emotionally viable. 
Legal abortion had an important function as a fertility control method, especially in 
backward areas and in the intervening period of diffusion of family planning norms 
and the acceptance of modern contraceptives. The legal abortion experience 
presented the opportunity for post-abortal contraceptive instruction and service. 
This view was expressed by Ferreira (1985: 15) and was supported by Hindu lawyers 
who were interviewed. On the other hand Ferreira's views were criticized very 
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strongly by conservative Hindus. Since contraceptives are available so easily and 
freely people should act more responsibly. If abortion was legalized, then there 
would be mass-scale abortions and a total disrespect for life. 
3.4.6 DISADVANTAGES OF LEGALIZING ABORTION 
The government legalisators, policy makers and the promoters of family planning 
programmes that provided abortions were likely to be targets for criticism from anti-
abortion interest and conflict groups and campaigners. 
Opposition may be expected from churches and other religious organizations. 
H legalized abortions were justified on the grounds of achieving demographic goals 
such legalised abortions could be politicized. 
Where abortions were to be provided through the family planning programme, the 
mobilization of funds for the provision of services and establishment of facilities to 
meet the demand for legal abortions would be costly and problematic. Not only will 
it result in a heavy demand on medical services and resources but anti-abortion 
activists might openly attack the channelling of medical resources to fund abortions. 
Medical personnel might be reluctant to participate in an abortion service, as might 
administrators of medical institutions be to allow their facilities to be used for 
abortion. Medical doctors who were interviewed said that they would not perform 
abortions if it was done for social reasons. 
188 
3.4.7 ABORTION AND THE NEW SOUTH AFRICA 
Safe abortion on demand will probably not be a right in the new South Africa. The 
main political parties, still dominated by men, either refuse "to stick their necks out" 
on the issue - or condemn abortion outright (Daily News 15/5/92). 
The African National Congress Women's League, regarded as one of the most 
progressive women's organisations, is not prepared to support the liberalisation of 
abortion laws. However, some of the women support abortion strongly. They feel 
that women must be given a free choice. They also feel that facilities must be 
provided for clinical abortions (Agenda 17 /4/94). 
The Democratic Party spokeswoman, Caroline Knott, said abortion was a "highly 
emotive and religious issue" of which everybody has a personal view. 
The lnkatha Freedom Party's response to abortion is that the matter has not been 
discussed on central committee level. 
The government opposes changes to the present legislation and the Conservative 
Party believes abortion is a sin. The Conservative Party spokesman, Chris van der 
Reever, said that his party was Christian and nationalist and "absolutely against 
abortion". 
The Pan African Congress believes the high occurrence of backstreet abortions 
means legislation should be reviewed. The Pan African Congress secretary of 
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health Saman Silva said that their organisation is very concerned about the 
complications of backstreet abortions. The legislation should be replaced by new 
legislation that will have to reflect a balance between the moral value system of the 
historically indigenous people and the hard, clinical facts of backstreet abortions". 
Azanian People's Organisation supported abortion on demand and criticised other 
political parties for their lack of interest in women's reproductive freedom. The 
president of the women's organisation (Azapo) said: "Men must stop deciding for 
us. We have to come out in support of abortion. If we don't, we are not helping the 
very people we are trying to represent. Backstreet abortion and women struggling 
to cope with unwanted children affect the day to day lives of women". 
In private, many politicians support the liberalisation of abortion laws. 
Even a National Party president's councillor, Adrienne Koch said that she supported 
the right of women to abortion on demand before the 10th week of pregnancy. 
The Government of National Unity will debate the issue of abortion (Daily News 
15/5/92). 
Chapter Four deals with contemporary Hindu views on euthanasia, suicide and 





The views of the Durban Hindus (who were interviewed) were many and varied 
according to age, sex and occupation. What was also interesting to note was that 
people of the same age and sex had different views. Views also varied according to 
one's values in life and view of life itself. Therefore, it would be wrong to say that 
people of a certain age group had a particular view, or that all females thought alike 
and all males did likewise. 
According to many the religious views or precepts worked in theory only. One had 
to take cognizance of utilitarian and practical aspects. Although many were aware 
of the religious principles and beliefs, circumstances alone determined the course of 
action. Financial and economic considerations also played an important role. 
The ethics and values surrounding the study of this phenomenon was determined 
greatly by financial considerations. Decisions concerning life and death could not 
be made on religious beliefs and values alone. Utilitarian and practical 
considerations overruled religious belief and values of individuals concerned. Old 
religious beliefs were given new interpretations because of the demands of the 
circumstances in which people found themselves: the theory of karma and dharma 
have been given new interpretations because of changing circumstances. 
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4.2. EUTHANASIA 
Almost all the views expressed were in support of euthanasia in some form or 
another. The debate surrounding euthanasia was based on the question of whether 
one was "prolonging life" or "prolonging death". 
4.2.1 TYPES OF EUTHANASIA 
4.2.1.1 PASSIVE EUTHANASIA 
This form of euthanasia was supported by almost everyone, once the hopelessness of 
the situation was established. Nowhere is it stated in the scriptures that a person be 
kept alive by artificial means nor is it stated in the Hippocratic Oath which has been 
discussed at length in the preceding Chapter. These were neither known of nor 
available at that time. Those that held on to religious beliefs stated that one should 
"let nature take its course". One respondent felt that nature should not be 
interfered with too much. 
The most important person in the euthanasia debate was the patient. His wishes 
and requests had to be respected at all times. Obviously, the patient concerned had 
to be in a conscious state and mentally sound in order to make his wishes and 
requests known to the family and the physician concerned. If the patient was well 
aware that his condition was such that no amount of medication or treatment would 
benefit him then he had every right to ask for the cessation of treatment and 
medication. All respondents agreed that the patient had the final say. 
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However, some did feel that if the patient had to be kept alive by artificial means 
then one should do so. They felt that if life support systems were available they 
should be used to keep patients alive. One should do one's very best to keep 
patients alive, according to some views. To them this was an act of dharma, 
righteousness or duty. Yet others felt that this could not be performed due to the 
lack of finances. Here one can see clearly how the financial factor determined one's 
duty, value and ethics in the euthanasia debate. 
4.2.1.2 ACTIVE EUTHANASIA 
One of the most important tenets of the Hindu religion is the Law of Karma. "As 
you sow, so shall you reap". The application of this law is beyond manipulation, 
intervention or corruptibility. The wrong doer will definitely be punished for his 
wrong deeds. Nobody can escape the penal provisions of the law. Its application 
allowed neither escape nor exception. Similarly a pious man performing good 
actions would according to the law be rewarded for his good deeds. Each and every 
good or bad action would have equal and appropriate reaction and would invariably 
rebound on the doer attracting just reward or punishment. 
Therefore, according to this law physical suffering was the result of some past deed 
or action. As stated earlier there was no escape from this. If one was to apply the 
Law of Karma then obviously there was no place for active euthanasia in the 
traditional Hindu views. By administering active euthanasia on a person who was 
going through a lot of pain and suffering, one was interfering with the Law of 
Karma, one was hampering the Law of Karma from doing its work and relieving the 
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person from this state. According to the theory of reincarnation the person 
concerned would come back in the next birth and undergo the same suffering. 
Spiritually more harm was caused by administering active euthanasia, one was not 
giving the individual a chance to work out his or her karma. If this was done 
repeatedly then the individual concerned made no progress in his spiritual 
development. This was the view expressed by the older generation and priests in 
particular. 
However, other Hindu philosophers and academics thought differently. They felt 
that the end result of passive euthanasia and active euthanasia was the same so why 
not choose the latter. After all, they argued that euthanasia was supposed to mean a 
quick and painless death. Active euthanasia, in their opinion, was more in keeping 
with the definition of euthanasia. In passive euthanasia the patient lingered on for 
days if not months in suffering. Therefore, passive euthanasia served no purpose at 
all. 
Yet others gave karma a new interpretation and supported active euthanasia. The 
person who administered active euthanasia, the lethal dose, or injection was 
according to those believers the agents of the Lord who were chosen to perform 
active euthanasia and thereby put an end to suffering. Any action that one did at 
any time or moment in the present tense would give its fruit immediately and on the 
spot. It was called kriyaman karma. In this case it was releasing the soul from a 
body that was diseased or handicapped by some illness, and could not perform 
action. According to the Law of Karma action was necessary all the time. It was 
through action that the soul evolved or devolved. Any action was bound to have 
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reaction, any cause was bound to have its effect and any effort was bound to result 
into fixed destiny. This was the immutable Law of Karma. Human beings are 
rational beings and they act according to their rationality. According to man's 
rationality, putting an end to suffering was a dharmic act. Hence kanna and dharma 
the two most fundamental beliefs of Hinduism has been given a new interpretation. 
This view is shared by medical doctors and younger priests. 
The medical profession wholeheartedly supported active euthanasia, while some 
said that they would give the lethal injection if a situation arose and if it was legally 
permissible, others who favoured active euthanasia were in doubt whether they 
would be able to actually administer the lethal dose. Active euthanasia seemed to 
have great support in theory, but when it came to the actual administration of the 
lethal dose there was a great deal of doubt and controversy as to who should really 
administer or perform active euthanasia. 
Those who supported active euthanasia also felt the need for the Living Will. Those 
in the medical and legal professions felt that every individual should consider the 
"Living Will". Since no one was sure as to what was going to happen to a person (in 
cases of accidents, terminal illness) one should leave behind a will, so that it would 
be easy for those taking care of such inmates to make a decision when the time 
arose. 
Some also felt that even if there were a proper institution to decide for the patient, 
corruption and abuse would somehow creep in. Even those patients who could 
decide for themselves would probably opt for active euthanasia even if they did not 
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want to. They could feel that they were a burden to their families, hospital and 
society in general. Some patients had a tremendous threshold for suffering. They 
would prefer to carry on suffering than to die. To some life was sacred irrespective 
of the quality. How often does one hear, "as long as there is life, there is hope". 
Yet there were others, housewives, in particular, who felt that active euthanasia was 
just not acceptable. They argued that it was a wrongful act, adharmic, to take 
another person's life irrespective of the circumstances. Human beings should not 
play God; death and dying is the work of the Lord, and it should be left in God's 
care. They should only pray and beg God to take away a life that was not worth 
living. One should not be involved actively in taking away another's life. Those who 
hold this view, would never do it, neither would they expect their family or physician 
to do it. Rather they would let nature take its course. A sense of guilt deterred 
them from participating or supporting any form of active euthanasia. 
The debate surrounding active euthanasia was too intense and consensus could not 
be reached. No conclusive answer could be arrived at due to the complexity of the 
issue and the debate surrounding it. 
4.2.2 ORDINARY VERSUS EXTRAORDINARY MEANS 
It was an accepted rule that a doctor had the duty to administer ordinary means to 
preserve life, but there was no duty to administer extraordinary means. This was the 
view of the medical profession. According to other views, the doctor is a human 
being and can only do so much, and that no one can expect him to perform any 
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miracles. However, ordinary and extraordinary means were terms that were 
relative. Medicines and treatments should be such that these could be obtained 
without excessive expense, pain and inconvenience. The administration of such 
medicines and treatments should bring about some positive results in the patient's 
condition and pave the way to the patient becoming a normal human being capable 
of looking after him or herself. If this could be established then treatment could 
continue. This was the general view. 
One respondent interviewed felt that extraordinary means if available should be 
used to assist the patient concerned. To this respondent life was so sacred that it 
had to be preserved if the possibility was there. Even if there was a very slim chance 
of recovery one ought not to give up. As long as there is life there is hope. 
Others felt that the emotional and financial cost to the family be considered. 
Sometimes the emotional strain on the family was greater than the strain on the 
patient himself. Especially if the patient was comatose no emotions were expressed. 
At times family consideration was greater than the consideration for the patient. 
4.2.3 WHO HAS THE RIGHT TO DECIDE? 
There was general agreement that the patient had the right to decide provided that 
his mental faculties allowed it. If the patient concerned was unable to decide then 
obviously the next of kin (mother, father, husband, wife) or some other relative or 
friend together with the institution concerned had to make the decision. 
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As mentioned in the introduction of this chapter, financial considerations were an 
important factor in decision making. Many felt that one had to be practical and 
utilitarian. "It would be foolish to spend one's life savings on a hopeless case". Once 
it had been established that the patient was going to die within a few months, weeks 
or days, then it would be unwise to keep the patient alive, especially if it was a 
financial burden on the family to keep such a patient alive. The money spent on 
such a patient could be used profitably by some other member of the family. Wise 
decision making was of paramount importance. Sometimes one was left with no 
choice, so one either resorted to active or passive euthanasia. One had to 
experience the situation in order to appreciate the choice of the decision that had to 
be made. It was not an easy task for the person who had to make the decision 
finally. 
4.2.4 KILLING AND LETTING DIE 
Although the end result of "killing" and "letting die" was the same many would 
prefer the latter. Many were anti-killing. Although many desired the result, that 
was death (for terminal patients), they felt that death should be the responsibility of 
God. They would rather pray and ask God to end the suffering. Therefore, many 
Hindu's performed the Gaudhan prayer for very ill patients (see end notes). Many 
felt that their conscience would not allow them to terminate a life, irrespective of 
the quality of that life. Some medical doctors felt that they would terminate such 
suffering if the need arose, provided they were permitted to do so. 
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4.2.5 REFUSAL OF MEDICAL TREATMENT 
The patient had a right to refuse medical treatment. No doctor, family or legal 
advisor could force a patient to undergo medical treatment if he did not want to. 
This could lead to the patienf s death. Sometimes doctors were of the opinion that 
they committed euthanasia by omitting to act. However, this opinion had no legal 
basis: the doctor was not even allowed to treat. Sometimes the patient was put 
under pressure, even denied presence in the hospital if the patient refused 
treatment. According to the views of the medical profession such pressures were 
against the law. The patient had the right to refuse and after refusing was entitled 
to normal care. Because of the contractual relationship between the doctor, 
hospital and patient it would be a breach of contract or it would also be considered 
criminal in some countries if normal medical and nursing care should be withdrawn. 
Because of civil and criminal liability the doctor is entitled to ask from the patient a 
written statement containing his refusal of treatment. 
4.2.6 EUTHANASIA OF DEFECTIVE NEWBORNS 
The general view was that all parents should be responsible for the care and upkeep 
of all infants irrespective of their condition. Like any infant the deformed child was 
a person with a right to life, a right that was the basis of one's social order and legal 
system. Medical doctors and some parents did state that if the defect was such that 
it did not have any of its vital organs and as a result its survival became an 
impossibility, then such infants should be left to die at birth. The decision so made 
must be to the benefit of the infant in question. Other infants with minor defects 
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had a right to life, to education and to medical treatment, like all other normal 
children. If such children required expensive surgery then they should not be denied 
this. Mothers in particular were very sympathetic towards children with defects. 
Some felt that parents were responsible for defects in their children. Mothers who 
had previously taken birth control pills had caused defects in their children. This 
was proved in the case of thalidomide babies. 
Those who were more familiar with Hindu religion and philosophy felt that defects 
in babies were the result of karma. These children had to work out their karmas; 
therefore, they should be allowed to live and develop like everybody else. Those 
who were not familiar with Hindu philosophy argued that the other children were 
being deprived of time because parents spent more time and paid more attention to 
the abnormal child. Yet others felt that these children had a role to play in society. 
Handicapped children were no longer regarded handicapped, because of the 
different opportunities presented to them by various organisations, so that they too 
could contribute to society. 
Should such infants be starved to death? (Those with very severe defects). The 
answer was definitely "no". Many and especially Hindu doctors said that it is 
criminal to do so. These infants should be fed like all other infants and made 
comfortable but should not be given any specialized treatment. It is cruel and illegal 
to starve someone to death, irrespective of the condition. 
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4.2.7 SHOULD EUTHANASIA BE LEGALISED? 
There were both pros and cons to this question. If euthanasia were to be legalised, 
people were afraid that it could lead to maladministration and abuse. Others felt 
that if it was conducted on the recommendation of a board, as stated earlier, and in 
Chapter three in particular, then there should be no loophole for abuse. The 
medical profession gave wholehearted support for the legalization of euthanasia. 
Perhaps they know better, because of the suffering they witness daily in their lives. 
4.3 SUICIDE 
Very sympathetic views were expressed towards those who had committed suicide. 
Some felt that those who had committed suicide might have had deep psychological 
problems. According to them no person in his proper frame of mind would want to 
commit suicide. Survival was not an easy task in this day and age. Not all people 
can cope with stress. Because of demands of society, family life and work situations 
people live very stressful lives. Some are able to cope while others cannot. Those 
that committed suicide did so as a form of escape. Very often young men and 
women committed suicide, as a result of disappointment and being let down by their 
loved ones. Sometimes a person might be ashamed of something that he has done, 
and cannot face society. While some regarded suicide as an act of bravery and was 
praiseworthy, others regarded it as cowardice and condemnatory. 
According to some Hindu theologians suicide is looked upon as a crime. One has to 
face realities of life. One could not escape it by committing suicide. It is wrong to 
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commit suicide. The consequences of committing suicide were much more serious 
than the problems of life itself. According to one belief the person who committed 
suicide did so for seven generations. Hence, that soul would not be able to evolve 
spiritually. The soul of those who committed suicide did not find a rightful abode. 
The astral body roamed about and caused havoc. It became a harmful spirit. 
People with evil intentions used these spirits to harm innocent people. 
The soul was supposed to leave the body only when the Lord willed it. If the soul 
left the body prematurely, then this soul roamed about causing mischief. Only when 
the time was proper did the soul go to its rightful abode. This was the view of some 
of the Hindus. 
4.3.1 DISPOSAL OF THE BODY 
According to early Hindu scriptures, the corpse of those who had committed suicide 
was to be buried and not cremated (Dehejia 1979: 72 - 73; Pandey 1969: 273). This 
view has changed. Personal observation showed that those who had committed 
suicide were also accorded proper cremation rites and post funeral ceremonies. The 
argument used was that one could not discriminate against the dead. 
4.3.2 CONFLICTING VIEWS 
According to some views suicide is wrong because it is against the Law of Karma. 
According to the Law of Karma a person who had committed suicide to escape the 
sufferings and the ills of the world was destined to take birth and start from where 
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he had left off. According to Hindu philosophy there is no escape from suffering, 
one will come back over and over (samsara) again to fulfill that suffering. Suffering 
was looked upon as a task that had to be completed at all costs. Therefore, it is 
believed that one should try not to escape it. Suffering is essential to the soul, if the 
soul is to evolve. 
Suicide is permissible in certain circumstances only. A person who had committed 
sati was praiseworthy. The soul of such a person was liberated. Suicide in the form 
of voluntary euthanasia is acceptable in Hinduism. According to one Hindu 
philosopher (a Senior Lecturer in Hindu Philosophy) suicide should be committed 
in the last stage of a person's life. A sannyasi usually committed suicide through 
fasting and meditating. His body was so weakened through the lack of food and 
water that he gradually passed away. It was a very peaceful passing away and not a 
bloody or violent one as is seen in contemporary times. However, it is criminal to 
assist a person commit suicide. In suicide pacts if the one survived accidentally then 
he or she became liable for the other's death. 
4.3.3 LIFE IS A GIFf FROM GOD 
Many argued that life is a gift from God and that, therefore, since God had given it 
only God might take it away. To kill oneself is therefore, to act against God's 
purposes for human life and thus to violate the meaning of human life. The 
argument that suicide was always wrong rested on the general duty to preserve 
human life. The prohibition of suicide was derivative from this general duty. One 
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could claim that the sanctity of human life was such that it should never be directly 
taken whether by self or by others. Suicide is wrong because it violates the sanctity 
. 
of human life. 
4.4 ABORTION 
One view saw the unborn child possessing inviolable rights including the right to life 
from the moment life began in the womb. The other view saw the unborn child as 
less than human often as merely "a part of the mother's body", whose rights 
necessarily yielded to the convenience of its parents and society at large. These 
contemporary attitudes on taking foetal life were organic developments of two 
fundamentally different legal mentalities, the ancient and the modern. In the 
abortion debate it was not merely two individual's facing each other; it was a 
confrontation between the world views of two fairly distinct cultures, one traditional 
and dated, the other new and untested. The debate now centred on a practical legal 
question, should existing laws against abortion be relaxed to make abortions easier 
to obtain? Many views expressed showed that there were no clear cut answers. 
While they supported abortion on certain grounds, they were against abortion in 
other instances. In other words, abortion had both advantages and disadvantages. 
Females and the older generations expressed views on abortion that highlighted its 
disadvantages. 
204 
4.4.1 WHEN DOES LIFE BEGIN? 
Here the views were varied although many felt that life began at conception, others 
felt that it was at birth, or at quickening. Yet there were many others, especially the 
young, who were not sure exactly when life began or at what stage of the 
development of the foetus did the soul enter it. 
4.4.2 PRO-ABORTION OR LIBERAL VIEWS 
Those that supported abortion felt that it would have several advantages. Firstly the 
number of unwanted children in the world would be lessened. This would be an 
advantage to the rest of the children, because there would be more resources at 
hand. Hence the quality of life would improve since these children would be 
exposed to a better education. The mother herself would not be saddled with 
unwanted children. If she had fewer children then she would be able to give them 
more of her time. She would also be able to provide them with better resources. 
The mother, the children and society at large would benefit if abortion were 
permissible. Many also felt that the mother had the right to decide, since the foetus 
was totally dependent on her for survival. The foetus was attached to the mother's 
body, and therefore, one could say that it was a part of the mother's body. One had 
sole rights over one's body. It would be unfair for someone else to make decisions 
for the mother. Although it might seem wrong in the eyes of others, it was the 
mother's decision that one had to respect. 
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4.4.3 AT WHAT STAGE OF THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE FOETUS 
IS ABORTION PERMISSIBLE? 
H abortion has to be performed, then it should be done in the first trimester of 
pregnancy. Medical opinion is that it should be done within six weeks of pregnancy 
and not later than that. Some said that it should be done before quickening. 
However, the cut off period was six weeks. There was a general consensus amongst 
Hindu doctors on this cut off period. 
4.4.4 GROUNDS FOR GRANTING ABORTION 
As stated in chapter three abortion should take place if the pregnancy is as a result 
of rape or incest, if the pregnancy is a threat to the mother's physical or mental 
health and if the foetus is defective. However, there were counter arguments. One 
could have been raped because of one's karma. All actions are as a result of 
accumulated karma. The foetus that was being carried by the rape victim might 
have been a perfectly healthy foetus. Why should this foetus be aborted? The 
foetus cannot be blamed. If it was in the person's karma to bear and bring up this 
child then she must do so. Probably she might owe it to this foetus or child to be. 
She could not escape this. She may be destined to be a mother in this way. Others 
felt that it was her karma to realise that this foetus would remind her constantly of 
the rape incident and it would also cause her social embarrassment; therefore, she 
must abort. She was in the position to realise the consequences of such birth. 
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Some felt that even if the pregnancy was detrimental to the mother's physical and 
mental condition she should still have the baby. This was taking the Law of Karma 
in all its seriousness. H the mother had to die because of the pregnancy, then this 
was also in keeping with karmic action. Even if the mother had to die in child birth, 
and the child survived, then it was this child's karma to live without a mother. It 
works both ways, the child and the mother's karma interact. 
A mother carrying a defective foetus should allow this foetus to be born. Defect is 
as a result of karma. By aborting, one did not give the child a chance to work out its 
karma. The soul of such a foetus would stagnate. Therefore, if one wanted the soul 
to evolve, then one should allow this infant to take birth. This was a view shared by 
priests and people familiar with Hindu philosophy. Others argued that mothers and 
siblings of such infants also suffered. This was true and it was a result of collective 
karma. The entire family shared this suffering and one could not avoid this. 
However, personal observation and local newspaper articles showed that abortions 
took place (backstreet) more because of social reasons than reasons listed above. 
Teenage abortions showed that it was done without the knowledge and consent of 
parents. Many feared that their careers would be in jeopardy and sought illegal 
backstreet abortions. Many have died because of this. Many were embarrassed and 
felt that they brought disgrace upon themselves and their families. Therefore, most 
of the abortions that took place were for social reasons. According to newspaper 
articles it was pathetic to note the manner in which the foetuses were disposed. 
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Some mothers with teenage daughters did not approve of .abortion. If the mother 
was incapable of looking after the child (finance, study, careers) then adoption was 
the solution to unwanted babies. This was the advice that young Hindu mothers 
would give to their teenage daughters. They would also respect the daughter's 
decision if they disapproved of abortion. However, mothers were willing to counsel 
their children regarding sex and abortion. 
Those in the medical profession felt that those who were seeking abortion needed 
counselling. Some people in the medical profession and especially the young 
support social abortions. They are not prepared to have unwanted children. 
Sometimes this was in conflict with their wives' views. 
It was found that once a defect in the foetus was detected through scans and 
amniocentesis, most of the young mothers preferred to abort. They were not 
prepared to go through the suffering with the child. It would be too much of a 
burden on them. Even those mothers who could not bear children were not 
prepared to have an abnormal child. The fact that the child with a defect was a 
child with "life" some mothers did not take this into consideration. 
Miscarriage was nature's way of aborting the defective foetus. The view of one 
doctor was "why not help nature along". He felt that it was a natural thing to abort a 
defective foetus. 
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4.4.5 REJECTION OF ABORTION 
The traditional view is that there should be no abortion for anyone at anytime 
irrespective of the circumstances. Life is too sacred to be terminated at any stage of 
its development. Life, despite its quality is better than no life at all. 
Chapter Five analyses and interprets the contemporary views of the Durban Hindus 
and examines to what extent their views are influenced by scriptural injunctions and 
South African legal and medical ethics. It also shows to what extent their views 




Gaudhan translated literally means giving a cow as a gift. It is the most important of 
the pre-death rituals amongst the Hindi-speaking Hindus. First mentioned in the 
Sutra period its origins lie in the myth of the soul having to cross the Vaitarani River. 
The river itself is symbolic of suffering. Gaudhan is made to assist the critically ill 
overcome their suffering either to recover or to pass away peacefully. It was made 
to a Brahman as he was considered the intermediary between the living and the 
supernatural. The cow given to the Brahman would therefore reach the soul (of the 
deceased), assist it in crossing Vaitarani (a river of pus and blood) and guide it to 
Yama (God of death). This ceremony could also be considered as an act of charity 
since charity is considered one way of cleansing one of sin. But since gaudhan was 
made at other samskaras (the Vivaha samskara) it could also be considered as 
charity to the bridegroom (Pandey 1969 : 212 - 213). These days money is used in 





The problem of extreme old age and severe illness or terminal disease have plagued 
the minds of people over many centuries. The manner in which people have dealt 
with the problem have varied from age to age, from culture to culture and from 
person to person. Religion has also played a role in finding a solution to the 
problem. The problem today becomes even more complicated due to the advances 
in technology and the progress in medicine. The phenomenon euthanasia in the 
Classical Period was not as complicated as it is today. People in those days did not 
have very many alternatives or any alternative at all. Therefore, the phenomenon of 
euthanasia was really a phenomenon of suicide in the Classical Period and scripture 
makes reference more to suicide than to euthanasia. 
However, the Hindu in the Durban area, with all the advances in high technology 
and scientific development is faced with serious dilemmas. Hindu scripture does not 
provide the answers. It merely provides guidelines and spells out certain 
consequences of such acts concerning euthanasia and suicide. 
The Hindu in Durban does not live in a predominantly Hindu society, but exists side 
by side with the other religious groups. The life of all South Africans including the 
Durban Hindu (irrespective of their religious denomination) is governed by codes of 
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Roman Dutch Law. Religion is a personal issue and plays a very small role (or no 
role at all) concerning the life and death of another individual. Research has shown 
that decisions concerning such issues of life and death especially of other individuals 
is based on the law of the country and medical ethics. 
Hindus in Durban have been born and brought up in a society that is predominantly 
Western. As a result Western values have made a tremendous impact on Hindu 
life-style. The Hindu principles of karma and dharma, have been re-interpreted to 
suit changing circumstances and situations. Research shows that situation ethics 
rather than religious teachings is the guiding factor in decision making regarding 
euthanasia. 
S.1.1 ARGUMENTS FOR AND AGAINST EUTHANASIA 
Research shows that arguments presented in favour of euthanasia is based not on 
religious beliefs, but on circumstances. The views expressed by Hindu lawyers and 
doctors and other academics were not different from those of Western scholars. 
The explanation is simple. These people have studied at institutions that operate 
according to Western standards. From childhood they have been trained along 
Western lines. Doctors are constantly updating their knowledge through British and 
American medical journals. Although Hindus practise their religion and perform 
certain rituals and samskaras, their outlook on matters concerning life and death are 
not stringently based on scripture and Hindu beliefs. Thus debates about the 
rightness or wrongness of mercy killing generate heated displays of emotion. Some 
consider it cruel deliberately to end the lives of relatively powerless individuals who 
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are dying that they tend to imagine that only people who are merciless like the 
prototype Nazi agent could engage and sanction such acts. At the same time there 
are others who find it so cruel to wait for death if a dying person is suffering that 
they tend to regard opponents of mercy killing as insensitive moral legalists, willing 
to be inhuman for the sake of obedience to absolute rules. Both the proponents and 
opponents of mercy killing think of themselves as merciful, but each finds it virtually 
impossible to think of the other as merciful. Each feels that he is doing the "right 
thing" without taking into consideration what the other feels. 
5.1.2 LIFE NOT WORTH LIVING 
Much sympathy was expressed in Classical India for euthanasia in the sense of 
"freedom to leave" by one suffering from an incurable disease or facing extreme old 
age. Accordingly, euthanasia, belonged to the category of self-willed death and was 
never formally viewed as mercy killing of another person. Once there was a formal 
public declaration of the intent to perform self-willed death, helping the person was 
allowed. The individual's choice and will-power to implement it was therefore, 
mandatory when euthanasia was accepted in the premodern Indian context. The 
phenomenon of euthanasia was intimately related to the larger categories of heroic 
and religious self-willed death which in turn were related to the yet broader context 
of violence and non violence in Indian society and religion. "Euthanasia was 
permissible only in the case of debilitating old age and terminal illness where the 
person concerned was not able to enjoy the pleasures of life" (Young, 1989 : 94 - 96). 
This is the argument used by proponents of euthanasia today. Modern Western 
supporters of euthanasia argue that euthanasia should be allowed when one is no 
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longer able to live with dignity and comfort and when the quality of life is 
intolerably undermined. This view was greatly supported by Hindu doctors who 
were interviewed in Durban. Perhaps they are in a better position than others to 
support this view, since they witness the suffering on a daily basis. Nobody knows 
the state or condition of the physical body better than a physician. One respondent 
(a medical doctor) felt that the decision concerning euthanasia should be left to the 
physician concerned. Most of the doctors who were interviewed felt strongly about 
the legalization of euthanasia. They criticised the lawmakers as people who had 
witnessed very little suffering and therefore, were not sympathetic to the supporters 
of euthanasia. The question that was of great concern was one of abuse. Most of 
the medical doctors agreed that it would definitely lead to abuse if euthanasia was 
not carried out in the proper manner. The decision was not to be made by a single 
individual. The family together with two or more physicians (outsiders) rather than 
the attending physician should assist in decision making, if the patient was mentally 
incapacitated or in a comatose state. 
Although euthanasia was permitted in the Classical Period in India, the decision had 
to come from the individual concerned. He had to make a public declaration, that 
he no longer wished to live, and on those grounds outside help was permissible. 
However, there is no clarity with regard to persons who were not able to make a 
public declaration. 
The Western view is that persons who want to end their lives should resort to 
suicide and not to euthanasia. This is supportive of individuals who are mentally 
and physically capable, have access to drugs (if crude method's are to be avoided) 
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and can act in such a way that no other person would appear to be in a position to 
have prevented it. This is rare for patients in hospitals. To be certain of success, 
suicide would be premature and in some cases the unnecessary result of mistaken 
self-diagnosis. There is a suggestion of a compromise by an amendment of the 
Suicide Act (American) to permit doctors to supply the sleeping pill, but not 
themselves administer it (Wilshaw, 1974: 6). The impression the doctor gets here is 
that although one desires the end result that is death, one does not want to be 
legally or morally implicated in this act of killing. Although the physician might be 
willing to assist, he does not want to be the direct party to it. However, some of the 
Hindu doctors who were interviewed recommended active euthanasia. Some said 
that they would be able to implement active euthanasia themselves, while others 
recommended it, but were not sure whether they would be in a position to actually 
administer it. Some felt that it was a duty or a dharmic act to administer active 
euthanasia and thereby put an end to suffering. This view is in keeping with the 
Classical tradition in that euthanasia is a dharmic act; and therefore the person 
performing euthanasia should be free of guilt. Euthanasia is a positive act according 
to Hindu thinking (both past and present). Hindus largely influenced by Western 
views on the other hand, although they desire the end result think it immoral or 
criminal to actually perform the act of euthanasia. 
Sometimes it becomes necessary to review and re-interpret the Hippocratic Oath, so 
that one acts in the best interest of the patient. A good doctor is aware of the 
distinction between prolonging life and prolonging death. According to some Hindu 
doctors who were interviewed certain doctors are practising a suppressed form of 
euthanasia. If this is so, it is without the firm knowledge of the patients' wishes. 
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This leaves very many thousands of sufferers in protracted stages of disintegration 
and distress, instead of assisting them to die peacefully. 
Orthodox Hindus feel that these people (who are in extreme pain) must live out 
their natural lifespan. Suffering is the result of one's karma. If active euthanasia 
was performed on them, then these individuals would take birth again and fulfill 
that suffering. Since human life is not guaranteed in the next birth, they should not 
be deprived of working out their karmas in the present life. By performing active 
euthanasia, one may be putting an end to physical suffering, but spiritual progress is 
being hampered. To a Hindu spiritual progress is of utmost importance. Others 
have argued that the one who performs active euthanasia is the agent of the Lord. 
He is chosen by the Lord to put an end to that suffering. It is that individual's 
karma, that his suffering be only for that particular period. Hence the principles of 
karma and dharma have been re-interpreted. Religious principles have to be 
modified at times to suit the needs of society. The Hindu religion teaches that 
religion is dynamic and not static. If religious principles are not modified, then they 
become outmoded and outlived. In order for them to survive they have to undergo 
a process of change and modification. Hinduism has survived for many, many years 
because of its flexibility. This can be seen in scriptures, how the concept of life and 
death has been viewed in the different eras. Hinduism also teaches us that there are 
many paths to salvation. 
The Hindu doctors who were interviewed said that euthanasia is not a matter of 
killing patients, the disease from which they are suffering does that. Death for such 
patients becomes a slow process, euthanasia merely hastens it. It is a matter of 
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advancing the inevitable end of a life which has become useless and burdensome. 
The person who performs euthanasia does so according to his or her own dharmic 
belief and act. The act becomes dharmic only in so far as it is done for the person 
concerned and for cosmology in general and not for any selfish motives. One of the 
reasons in the Classical Period for euthanasia was social order; society would not be 
able to shoulder the burden of providing for the extreme aged and the incurably 
diseased. 
Supporters of voluntary euthanasia desire the merciful release to be effective before 
suffering has been prolonged. It should also be remembered that compassionate 
doctors too, share the sadness which surrounds the helpless case when further 
efforts are futile. Hence merciful doctors are placed in an unfair position. This is 
the view shared by Western scholars as well as the Hindu doctors who were 
interviewed. Due to newer techniques for prolonging the failing life of a dying 
patient without hope of restoring the person to a worthwhile existence, doctors are 
left with the heavy responsibility of decision on their course of action. The 
possibility of authentic knowledge of the patient's wishes should be available to the 
doctor. The liberty of an individual is of paramount importance. It implies 
complete freedom of action in so far as it does not interfere with the moral and civil 
rights of others. It embraces the right (within this framework) to direct one's own 
mode of life according to conscience, judgement and desire and should also enable 
one to determine that he shall not die in prolonged distress where it could be 
otherwise. 
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Others have argued that the services of doctors are welcome and necessary to the 
care of personal well-being, but it must be emphasised that every individual still 
remains the owner of his own person and may dispose of it at will. Hence it is 
indisputable that personal liberty justifies the moral right of a person to decide 
whether or not his death be gentle. 
5.1.3 HOW CAN THE RIGHT TO CHOOSE TO DIE BE LEGALLY 
ESTABLISHED? 
Most of the academics and Hindu scholars who were interviewed stated that they 
belonged to the South African Voluntary Euthanasia Society (SAVES). The 
Voluntary Euthanasia Proposal is that adults who wished to do so would sign a 
declaration setting out that in the event of an illness or affliction from which death is 
the only release, then the period of useless suffering and distress would be 
shortened by euthanasia. This type of declaration or will is also supported by 
Western scholars (Wilshaw, 1974 : 6). 
The main parts in the declaration would read:-
"lf I should at any time suffer from a physical illness or impairment of a severely 
distressing character reasonably thought in my case to be incurable and expected to 
cause me extreme suffering or render me incapable of rational existence, I request 
in advance the administration of euthanasia at a time or in circumstances to be 
indicated or specified by me or, if it is apparent that I have become incapable of 
giving directions at the discretion of a physician in charge of my case. 
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In the event of my suffering from any of the conditions specified above, I request 
that no active steps should be taken and in particular that no resuscitatory 
techniques should be used, to prolong my life or restore me to consciousness.". 
The declaration would be witnessed by two persons of approved standing, testifying 
that the declarant knew its meaning. The declarant could cancel the declaration at 
any time simply by tearing it up or ordering its destruction. Unless revoked, the 
declaration would be valid throughout the life of the declarant as a will. Wilshaw 
says that the intention is that people would make their declarations while in normal 
health, and as a safeguard against impulsive active action, a month is suggested as a 
period for "second thoughts" before euthanasia could be applied (Wilshaw 1974: 6). 
A consultant in addition to the doctor in charge of the patient would have to certify 
that recovery was hopeless before resorting to euthanasia. The form would 
normally be kept by the patient's doctor or other trusted person who would forward 
it to any hospital where the declarant became an in-patient. A duplicate declaration 
stated to be a duplicate and bearing the name and address of the holder of the 
original could be retained by the next of kin. Most of the people who were 
interviewed supported the "living will". Nobody wants to be a burden to their family 
or society at large. Even the very old people, plus or minus seventy year age group 
were not in support of life support systems. They felt that one was merely 
prolonging the agony and interfering with nature. While the younger generation 
supported active euthanasia, the older generation was against it. Here again they 
felt that one was interfering with nature. Suffering was the result of one's kanna, 
and one could not escape that. The cessation of life was the work of God and not of 
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man. The Classical Period on the other hand supported active euthanasia, and their 
view of the phenomenon was the same as that of Western scholars and the younger 
generation of the Hindus in Durban. 
S.1.3.1 PRESSURISATION 
Some argued that if euthanasia was legalised, then people would feel pressured to 
support euthanasia. The old and the sick, even if they were against euthanasia, 
would probably give in to euthanasia, so as not to be a burden to family and society. 
A life worth nothing to society might be worth very much to the person whose life is 
in question. 
The fear that it would be possible to persuade an old weak willed relative to sign a 
declaration in order to get him out of the way is without substance according to 
some proponents of euthanasia. In the first place there would be two impartial 
persons of recognised standing to ascertain and certify that no pressure is applied; 
these witnesses would be aware of the possibility of pressure and therefore, guard 
against it. 
However, suppose the witnesses were careless or were deceived and the chronic but 
meek invalid did sign a declaration this would not bring instantaneous death. There 
is the factor of thirty days in which to keep up the enforced resolution. If the 
patient's condition does not justify euthanasia at that stage the doctor would say so; 
certainly he would not be able to get a consultant to concur to the contrary. 
Therefore, the pressurised meek would be in a stronger position than before and 
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would not be pressured by his hostile family (as well as in his own mind) for the 
doctor in charge does in fact remain in charge and would say, "No!" to any 
premature euthanasia. The only means of circumventing this safeguard would be 
collusion and corruption by the doctor, the consultant and the two witnesses of 
established standing. If the doctors were so minded, there are easier and less risky 
ways of achieving their end. 
This is equally true of the chronic sick or senile who might feel they are becoming a 
burden to relatives or society and sign a declaration on that account. Euthanasia 
would only come their way to avoid unnecessary suffering in the last extremity; 
nevertheless, it would be a comfort to most people to know that their life would not 
be allowed to end in protracted anguish and distress. 
For many this may seem to be a very sensible and democratic solution to the 
problem of euthanasia; where the answer comes from the individual himself in a 
legal manner. Other individuals are free from guilt, for they would not be 
performing an act of their own accord, but will be merely carrying out an instruction. 
This modem idea ties up very closely with the Classical view; there the individual 
concerned had made a public declaration that he did not wish to live any more. 
Outside assistance was also permissible then and will be permissible now if such a 
declaration had been made in writing. In the Classical Period, it was just a one man 
decision. In the modern period this declaration only comes into practice after the 
situation has been monitored carefully by the medical team; the chances of any 
corruption or malpractice is further lessened. 
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There does seem to be some consensus on euthanasia from the Classical to the 
Western view. Contemporary views also are very similar to the Classical and 
Western views. All ideas and views are being taken into consideration and common 
solutions are being formulated. Although the problem seems to be a very complex 
one, there seems to be a great deal of consensus on the phenomenon of euthanasia 
both from Eastern and Western viewpoints and also from those who share Eastern 
and Western views. 
5.1.3.2 THE DANGER OF MISTAKEN DIAGNOSIS 
Some people recount that they were at one time told that they bad only a short time 
to live and are in fact living years later. Such predictions are rash and irresponsibly 
made in the early stages of an illness. It is well for the lay person to bear in mind 
the difference between being very seriously ill and actually dying. The former often 
recover, the latter never do. Euthanasia would only be considered when the patient 
was definitely fighting a losing battle. 
The average doctor knows when a patient is dying. In those cases where euthanasia 
might be considered in accordance with the known wishes of the patient, the law 
would require that a specialist also be consulted. Such consultations could, no 
doubt, reduce the percentage of wrong diagnoses which otherwise occur. Indeed the 
opinion of the consultant might serve this to prolong a useful life rather than 
shorten it. The remote possibility of a mistake occurring in these circumstances is 
one that a declarant would be prepared to take. Man takes chances all the time. 
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It is also true that new cures are continually being discovered for conditions that 
were at one time incurable. When a new cure is found, euthanasia would be out of 
the question for that complaint. Unfortunately, however, the physical condition of 
an already seriously afflicted patient degenerates faster than medicine advances. In 
all such matters it is necessary to deal with conditions as they are known to be - not 
as they might be at some future date (Wilshaw, 1974: 11 - 13). 
5.1.4 RESPECT FOR HUMAN LIFE 
Respect for human life is fundamental to society and this respect must be preserved. 
But this respect need not be based on some concept of absolute value. Just as one 
recognizes that human life is not infinite in duration, one should face the fact that its 
value varies with time and circumstance. Just as religious tradition teaches one that 
the duty of preserving life, does not itself hold life to be of absolute value, and of 
recent times the medical tradition shared this view. Both religious and medical 
tradition looked upon death as a natural part of life, not as an unmitigated evil, or as 
a sign of the physician's failure. Hindu belief looks upon death as the ending of one 
and the beginning of another phase of existence. There is no finality in death. 
Death is only the annihilation of the physical body and the finding of a residence for 
the atma (soul) which is immortal. This is the argument used by Hindu doctors who 
have a fair knowledge of Hindu philosophy in support of euthanasia. One is merely 
releasing the soul from bondage. The body is disintegrating slowly and the person 
who performs euthanasia is merely aiding the cessation of all bodily function. 
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Western authors believe strongly that there are circumstances when it is morally and 
ethically acceptable to allow a patient to die without extraordinary means to prolong 
his life. This belief is based on two humane and significant concerns. 
1. Compassion for those who are painfully and terminally ill (Dyck 1973 in 
Marcinek 1981: 132). According to Kohl (in Marcinek 1981: 132) allowing 
a person to die if he is terminally ill and is suffering can be considered an act 
of kindness. To the extent that one believes kindliness to be a virtue, this is a 
virtuous act (dharmic according to Hindu belief). 
2. Concern for human dignity associated with freedom of choice (Dyck 1973 in 
Marcinek 1981 : 132). If one defines human dignity as the right to make 
decisions which affect oneself as does Kohl then one has the right to decide 
to refuse medical treatment (intervention) by extraordinary means to prolong 
life when one is terminally ill. One of the major fundamental moral 
principles is that of freedom and autonomy. One can restrict a person's 
freedom only if this restriction demonstrates respect for the person as a 
person (Ruf 1977 in Marcinek 1981: 132 - 133). 
The argument used by many who were interviewed especially academics was that if 
a terminally ill person wishes to die without any heroic measures to prolong life can 
one logically or morally force him to prolong his painful existence on the basis that 
one respects him as a person? If an adult knows what he is doing and is not harming 
anyone else in the process, is one not violating that person's right to autonomy by 
not permitting him to die peacefully, comfortably and with dignity? 
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The principle of human worth or respect for life derives from the view that human 
life has an intrinsic value. The physician's duty to do no harm grounded in the 
Hippocratic tradition of fiduciary relationship between patient and doctor is an 
extension of this ethical principle because it involves the intentional active ending of 
a life (Meier et al 1983: 294). 
Some respondents of the medical profession say that respect for life can be 
redefined. The foregoing arguments against mercy killing appeal to the principle of 
respect for life and urges one to act to preserve this value. But what does it mean to 
respect the life of a dying older person. The preservation of life may be an 
inappropriate goal in the suffering terminally ill who expresses the wish to die. 
Especially in the elderly, as the prospects of cure diminish, the responsibility to care 
and comfort grows in importance. This often demands even greater skill, stamina 
and attention from health professionals. Is it wrong one may ask if these caring 
measures slightly shorten life? Perhaps the principle of respect for life should be 
redefined to direct terminal care away from futile attempts to prolong life and 
toward efforts to ease pain, maximize function and lessen the sense of abandonment 
and loneliness so often cited by the dying. This shift in emphasis in no way weakens 
the moral foundation of the physicians' role. It requires compassion and courage to 
accept the responsibility of administering a dose of morphine that eases pain but 
may shorten a life. In a limited and appropriate context, this measure may improve 
the moral strength of the medical profession by demonstrating respect for the life of 
the person instead of respect only for the maximum duration of biologic existence 
(Meier et al 1983 : 297). 
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However, mercy killing must not be a substitute for optimal medical care. Prior to 
any consideration of any act that might hasten death, the care-giver must be sure , 
that all other avenues of pain relief including physical and spiritual support have 
been tried to their limits. Often further examination of available data about the 
patient's illness, fears and options can eliminate the need for the practice of mercy 
killing. Excellent home care and hospice options are sometimes available and their 
development should be supported. Increasing awareness of proper pain control 
techniques should permit comfort in almost all patients who are terminally ill; only 
in very rare cases does the administration of adequate pain medication pose a 
serious risk to life. Efforts to improve the quality of life for the dying patient should 
therefore, reduce the demand for active euthanasia. Thus what is needed in the vast 
majority of cases is the appreciation of the special needs of patients in this phase of 
their lives, and the expertise and compassion to meet them (Meier et al, 1983: 297). 
Euthanasia in such cases where everything else fails, becomes a virtuous act. Death 
even killing becomes an act meriting the greatest award according to proponents of 
euthanasia. 
Brahmin authors of the legal texts also gave a religious dimension to the context of 
euthanasia, which distinguished it from suicide. Euthanasia may be administered 
when a person no longer can perform the rites of bodily purification, which may 
occur in the case of extreme illness or extreme old age. Because these duties are 
dharmic and required, the non performance of them, would ordinarily create 
demerit/sin (papa). Since the incapacitated person cannot perform mandatory 
religious duties because of circumstances beyond his control it was necessary to 
create an exception to the general rule regarding required acts. Non-performance 
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of obligatory action by an incapacitated person is to be considered dhannic. If non-
performance of obligatory rituals is considered dhannic for an incapacitated person, 
then euthanasia, which is defined in part, by the situation of incapacitation, may also 
be considered dhannic. If euthanasia is dhannic, then in Brahmanical terms, it is 
righteous and religious (Young 1989: 95). 
One implication of this legal scope for euthanasia is that responsibility for self-
willed death rests with the individual. The Law of Karma is the key to 
understanding the issue of individual responsibility. It is important for an individual 
to consider the various criteria for euthanasia and to determine whether the desire 
to die is legitimately a case of euthanasia or whether it is a case for suicide. 
According to Young the distinction is crucial for the latter generates demerit or sin 
(papa) and leads to hell (Young 1989: 95). While an individual was responsible to 
determine whether the desire to die is legitimate or not, the leaders of society were 
responsible for the larger issue of whether any kind of mors voluntaria religiosa 
should be legitimated. The decision was made on the basis of the scriptures, the 
practice of the good people, and societal conditions. There was a recognition of 
how human lives interconnected to determine the social order. One definition of 
dhanna was social order. Practices such as euthanasia were viewed critically in 
social terms so that the welfare of society was taken into consideration. Once this 
had been established, then an individual was free to choose actions that may be 
optional but must be dhannic, in that they contribute to the general good of society 
or at least do not obstruct it (Young 1989 : 96). 
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Just as the people in the Classical Period (Brahmin jurists) used dharma (social 
order) to justify euthanasia, Western scholars and the modern Hindu in Durban use 
the theory of utilitarianism to justify euthanasia. The principle of utility attempts to 
balance the consequences of actions so that the greatest good is achieved. It can 
justify differing policies, depending on what is viewed as a good. For example, some 
persons favour "living will" legislation because it would save money that would 
otherwise be spent on old and dying patients; they argue that preserving life in the 
chronically ill elderly does not serve the best interests of society. However, 
opponents of mercy killing argue that loss of protection for weaker dependent 
members of society might easily follow such. They fear that the value of a life could 
become inversely proportional to its burden to society. As a result, older persons 
might feel pressure to opt for active euthanasia for fear of becoming emotionally or 
financially burdensome to their families or to society at large. These arguments 
appeal to the principles of autonomy and respect for life that prohibit the 
involuntary sacrifice of individual lives, even if the overall social welfare appears to 
benefit from such an action. However, the principle of utility may also be 
interpreted in a manner consistent with these values mandating constraints on 
killing which became of a less tangible but perhaps more fundamental benefit to 
society (Meier et al 1983 : 297). 
5.1.5 SANCTITY OF LIFE VERSUS QUALITY OF LIFE 
Joseph Fletcher, one of the greatest proponents of euthanasia says "one should drop 
the Classical sanctity of life ethic and embrace a quality of life ethic instead". 
Contemporary views in the Durban area strongly support Fletcher's view of quality 
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of life instead of the sanctity of life. Personal integrity according to the supporters 
of this view is more important than biological survival. Brahmin jurists in the 
Classical Period in India also supported the quality of life principle. The highest 
good is not just being alive, but "how alive". Biological existence (life) is not 
sacrosanct anymore as established by religious tenets and medical piety. In the 
realm of medical care the sanctity of life has had priority at all costs (Fletcher, J. 
1975 : 46 - 47). However, this view is changing rapidly, moreso, amongst medical 
practitioners and new meanings are now given to the Hippocratic Oath. In the light 
of technological development, fabulous biomedical gains have been made in 
neonatology resuscitative treatment, artificial life support systems and organ 
replacement by means of transplanted tissue or implanted artificial substitutes. The 
question of human or medical initiatives in living and dying is therefore, a problem 
caused by success not by failure. Now man can preserve and prolong life, a task that 
was not even dreamed of by one's grandfather, so much so that one can at last see 
why prolonging living may paradoxically be prolonging dying. Along with the 
problem of how to save life comes the problem of when to stop it. 
Thanatology is exploring the more realistic and contemporary terms the question of 
where one is to draw the line between prolonging living and prolonging dying. 
Whereas the so called "human vegetable" was once an infrequent problem in 
terminal wards of hospitals, it is now a common daily problem because of medical 
success. The loss of personal integrity now often occurs long before biological 
death. Death has changed its meaning, instead of being an event is now a process. 
The old fashioned death-bed (in traditional Hindu homes a mat strewn with kusa 
grass), scene of final farewells, family gatherings, and the family priest offering 
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prayers (gaudhan ), the ganga jal and tulasi leaf is replaced; death comes now in 
hospitals from chronic rather than from acute diseases which are more apt to be 
metabolic than infectious or contagious. Patients do not meet death anymore; the 
end comes for them while comatose, betubed, aerated, glucosed, narcosed, sedated 
not conscious not even human anymore. Given this picture it is no surprise that the 
''white coat is losing some of its shine" in patient's eyes and that people begin to fear 
senility more than death (Fletcher, J. 1975: 47). According to popular Hindu belief 
it is very important for a person to be conscious when he is dying. His last words 
and desires determine his next birth. Very often a person who is dying repeats the 
word Ram or Krsna. In the olden days people named their sons Ram and Krsna, and 
when they were dying even if they called their sons by their name (Ram or Krsna ), 
moksa was granted to him, by virtue of the fact that he had uttered the name of Ram 
and Krsna. Uttering the very name Ram or Krsna was more important to the dying 
than the thought of God itself. This is an old Hindu belief. His thoughts at the 
moment of death determine his next birth; therefore, it is very important for a 
person to be conscious when he is dying. 
Not only are the conditions of life and death changing but definitions of life and 
death are also changing. The medical profession is at last accepting the ancient 
philosophical theological idea that humaness consists not in spontaneous organ 
function, but in the ratio, man's rational faculty or cerebral function. One may ask 
the question when did Senator Robert Kennedy die? When the assassin's bullet 
smashed his midbrain or eight hours later when the Classical medical criteria, 
absence of pulse heart beat breathing papillary light reflexes and so on said so? 
What one calls "mind" is what the brain does its function or product. In the new 
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view death has ensued when brain function is lost irreversibly, no matter if heart 
beat or blood circulation or breathing persist. The traditional criteria for the 
determination of death are subordinated and have been replaced by the concept of 
''brain death" and confirmed by retina and de-oxygenation tests. 
The essence of the new life death concept, which favours human being rather than 
mere biological functioning is caught up in a famous surgeon's remark: "When the 
brain is gone there is no point in keeping anything else going". This can be 
illustrated by the following example: 
"Doctors told us that Navi's brain stem was damaged. They kept her under 
observation from Tuesday and conducted the last test on Thursday morning before 
telling us that there was no chance of a recovery", he said. He said that the family 
had agonised for two days over whether they should keep her alive but believed it 
would be futile. Dr Rajah said that the family members had asked doctors to make 
certain that there was no chance of recovery before they took the decision to switch 
off the life-support machine (Tribune Herald 4/4/93). 
Death should not be looked upon as an enemy, it can also be a friend. Death is part 
of the natural order and likely to remain so for a long time. Perhaps it may be 
appropriate to quote Dr Eliot Slater, a biologist on the necessity of death. "Death 
performs the inestimable office of clearing up a mess too big to mend .... In human 
communities if the aged and the sick did not die within a short time after they had 
ceased to be self-supporting the burden on society would become disastrous. The 
position of the biologist asked to contemplate the death of the individual is that this 
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is an end devoutly to be wished. Death plays a wholly favourable indeed an 
essential part of the human economy (Williams 1966 : 182). Without natural death 
human societies and the human race itself would certainly be unable to thrive". 
Perhaps when one realizes this, one may realize at the same time that there is a 
point in the degeneration of one's body when life loses its value and then one may 
be prepared voluntarily to leave the science to his successor (Williams 1966: 187). 
Those that opposed euthanasia, said that life had value, irrespective of its quality. 
As long as there is life there is hope. Can one legitimate a stewardship of life and 
death as well as of health? One takes the initiative and exerts control over disease 
and injury, interfering with the natural processes of illness and accident. The 
"artificial" interference with nature is exactly what medicine is i.e. - a human 
intervention in what some religious believers would call God's providence. Given 
such a simplistic theodicy, they would then argue that to prevent a conception or 
birth or to hasten or contrive a death is an impious invasion of the divine monopoly 
that by special providence living and dying are in God's hands and that life is God's 
to give and only God's to take (Fletcher, J. 1975 : 48 - 49). 
This human concept of life and death fits for example with urgencies of organ and 
tissue transplantation from cadavers in cases where the recipient's life will be lost if 
the replacement has to wait until all the donor's functions have ceased 
spontaneously. This quality of life ethic, is so much less selfish and egoistic, so much 
more socially conscientious and so much more adapted to saving real life, as well as 
showing more respect for personal integrity. This can be seen as the extension of 
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the philosophy of utilitarianism. According to the Bhagavad Gita this would be a 
selfless duty. 
According to Hindu belief, a person suffers out of his own choice. This may not be 
acceptable to the medical profession and Western scholars. All the pleasures that a 
person enjoys and all the sufferings that he or she endures is as a result of his or her 
karma. Suffering therefore, according to Hindu philosophy, is an integral part of life 
and a person has no choice in the matter but to endure it, it is through his own 
doings that he is in the position that he is in. It is neither God's providence nor 
God's will. 
5.1.6 THE DILEMMA OF EUTHANASIA OF DEFECTIVE NEW-BORNS 
Euthanasia in the paediatric age group involves a constellation of issues that are 
materially different from those of adult euthanasia. The difference lies in the 
somewhat obvious fact that infants and young children are not able to decide about 
their own futures and these are not persons in the same sense that normal adults 
are. While adults usually decide their own fate others decide on behalf of young 
children. Although one can argue that euthanasia is or should be a personal right 
the sense of such an argument is obscure with respect to children. Young children 
do not have any personal rights, at least none that they can exercise on their own 
behalf with regard to the manner of their life and death. Hence someone else 
decides for him (Engelhardt 1975 : 180). 
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The response from the Hindu housewives was that these children should be treated 
like any other child. One should not treat them any differently because they have a 
defect. According to these Hindu housewives, it is the parent's duty to provide for 
these children. Medical care should also be given to these children whenever 
necessary. Many felt that these children be given extra and special attention; than 
one would probably give to ordinary children. 
The possibility of saving the life of severely handicapped infants cause ethical 
problems for physicians and parents alike. Very often questions are asked as to 
whether these children be saved or allowed to die. What practice and ethical 
principles should be applied for treatment or non-treatment of these infants? Some 
try to escape the ethical problem by arguing that such infants be aborted (Varga 
1982: 441). 
Popular American magazines have presented accounts of parental decisions not to 
pursue treatment. The decisions often involve a choice between expensive 
treatment with little chance of achieving a full normal life for the child and "letting 
nature take its course" with the child dying as a result of its defects. As this suggests 
many of these problems are products of medical progress. Such children in the past 
have died. The quandaries are in a sense an embarrassment of riches now that one 
can treat such defective children. Must one treat these children? And if one need 
not treat such defective children may one expedite their death (Engelhardt 1975 : 
181). 
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Obsel'fations reveal (discussion with teachers of handicapped children in schools, 
institutions for the handicapped, etc.) that many of the defective children in the 
Indian community (including the Hindu community) have taken birth in very poor 
homes. The families in which they are born are relatively large. The breadwinner 
of the family is normally the father. With inflation taking its toll on everybody, this 
poor father can barely feed, clothe and shelter his family. The care of the defective 
child becomes an added burden. Sometimes these children have to undergo 
expensive surgery. Most parents can barely afford them. State help in this regard is 
at its minimum. The debate goes on should money be spent on such inmates of 
society? Many feel that these children will be a burden as long as they live. The 
maxim, "If life was a commodity that money could buy, then the rich and only the 
rich will live and the poor will die". In this day and age, there seems to be a great 
deal of truth in this maxim. The cost of medical care and surgical operations is so 
great that only the rich can afford it. Today the rich can have a longer life-span, 
than the poor. But unfortunate as it may be, seven times out of ten, it is the poor 
who face this plight. In the Classical Period these children probably died at an 
earlier age because of the lack of medical treatment at times. 
Since infants and small children cannot commit suicide their right to assisted suicide 
is difficult to pose. Children are not persons (according to Western scholars) 
because they cannot exercise their own rights; they belong to parents and to society. 
However, adults belong to themselves in the sense that they are rational and free 
and therefore, responsible for their actions. Adults are sui juris. Young children, 
though are neither self-possessed nor responsible while adults exist in and for 
themselves as self-directive and self-conscious beings. Young children, especially 
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newborn infants exist for their families and those who love them. They are not, nor 
can they be responsible for themselves. If being a person is to be a responsible 
agent, a bearer of rights and duties children are not persons in a strict sense. They 
are rather persons in a social sense others must act on their behalf and bear 
responsibility for them. They are, as it were, entities defined by their place in social 
roles example, (mother-child) (family-child) rather than separate individuals. They 
cannot decide for themselves. Young children live as persons in and through the 
care of those who are responsible for them and those responsible for them exercise 
the children's rights on their behalf. In this sense, children belong to families in 
ways that most adults do not. They exist in and through their family and society 
(Engelhardt 1975 : 183). 
The Hindu housewives in the Durban area, said that they would never recommend 
euthanasia for the defective newborns or handicapped children. Even the Hindu 
doctors who were interviewed said that parents should care for these children and 
euthanasia was out of the question. According to these doctors, children belonging 
to this category, should be fed and cared for like any other children and not be 
starved to death as some Hindu doctors propound. 
Dr John M Freeman (in Varga 1982 : 440) mentions a practice of not properly 
feeding defective infants. The children are highly sedated and are fed only "on 
demand". "With the gentle help of sedation and feeding on demand ... children 
starve to death without making too much noise". Starving somebody to death when 
he could be fed can hardly be taken as an innocent omission of an act. It is rather a 
deliberate termination of the life of a human being. It is puzzling to note that some 
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persons are unequivocally against the active killing of defective infants and do not 
perceive the omission of feeding or of medically useful treatment of the defective 
infant as equivalent to killing them. Whether a person is killed by active or passive 
means it does not make any difference from the ethical point of view (Varga 1982: 
440-442). 
Some young Hindu doctors (married with no children) felt that starving these 
children to death would be in the best interest of the child. One doctor said that 
such children should not be allowed to be born in the first instance. Such children 
only become a burden onto themselves, to their parents and to the community at 
large. Hence, one can see that utilitarianism takes precedence over 
humanitarianism. One cannot condemn this view in toto. Hindu dharma looks at 
the welfare of the people at large rather than at the individual in particular. 
Hindu respondents on the other hand (housewives and doctors) said that it was 
criminal to starve a child to death (irrespective of its quality). They said that they 
would never do this nor will they ever make such a recommendation. 
The crux of the question is then, to determine when and under what circumstances 
is the omission of an act ethically justifiable? When is it not duty to treat a defective 
or sick infant and let him die? Many defective newborns died in the past because 
there was no effective treatment available. Since about 1950, however, many of 
these children can be saved and can live a good number of years notwithstanding 
some burdensome handicaps they have to carry their entire life. Antibiotics and 
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new developments in infant surgery can save defective infants. The price of survival 
can be enormous in suffering and inconvenience for the patients themselves for the 
families involved and in medical expenses (Varga 1982: 442- 443). 
Taking the above into consideration, would it be in the interest of the defective 
newborn and of the family involved to let him die? When is it ethically justifiable to 
let a newborn baby die and not to subject him to "heroic" and excessive treatment? 
The choice may be agonizing for those who have the responsibility to make the 
decision. Medical science has made a tremendous breakthrough in this respect in 
terms of medicines, treatments, life-prolonging techniques and public awareness 
through conferences and symposiums, books and articles dealing with this and the 
ethical dilemma is on the increase. All these provide guiding principles for helping 
the selection of babies who may be allowed or should be allowed to die and of those 
who should be treated. There is no unanimous decision in regard to this 
controversial question. Progress in medical science and the increase in high 
technology complicates the issue even further and makes decision-making even 
more complex. Even those Hindus who were interviewed had differing views. It is 
difficult to obtain a unanimous view on such delicate issues. Experience, social and 
emotional constitution of people differ from individual to individual. It is based on 
these factors, that people have expressed their views on defective new-borns. 
Some doctors who were interviewed felt that those newborns who had very severe 
impairments should not be subjected to complicated surgery and costly treatment. 
They should (that is the defective infant) be fed, kept clean and made comfortable 
only. The rest should be left to God. The purpose of medical intervention is to cure 
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the patient or, at least help him live with impairment. Medical intervention in the 
case of defective babies must be seen as a useful means for curing some of the 
baby's disorders or offer reasonable hope of benefit for strengthening the vital 
functions of the newborn so that further development and improvement will be 
possible. Perhaps, it may be unreasonable to apply useless means. Nourishment is a 
basic necessity for maintaining and developing any vital functions. Consequently 
corrective surgery that would restore the possibility of feeding the baby is an 
ethically mandatory medical intervention unless the infant is already dying of other 
impairments as well. A baby has the right to life and the parents have the duty to 
protect this right by means which are effective and are normally available to them. 
"Useful" and "useless" have been used instead of "ordinary" and "extraordinary" 
means. The reason for the former terminology is to avoid confusion and 
misunderstandings. For the average layman, the term " extra ordinary means" 
signifies some unusual or experimental therapy not readily available in all hospitals. 
The popular opinion would hold, then, that the application of ordinary means is 
ethically obligatory and one may omit only the use of extraordinary means. The 
fact, is that sometimes the use of ordinary, that is, customary means is useless and 
consequently it is not reasonable or ethically obligatory to apply them (Varga 1982: 
443 - 444). One has to take into account the excessive hardship that the application 
of the customary means would impose on the patient and on those who are involved 
in caring for the patient. Traditional natural law of ethics states that an affirmative 
duty admits of excuse because of the possibility of excessive hardship. No negative 
natural duty must be violated however, in connection with the omission of an act 
that would involve excessive hardship. Thus no defective infant may be directly 
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killed in order to avoid the excessive hardship of caring for him or her. Varga says 
that it is a negative duty "never to kill an innocent person". It follows from this that 
one may not kill a person to free him from suffering or inconvenience either. 
When medical experts judge that the efforts to save the life of a defective infant is 
hopeless, the parents have nothing else to rely on in the decision than the opinion of 
competent physicians. Doctors themselves may be in doubt as to the effectiveness 
of a certain medical intervention and the excessive hardship it creates for the infant 
and parents. In doubtful cases when the doubt is about a fact and not about the 
existence of a duty one has to choose the safer course, that is, one has to make an 
attempt to save the infant's life. 
Very often people ask the question whether human life can be measured in terms of 
monetary value? Many have argued that when it comes to saving a life expenses 
should not be considered at all because human life is priceless. However, it is not a 
simple monetary valuation of human life; the issue is more complex than one can 
imagine. Money pays for the scarce medical resources and scarce expert services. 
The expenses are so high, that it cannot be borne by one family alone. The 
community assists with the soaring costs of medical care. The principle of 
distributive justice must be invoked here to determine a certain order of priorities 
since not all medical or other kinds of needs can be satisfied. This is the reality of 
the human condition. The excessive expenses may become a practical and moral 
impossibility either for the family or for the whole community. Nobody is obliged to 
do the impossible. The ethics involved here is situation ethics and Hinduism 
supports situation ethics. Decision making is dependent a great deal on situation 
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and circumstances. Eastern and Western views on such issues are based on 
common grounds. Thus it is ethical to take into consideration excessive expenses 
when one decides whether or not a patient should be treated. Many sick people die 
because of a lack of life-saving means. Health care whether of infants or of adults 
must take an important place among the priorities of a nation's economic planning. 
But it must be realised also that there is a limit to the resources that can be spent on 
health care. Human life is "priceless" but maintaining it has its price which 
sometimes may be impossible to pay (Varga 1982: 446). It has become common 
knowledge t at to maintain defective children is a costly affair; therefore, Hindu 
professional women feel that defective children should be aborted in the foetal 
stage. The sychological impact and crises created by birth of a defective infant is 
devastating. Not only is the mother denied the normal tension released from the 
stresses of regnancy but both parents feel a crushing blow to their dignity, 
self-esteem nd self-confidence. 
Caring for s ch a child in the home environment is not an easy task. Difficult and 
demanding djustments have to be made to accommodate such a child. Parents 
must learn ow to care for a disabled child, confront financial and psychological 
uncertainty, eet the needs of other siblings and work through their own conflicting 
feelings. M thering demands are greater than with a normal child particularly if 
medical car and hospitalization are frequently required. Younger siblings may 
react with h stility and guilt, older with shame and anger. Family resources can be 
depleted (es ecially if medical care is needed), consumption patterns altered or 
standards of living modified. It may become necessary to find a home near a 
hospital, an plans for further children changed. The modern view is that these 
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children are looked upon as a burden to society in general and to their families in 
particular. Coping with family is no easy task for a working mother. Having a 
defective child adds to the burden of family care. One has to be realistic. 
While one sympathises with a parent who has to bear the brunt of having a defective 
child, at the same time one cannot view life in utilitarian terms only. The 
experience of living through a crisis is a deepening and enriching one accelerating 
personality maturation, and giving one a new sensitivity to the needs of spouse, 
siblings, and others. As one parent of a defective states: "In the last months I have 
come closer to people and can understand them more". The hard hearted can 
become soft and compassionate, and view all living beings with a deep sense of 
compassion and feeling. Out of every evil cometh some good. 
Life is an experience of both pleasure and pain. As has been stated earlier, all that 
one experiences in one's lifetime, is as a result of one's past deeds (karma). As a 
Hindu, one ought to accept this, and do that which his dharma permits him to do. 
Eastern as well as Western views display similar sentiments with regard to the 
defective child. "Thus while social attitudes regard the handicapped child as an 
unmitigated disaster, in reality the problem may not be insurmountable, and often 
may not differ from life's other vicissitudes. Suffering there is, but seldom is it so 
overwhelming or so imminent that the only alternative is death of the child 
(Robertson 1975 : 258 - 259). 
Physicians and nurses also suffer when parents give birth to a defective child; 
maybe not to the degree of the parents. To the obstetrician or general practitioner 
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the defective birth may be a blow to his professional identity. He has the difficult 
task of explaining the defects, their causes and dealing with the parents' resulting 
emotional shock. Often he feels guilty for failing to produce a normal baby. Nurses 
too suffer role strain from care of the defective newborn. They face the daily 
ordeals of care - the progress and relapses, and must deal with anxious parents. 
Care of the defective newborn also imposes societal costs, the utility of which is 
questioned when the infant's expected quality of life is so poor. Medical resources 
that can be used by infants with a better prognosis or throughout the health care 
system generally are consumed in providing expensive surgical and intensive care 
services to infants who may be severely retarded, never lead active lives and die 
shortly. The taxpayer is also burdened. 
If the non-treatment of defective newborns has become deeply ingrained in medical 
practice, one can only hope that it will only be confined to those cases in which the 
clearest and most indisputable grounds for withholding care exists. The attending 
physician is a partial check on parents who would unjustifiably deny treatment, even 
if the criminal law is not. Although the decisions of physicians are mainly medical , 
they too can become moral agents when a situation demands it, as in the case where 
a parent denied surgery to a Downs Syndrome suffering from duodenal atresia and 
the child died of starvation. Although moral decision should not lie with physicians, 
they do have a right to make ethical decisions if it is to the benefit of the patient. 
Hence legal and medical ethics is an integral component of the euthanasia debate. 
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The whole controversy can be resolved if each person accepts his responsibility and 
does his duty (dharma) without any selfish motives. The performance of one's duty 
in Hindu philosophy is of ultimate concern. Even moksa can be attainable through 
selfless duty. In this way the rta (order) or the balance or cosmology can maintain 
its equilibrium. The essence of the Bhagavad Gita is the performance of one's duty 
in a selfless manner. Religion must be lived out, and should not be confined to the 
temple, mosque or church. 
The views of Durban Hindus regarding the defective new-born are numerous and 
varied. Interviews with the different groups revealed that their views were largely 
dependent on and influenced by their educational background, professional training, 
age, to a very large extent, Western influences and utilitarian bias. Generally, 
however, those interviewed felt that handling of the defective child depends largely 
on the degree of defectiveness. This greatly influenced the views of those in the 
medical profession: depending on the nature and degree of defectiveness. 
Measures should be taken to treat the child to the fullest extent possible. Many 
parents and the older generation also felt the same way. Educated younger parents, 
especially when both were working, argued that euthanasia could be a welcome 
relief for the child. It would ensure that other children all receive the same amount 
of attention. 
Many of those interviewed attempted to be rational and mainly based their 
decisions on utilitarian grounds. Scriptural injunctions played very little part in their 
views. Some of the respondents (both young and old), however, did give their views 
in terms of kanna and dharma. Often the reinterpretation of these concepts was 
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necessitated in order to uphold certain views. Thus the new-bom's defect was seen 
as being the consequence of such child's karma, and consequently, it would be 
improper to administer euthanasia on such an infant. Since the defect was the 
consequence of the child's karma, the child should be allowed to run the normal 
course of its life and bear the outcome of its defects in order to complete or to fulfill 
the requirements of its karma. And it was the ka1117-a of the family members to live 
with and to bear the problems that came with such defects. It was the karma of the 
family to accept the child and do whatever they could for its comfort and well-being. 
The life of the family would have to be greatly modified in order to accommodate 
and cope with the child's defects. It also becomes a challenge to medical personnel, 
and others, associated with such a child to think of and invent ways to alleviate the 
child's suffering, so that its defects become less burdensome. In this way, therefore, 
it can be seen that karma of those associated with the child becomes closely 
intertwined with that of the child: it is their karma to endure with patience and love 
the challenges and frustrations that such a child could bring. The challenges also 
bring, in their solution, and increase in understanding and knowledge of the defects. 
This would constitute the basis for the completion of the child's karma, as well as of 
those associated with the child: the basis or the requirements for the advance and 
evolution of the child's karma and also of those associated with such children. 
Those in favour of euthanasia, however, argue that it is the karma of the child to be 
the subject of euthanasia. And it is the karma of the person administering 
euthanasia to be associated with the child and to perform this function. Thus the 
suffering of the child is ended and that of the family alleviated, so that they can 
continue to live a "normal life". In this way the karma of the child is also associated 
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with those around it. Thus when a person dies "naturally" it is assumed that such a 
person has lived and fulfilled a "normal" life-span. Consequently, when a defective 
child is allowed to live and those associated with it do all they can to make its life 
and problems bearable and "liveable", this constitutes the basis for the advancement 
in the karma of all concerned. In this way karma becomes closely intertwined with 
and a part of dharma. For the small circle of its associates, the child becomes the 
centre from which patience (to help, comfort, nurse and develop the child), love 
knowledge and understanding, and of consequence, acceptance, are built up. With 
acceptance of the problem assistance to the child is performed with love. This is 
then accepted as a duty (of parents, family, doctors, associates, etc.). It is the 
creation of an order; and the performance of this duty to uphold the order is a part 
of dharma. Karma, therefore, in its association with, becomes an integral part of 
dharma. 
5.2 SUICIDE 
Suicide is the ultimate vehicle of escape from intolerable circumstances of life. 
Painful feelings of social isolation, loneliness, frustration, failure, purposelessness 
spur the suicidal person into seeking relief by crying out for help or by inviting death 
to take him; often he seeks both help and death in an act of suicide. 
5.2.1 SUICIDE lSADHARMIC AND CONDEMNATORY 
Interviews amongst Durban Hindus revealed a condemnation of suicide yet a 
sympathetic attitude towards the victims of suicide. It was felt that those who 
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committed suicide did so because of circumstances beyond their control. Victims 
committed suicide because they could not cope with the stressful situations brought 
about by the demands of society and found suicide "an easy way out of a difficult 
situation". 
Suicide in contemporary society could be considered as passionate self-willed death. 
This would not have been accepted in Classical times. The victims would have been 
denied sraddha (post.;.cremation ceremonies) and even the cremation rites, as the 
Classical Period found only mors voluntaria heroica and mors voluntaria religiosa 
acceptable. Research shows that no persons commit suicide for the above reasons, 
hence suicide cannot be condoned on religious grounds. The souls of those who 
committed suicide on passionate grounds (emotional stress, psychologically 
unstable, etc.) did not gain moksa. Such a soul would continue in the wheel of birth 
and death (samsara ). This was a view shared by Hindus in the Classical Period. 
Contemporary society would permit such cases (i.e. those committing suicide) both 
cremation rites and the sraddha ceremony. The view is that the dead should not be 
discriminated against. Further sraddha (rites performed for the dead) not only 
benefit the dead but also the living. Therefore, one performs the rites out of a sense 
of duty (dharma) for oneself and one's own spiritual development. 
5.2.2 SUICIDE: THE PERFECT FORM OF SACRIFICE 
Although some Hindus in Durban do sacrifice, the only animal that most Hindi-
speaking Hindus sacrifice is a goat (a male goat). The sacrifice of man is definitely 
out of the question. At first in the Vedic Period five animals were sacrificed: man, 
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horse, bull, sheep and a goat. These five animals are said to represent all the 
animals (Tull 1989 : 83; Eggeling 1979 : 165). Animal sacrifice was further 
simplified in the Vedic Age. The goat was the only animal that was chosen to be 
sacrificed as it suitably represented the other four animals as well. The idea was not 
to shed too much blood. Human sacrifice was no longer in vogue. Thus it can be 
seen that in the Vedic Age itself there was emphasis in simplification and 
re-interpretation of rituals. Moksa through suicide was replaced by the desire to live 
out the natural life-span (that is one hundred years). It was believed that if one 
lived for a hundred years then one automatically obtained moksa. Sacrifice also 
took on a more symbolic form. Renunciation from worldly existence was also a 
form of sacrifice or "suicide". Many chose to sacrifice their lives in this way to gain 
liberation or moksa. 
Sacrifice of animals by contemporary Hindus is done sometimes out of fear and 
tradition. Most of them do not even know why the "goat" in particular is sacrificed. 
Orthodox Hindus feel that animals have to be sacrificed to appease the Gods. 
Others show their love to God by offering flowers, garlands, milk, honey and 
sweetmeats. These are sattvic offerings devoid of flesh and blood. The Arya 
Samajists perform only the havan ceremony, whereby only samagree and ghee are 
offered into the fire. A great deal of re-interpretation has taken place, and rituals 
are being constantly simplified. In contemporary times, no one commits suicide for 
religious reasons. Suicide for the attainment of liberation or moksa is now unheard 
of. 
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In the Vedic Period suicide was also recommended for those suffering from extreme 
old age and terminal diseases. In present times, suicide is not recommended for 
such people. The problem now rests with the family and the attending physician. In 
present times, it is not a problem of suicide, but a matter of euthanasia. 
5.2.3 IS SUICIDE THE ANSWER FOR LIBERATION ORMOKSA? 
The human life and the physical body is particularly important for salvation (moksa 
or liberation). The body according to one Hindu in the Durban area may also be 
viewed as the ''vehicle" for salvation. It is through the physical body that one 
performs actions and yoga. If the action that the individual performs is dharmic, 
then these dharmic acts help the soul to evolve spiritually. Thus one cannot 
disregard the physical body entirely, for it is only through the physical body that one 
attains moksa. Hence suicide is definitely not the answer for salvation. While the 
theory of rebirth (the wheel of samsara and the bliss of liberation(moksa) states that 
the individual may have had or may have in the future other kinds of birth (e.g. 
animal), it is only in the human birth that an individual may seek enlightenment. 
According to the belief of one Hindu (a scientist by profession) once a person has 
taken a human birth, he would not retrogress in his future births, that is he would 
take a human birth. This Hindu believes in the theory of evolution as understood by 
Darwin. He believed that the soul and the physical body did not evolve at the same 
pace. A person might be an "animal in human clothing". Hence the value of human 
life is defined positively by the unique opportunity it provides for the pursuit of 
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salvation. Human status is a product of an individual's karma, a result of good 
actions in previous lives. Abuse of this human status is productive of bad karma, 
according to Hindu scholars. 
Many of those who were interviewed felt that human life should be used 
meaningfully; and that salvation or moksa should be the goal of every individual. 
The longer one lived, the greater the chance was for salvation; provided that one 
performed righteous deeds, accumulated good karma and performed one's duty 
(dharma) with distinction. The person who committed suicide (according to those 
interviewed) had wasted his human birth and his opportunity for moksa. This is very 
similar to the Upanisadic view. 
According to one Hindu scholar the soul of a person who had committed suicide 
would roam about aimlessly and would be used by others to perform evil deeds. 
Further, this soul would for the next seven generations take birth in a body that 
would commit suicide. Hence there would be no spiritual development for this soul 
for a very long time. Therefore, the soul of those who commit suicide do not benefit 
from post-cremation ceremonies. The surviving relatives performed sraddha 
(ceremonies) for those who had committed suicide out of a sense of duty. It is 
believed that those who perform these ceremonies (sraddha) also benefit. In this 
case (suicide) only the performer of the ceremony benefit and not the one for whom 
the ceremony is performed. Therefore, one can conclude that contemporary Hindus 
(especially in the Durban area) strongly condemn suicide; for the attainment of 
moksa or enlightenment for the contemporary Hindu can be achieved through 
various ways without resorting to suicide. Those who are ritually inclined, perform 
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rituals (puja) at home or in temples. This takes the form of offering fruits, flowers 
and sweetmeats to their chosen deities, Lakshmi, Durga, Shiva, Hanuman, etc. 
There are also a few who offer animal sacrifice (goat) dedicated to mother Kali. 
These are Bhakti worshippers, who feel offerings must be made to the deities out of 
a sense of duty (dharma) devotion and love. There are also those who resort to 
meditation and practise austerities and visit holy places like the ashrams. These 
people are also interested in widening their spiritual knowledge (jnana yoga). Many 
Hindus attend Ramayan and Gita classes regularly. There is a great urge to learn, 
and those who are learned in the scriptures (especially the Ramayan and the Gita) 
the desire to teach. Contemporary Hindus feel that by engaging in such activities 
one is paving the way (path) towards liberation (moksa); hence a re-interpretation 
of karma and dharma. Many sathsang classes are held in private homes and shrines 
where people engage in prayer, meditation, bhajans and kirtans (singing the praises 
to the Lord through their chosen deities) as a means of spiritualising and coming 
closer towards God-realization. Thus there is this shift of emphasis of spiritualising 
through the use of the physical body rather than committing suicide. Suicide in the 
Classical Period was an easy way out, which often led to abuse. 
From the above one can deduce that for the contemporary Hindu suicide is not the 
answer for liberation and moksa, since there are more meaningful ways of attaining 
salvation (moksa). Renunciation (i.e. giving up worldly existence) was another way 
of attaining moksa. In the Classical Period this was regarded as a form of suicide 
and was confined to the third or fourth stages of a person's life. 
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However, this type of renunciation is not always possible for the contemporary 
Hindu. The contemporary Hindu cannot wander away from home and live in the 
open subsisting on water and air till his body sinks to rest (Manu 6 : 31 in Young 
1989 : 101). Time and place and circumstances do not permit this type of 
renunciation. Those Hindus who are spiritually inclined, renounce a worldly 
existence (based on material wealth) and adopt a more religious attitude. This he 
does in the third stage of his life, in the vanaprastha asrama. He leads a simple life, 
visits holy places, goes on pilgrimage (India, Benares, Gaya) and spends most of his 
time in prayer and meditation. This is his way of attaining God-realization. 
Renunciation itself has been re-interpreted by the contemporary Hindu. 
5.2.4 SERVICE TO MAN IS SERVICE TO GOD 
Yet there are other Hindus who feel that the goal for attaining moksa or 
enlightenment should not be left to the latter half of a person's life. A person 
should sacrifice his or her entire life towards serving other people. This service 
should be selfless. Hence one can say that suicide is now re-interpreted as a selfless 
sacrifice for the benefit and upliftment of fellow-beings. The bloody sacrifice 
(killing of animals to appease the gods) of the Vedic Period, has been re-interpreted 
in the Bhagavad Gita, as selfless service (sacrifice of the personal self to serve other 
beings, humans in particular. The entire teachings of the Bhagavad Gita emphasises 
selfless service. Karma yoga is a very important aspect of a person's life; by 
performing one's duty truthfully, honestly and sincerely for the good of the people 
one can attain moksa. Even the jivan mukta (having attained self-realization) works 
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for the spiritual upliftment of mankind. The Gita discusses service to mankind in 
general and not to the Hindu in particular. The teachings of the Hindu religion, all 
the scriptures, and the Gita in particular are Universal in character. 
Others interviewed said that there should be a balance between the material and 
the spiritual aspect of man. By utilizing one's wealth not only for oneself (or for 
one's progeny), but for others (who are totally unrelated) also is a means of 
attaining salvation. 
While the Ramayan teaches how dharma (Ram being the epitome of dharma) 
operates in a holistic sense for the general maintenance of rta (order) in the cosmos, 
the Gita is more personal in its approach. The Gita teaches that each individual has 
a particular duty to perform and that each one should perform that particular duty 
selflessly. 
Therefore, one can conclude that suicide is now re-interpreted as sacrifice of the self 
in terms of service to others. Yet others argued (i.e. those Hindus who were 
interviewed) that a balance should exist between the different yogas, bhakt~ jnana, 
karma and raja for a person to attain moksa. Their view was that each of the yogas 
was of equal importance. The different yogas took prominence in different stages of 
a person's life. 
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5.2.S SUICIDE AND REBIRTH 
Hindu philosophy holds that life in its broadest terms does not end with death. 
According to Hindu belief death opens the door to the next life whose type is 
determined by the way the preceding life was utilized. This is the Law of Kanna or 
cosmic justice, or the theory of reincarnation that occupies the central place in the 
Vedantic philosophy. Hindu priests who were interviewed also share a similar ~ew. 
Each individual who is born has to go through the different stages of life, student, 
householder, retired individual and an ascetic or sannyasi. Not all individuals reach 
the third and fourth stages. Many die a natural death before that. The quality of 
life that each individual enjoys or suffers is determined by the actions of his previous 
life. This is one's karma. As stated in Chapter One, one cannot escape the Law of 
Karma. People who resort to suicide, take birth again and again to fulfill their 
karma. Sankara also argues that one must live out one's life to allow the karmas to 
come to fruition (Young 1989 : 102). He implies that the moment of natural death 
signals the moment when there are no more karmas to create bondage. Suicide 
according to the Hindu priests is interfering with God's work or the natural order of 
succession. 
5.2.6 MODERN HINDU BELIEF AND THE INFLUENCE OF WESTERN 
THOUGHT 
Those Hindus (especially the youth) who had very little or no knowledge of Hindu 
philosophy and who were greatly influenced by Western thinking condemned 
suicide. These Hindu youth think that suicide is an evil act and it can never be 
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lawful. No motive can justify suicide. No good can be derived nor can an evil be 
averted from such an act. If one has to analyse this reasoning, one finds that it is 
based on religious belief and tradition and on sound reasoning. God is the author of 
life hence life is a gift of God given to man in order that he may give glory to his 
maker by good deeds (dharmic acts) preformed in life, until he returns to his maker 
to receive the reward for his good deeds or the punishment for the evil he did on 
earth (good or bad karma according to Hindu belief). Hence one can deduce that 
Hindu and Western beliefs on the phenomenon of suicide are very similar. Suicide 
is contrary to man's strongest natural inclination of self-preservation. The moral 
consensus of mankind, which look upon life as a thing of greatest value has always 
disapproved of suicide. Suicide is primarily a sin against God, because He alone has 
the right to dispose of man's life. Those who commit suicide are punished by God. 
This is very similar to Hindu thinking for they believe that moksa will be denied to 
those who commit suicide. 
Hindu lawyers who were interviewed also condemned suicide. Suicide is an 
unnatural act. Life does not belong to man it is only on loan to man from God. It is 
only for God and God alone to decide as to when the loan period should expire. 
Suicide is interfering with God's work. In civil law suicide is not considered a crime. 
However, anyone inducing or aiding another to commit suicide is punishable by law, 
even if the suicidal attempt was unsuccessful. It is a criminal offence to help 
someone commit suicide. 
Although suicide is condemned by all Hindus, yet the attitude towards those who 
commit suicide is one·of sympathy and identification. Various reasons were given as 
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to why "these poor folks" resort to suicide. Political, economic and social conditions 
influence the rate of suicides for it is higher in cities and industrial centres, than in 
rural areas. The reason is that civilization brings not only progress, but also 
anxieties, unattainable wants, intoxication, religious indifference, boredom with life, 
which are all factors favourable to suicide. 
5.2.7 THE SYMPATHETIC VIEW 
However, the more important causes leading to suicide are rooted in the spirit of 
the individual himself. Demands made by modern social living, exacting professions 
or burdensome responsibility, further heightened by excessive mental strain, which 
stresses anxieties, preoccupations and distress. To this must be added a lack of high 
ideals, aims and aspirations for, if man no longer has an objective in view, he ceases 
to appreciate the beneficial force for imperatives, duties and missions. Life loses its 
attractiveness, the future becomes dark and bleak. The idea of suicide begins to 
take root in his depressed and tired spirit. Other causes are impoverishment from 
financial set backs, gambling losses, disappointment in life, the death of a loved one 
among elderly couples nostalgia and brooding reminiscence. All these factors help 
create the ideal environment for the suicide. 
It has also been found that not only adults, but also a great number of children 
resort to suicide. Suicide among children and adolescents is on the increase 
throughout the world and Durban is no exception. The causes differ from those 
which influence adults to self-destruction. 
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It may seem that a child should be the last one to contemplate suicide, since the 
incentives for suicide action are generally absent from a child's young life. Instead 
due to a precocious and excessive degree of sensibility partly from unhappy or poor 
environment conditions, too. Many youthful lives are caught in the midstream of 
suffering, disappointment, frustration and neglect. The causes that are more likely 
to drive a young boy or girl to suicide are fear of cruel and humiliating punishment; 
severe castigation administered either by overly severe, sick or degenerate parents, 
continuous physical or moral maltreatment, humiliation, derision and the like, 
physical illness and pain, constant quarrelling, failure in an examination, finally in 
adolescents a drawing passion of love with all its delusions (Sunday Times Extra 
12/12/93). 
A more serious error contributing to the suicides of children into which too many 
parents and teachers fall, is to consider infantile disappointments as infinitesimally 
trifling or insignificant in comparison with the suffering of an adult. This may be 
true in an absolute sense, but one must admit that, the passions and sufferings of the 
young are less violent than those of adults so too their capacity of control is less 
pronounced and more tender and sensitive are their emotions. Defective training or 
unhealthy environment may also create in the life of a child conditions of grave 
injustice or suffering from which he finds it difficult to escape. 
Also to be remembered as a fact that because of pressing economic necessities, 
one's bustling and feverish pace of living seems to have a tendency to cause children 
to mature prematurely. Such a premature exposure to a complicated life places an 
untimely burden of studies on his mind, robs him too soon of his precious simplicity, 
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throws him into a tense existence of adult living and subjects him to the contagion of 
emotions that are too big for his age; all of which easily leads to various forms of 
instability that may culminate in irreparable tragedies (Roberti et al 1962 : 1177 -
1181). 
As indicated earlier, the Durban Hindu, condemns suicide on the one hand, yet is 
very sympathetic on the other. It is only when one experiences the problems and 
lives the life of the suicidals can one identify with such people, and offer a hand of 
sympathy. Even if one is a staunch Hindu and has in him the ingrained philosophy 
of karma and dharma, having been placed in a situation of the above nature one 
would probably resort to suicide. That would probably be the most prudent thing to 
do at that time. 
As has been said by one Hindu doctor, it is the karma of these people to engage in 
such an act (suicide) and put an end to their suffering. Some may view this as a 
demonic, others may view this as a spiritual act. Suicide may sometimes be viewed 
as an act of great courage (mors voluntaria heroica). 
S.3 ABORTION 
The most fundamental question involved in the long history of thought on abortion 
is: How does one determine the humanity of a being? The theological notion of 
ensoulment could easily be translated into humanistic language by substituting 
"human" for "rational soul"; the problem of knowing when a man is a man is 
common to theology and humanism. The positive argument for conception as the 
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decisive moment of humanization is that at conception the new being receives the 
genetic code. It is this genetic information which determines his characteristics, 
which is the biological carrier of the possibility of human wisdom which makes him 
a self-evolving being. A being with a human genetic code is "man" or "person" 
(Noonan 1973 : 15). 
5.3.1 ABORTION lSADHARM/C AND CAN NEVER BE CONDONED 
According to the old conservative view abortion is adharmic. This was the general 
view expressed by people of the older generation plus or minus fifty year age group. 
Learned Hindu priests also expressed a similar view, that is, the condemnation of 
abortion. By performing such an unkindly act, they felt that those who performed 
the abortion, and, those on whom the abortion was being performed accumulated 
bad karma. Such an act can never be considered dharmic. The Vedas and the 
Upanisads also condemn abortion. According to these scriptures abortion violates 
dharma, the socio-religious order in a most serious way. This implies that the living 
embryo enjoyed a special moral status in the eyes of the Hindu and deserved 
protection and respect. The older Hindus felt that a soul was present from the very 
moment of conception. Hence any wilful destruction of the zygote or embryo was 
regarded as "murder". 
Today the Western world questions the moral status of the unborn. Those Hindus 
in Durban who are greatly influenced by Western beliefs and views also question the 
moral status of the unborn and have thus favoured abortion on these grounds. 
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5.3.2 ARGUMENTS FOR AND AGAINST ABORTION 
Academics from the legal and medical fields say that abortion raises subtle 
problems for private conscience, public policy and constitutional law. There is no 
single problem of "the status of the unborn". The unborn entity changes and grows 
continuously, assuming new and dramatically different characteristics along the way, 
some of which could have crucial moral significance. For that reason it would be 
wise to adopt the careful terminology of the embryologists and speak of the status of 
the "ovum", the "zygote", the "conceptus", the "embryo", the "foetus" or the "infant" 
(Feinberg 1973 : 1 - 2). 
5.3.2.1 THE ARGUMENT FROM INNOCENCE 
Those Hindus interviewed in Durban, presented many arguments against abortion. 
One argument that had made a very strong impression was the argument from the 
point of innocence. According to them, every living foetus, regardless of its stage of 
development, is a human being and any act which is a deliberate and direct 
destruction of that innocent life is therefore an act of murder. Perhaps more simply 
put the killing of an innocent human being is immoral. Therefore, abortion is the 
killing of an innocent human being, hence it is immoral. These people were not 
familiar with scriptural views on abortion, however, their arguments had very sound 
reasoning and were similar to scriptural views. 
Marvin Kohl a Western scholar asks two questions concerning abortion. Firstly, is it 
true that each and every killing of an innocent human being is immoral? And 
260 
secondly, can one correctly say that a human foetus is a human being? Kohl says 
that the best way to answer the question is in the negative and that the argument 
from innocence must be rejected. 
He has illustrated his argument by the following example. "An obstetrician 
discovers in the middle of delivery that he is dealing with a twin pregnancy. It is a 
case of locked twins; a case where the first child presents by the breech and the 
second by the vertex where the two heads have locked in such a manner that the 
second fits into the neck of the first child making its delivery impossible. The 
question Kohl asks is what should the physician do if he cannot displace the head of 
the second child? Should he decapitate the first and save the second, or should he 
allow both to die?" (Kohl 1974 : 38 - 40). This is a situation in which a physician 
might be placed in. One Hindu doctor who was interviewed said that sometimes it 
might be necessary to kill one in order to save the other. But all efforts should be 
made to save both. But if this fails, all efforts should be made to save at least one of 
the twins. It would be immoral to allow both to die. The argument is that a 
physician should save what he can. 
According to Hindu belief or dharma, it is not a matter of doing the right thing but 
doing what would be the most prudent thing given the circumstances. Even killing is 
permitted in Hindu dharma, if circumstances demand it. There are ample examples 
in the Bhagavad Gita to illustrate this. The Lord Himself (Krsna) commands Arjuna 
to kill out of a sense of duty. Killing in special circumstances becomes a dharmic 
act. The importance of a value, according to Hindu law givers, does not lie in the 
abstraction but only in the context in which it is embodied. Its importance or worth 
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may vary from time to time (kala) and from place to place (desa). No value can be 
universalised or absolutized as good for all times and all regions. Even dharma 
cannot be invested with such universal meaning. Bhisma says in the Mahabharata 
"what is dharma in one place (or instance) may be adharma in another and what is 
adharma in one place may be dharma in another (Sheth 1987 : 22). One can draw 
an analogy with Joseph Fletcher's philosophy of situation ethics. Circumstances 
alone determine the course of action. 
One is faced here not with a moral law, but rather with a rule which if properly 
formulated would read : generally speaking one ought not to kill innocent human 
beings. The fact that it is a rule does not detract from its importance nor does it 
imply that exceptions are numerous. Nevertheless they do exist. For there are 
times when this rule conflicts with another moral rule, namely that one ought to be 
as just as is humanly possible. In the case of locked twins, justice requires that an 
exception be made to the rule concerning the killing of innocent human beings. For 
if it is unjust to kill one innocent human being, then it is a greater injustice to kill 
two equally innocent human beings? Here it is assumed that the foetus is a human 
being (Kohl 1974 : 38 - 40). 
5.3.2.2 AT WHAT STAGE OF THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE FOETUS IS 
ABORTION JUSTIFIABLE? 
Those who approved of abortion (especially Hindu doctors) said that the cut off 
point should be six weeks. According to all the Hindu medical doctors who were 
interviewed abortion should not be performed after six weeks. According to the 
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liberal view, the foetus should be disposable upon the mother's request until it is 
viable, thereafter it may be destroyed only to save the mother's life. Those Hindus 
who had adopted an extreme liberal view, said that the foetus is like an appendix, 
and may be destroyed upon demand anytime before its birth. A moderate view is 
that until viability the foetus should be disposable if it is the result of felonious 
intercourse or if the mother's or child's physical or mental health would probably be 
gravely impaired. This position is susceptible to wide variations. The conservative 
view is that the foetus may be aborted before quickening, but not after, unless the 
mother's life is at stake. For the extreme conservative, the foetus once conceived, 
may not be destroyed for any reason short of saving the mother's life. Hindu 
scripture also makes allowance for abortion on these grounds. 
The crux of the controversy is that the foetal life is looked at differently by different 
people, although they may belong to the same religious group. Some view the 
foetus, as a "human life"; some as a "human being"; some as a person, yet others 
view it as a "potential human being" only. It is on these grounds that people either 
approve or disapprove of abortion at the different stages of its development. Some 
say that every member of the human species is indubitably a person, a human being, 
at very latest at birth, if not at conception. These are controversial issues, some 
argue that personality and self-consciousness must be present for a human being to 
be a human being. 
The defense of the extreme conservative position runs as follows: The key premise 
is that a human foetus is a human being, not a partial or a potential one, but a fully 
fledged actualised human life. Given that premise, the entire conservative position 
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unfolds with a simple, relentless logic, every principle of which would be endorsed 
by any sensible liberal supposed human embryos. Their innocence is beyond 
question so nothing could justify destroying them except, perhaps, the necessity of 
saving some other innocent human life. That is, since similar cases must be treated 
in similar ways, the abortion of a pre-natal child can be considered if a comparable 
consideration would justify the killing of a post-natal child. 
5.3.2.3 ABORTION IS RIGHT AND WRONG 
Some Hindus who were interviewed gave a very simplistic answer to the problem of 
abortion (not based on any ethical argument but expressed in popular discussion) in 
that "abortion is right for those who think it is right and wrong for those who think it 
is wrong". Hindu philosophy certainly has no problem with this reasoning, because 
it believes in the law of kanna; one has to take responsibility for one's action, be it 
positive or negative. Hinduism does not prescribe to a person as to what he or she 
should do, but leaves it to his or her better judgement (ratio). 
This attitude of "rightness" and "wrongness" takes two different forms. Some feel 
that the moral issue is settled by the opinion of each individual judging his own case. 
Others suggest that morality is relative to the particular culture to which one 
belongs, so that abortion is right where and when a society views it as such and 
wrong when that is the view taken of it. 
H complete subjectivism or relativism were correct, then neither agreement nor 
disagreement is possible (Grisez 1972: 271). 
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Moreover, it can be argued that if this attitude were correct in regard to abortion, it 
is difficult to see why it should not also be correct with regard to any other kind of 
act. Actually this kind of reasoning is unacceptable. One cannot do those things 
that one wants to do. People live in a society which operates within certain 
constraints. A person cannot do those things that pleases him only. If abortion is 
right for those who live in a society where it is accepted and wrong for those who 
live in a society where it is forbidden, then the same must be true for other kinds of 
act. Relativism would lead to defiance. Society has to be regulated, and people will 
have to conform to certain norms. Therefore, the law interferes with certain issues 
like abortion. 
Unsound as the subjectivist and relativist positions are, they are often implicit in 
popular argument about the morality of abortion. If such issues like abortion and 
euthanasia were decided by traditional religions, there would be chaos. Religious 
prohibitions are no longer valid. They are relative. Religious and traditional norms 
have lost their fervour. People no longer feel themselves bound by the moral 
standards their parents accepted without question. How much more chaos would 
there be in a country like South Africa with such great diversity in religious belief, if 
there was no single law regarding such issues as euthanasia and abortion which all 
citizens had to adhere, despite their culture and religious beliefs. Thus the legal 
aspect of a country is so important in that it helps to regulate and maintain order 
especially in a country with such diversity in religion and culture. Hence the law of 
the country becomes more binding, than any religious tradition. 
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But the sociological fact that a change of attitudes is occurring by no means settles 
the question as to which attitudes are in fact the sounder. Yet the ethical questions 
were settled by the mere fact that attitudes are changing, then subjectivism or 
relativism would be correct. It would follow that the new attitudes would be no 
better than the old ones, but only different and that no reasonable grounds could be 
given for preferring the new morality to the old. One reason for the appeal of 
subjectivism and relativism undoubtedly is the promise they hold out that one's own 
moral judgement will be automatically validated (Grisez 1972 : 271 - 272). 
Everyone must follow one's own conscience, for one's conscience is nothing else 
than one's best judgement as to what one ought to do. (People act according to 
their own dharma). No one is guilty who does his best to find what is right and then 
acts according to the best judgement he can make. But such a judgement, for all its 
sincerity, need not be correct (Bhagavad Gita 3 : 35). 
5.3.2.4 THE PHIWSOPHY OF UTILITARIANISM 
Many Hindus, especially students and career orientated young people have adopted 
the philosophy of utilitarianism. These people feel that one should be practical and 
that one should not allow an unwanted pregnancy or child ruin their careers. 
Western scholars have also weighed the pros and cons of such a philosophy. 
The view that abortion is justified whenever the woman wants it, because she has a 
right to control her own reproductive capacity, is ruled out as soon as one grants 
that the foetus also is a person with rights. For if this is true, the foetus's right to life 
obviously is more important than the woman's right to dispose of her own 
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reproductive capacity. An obligation to forego abortion no more infringes on her 
rights than an obligation to forego infanticide infringes on parental rights. One has 
a responsibility towards one's dependent. This dependent has a life and one must 
respect life for what it is irrespective of the quality; it is not a material object that 
one can dispose of at will. 
Arguments that no unwanted child should be permitted to be born and that one 
must value quality of life more than mere quantity of life have also been introduced 
into the abortion controversy. However, a utilitarian theory of morality can use 
these arguments even on the supposition that the unborn are persons (or potential 
persons). A utilitarian theory would be even more likely to argue the justifiability of 
abortion in particularly difficult cases, for example, when the mother's health is 
seriously endangered, when the child will be seriously defective when the 
circumstances of the child's conception render its prospects very dim, or when the 
birth of the child would seriously lessen the chances of several brothers and sisters 
for a good life. 
Utilitarianism holds that the moral good or evil of human acts is determined by the 
results of the acts. If an act has good consequences then that act will be good; if it 
has bad consequences, it will be bad. 
Those Hindus in Durban who believe strongly in the utilitarian philosophy regard 
the life and well-being of the mother rather than those of the developing foetus. 
They say that everything possible should be done to save and give quality to the 
mother's life. Therefore, basing one's arguments on these principles one would 
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support abortion. It would be right to induce abortion if it is necessary to save the 
mother's life, since otherwise both she and the baby would die together, and it is 
better to save one than to lose both lives. Classical literature also made allowance 
or permitted abortion on these grounds. Then, even if it is the case of either or it 
usually will be better to kill the baby (foetus) since the mother's life will normally 
mean more to herself and others than the unborn's life will mean to it and to others. 
Next, the lack of advanced awareness and susceptibility to mental anguish in the 
unborn (or even in the young child) will justify killing it if its continued existence 
will spoil someone else's life (the mother's health; the well-being of existing 
children; the protection of society from the population explosion). If the child's 
own life will be one of misery than of joy it may be killed (defects of a serious sort; 
perhaps, the burden of being illegitimate and perhaps even being in the sad 
condition of being unwanted). Thus in the abortion debate (according to utilitarian 
ethics) the mother is more important than the embryo or foetus, because one can 
relate to the mother and not to the foetus, which cannot play any role in society. 
The argument continues, the existence of an unwanted child will spoil someone 
else's life (the mother's health, the well-being of existing children, the protection of 
society from the population explosion). If the child's own life proves to be one of 
misery than of joy, then the most prudent or rational thing to do is to put such a 
child away at the outset. This would be an act of dharma, according to Hindu 
philosophy, because killing is allowed in Hindu philosophy, if it is the most apt thing 
to do. Karma and dharma have been given a new interpretation here. The 
argument is that the child's suffering should be short lived. The question is why 
should one prolong suffering if one can shorten the period of suffering. The counter 
argument (as presented by older Hindu priests who were interviewed) would be that 
268 
if the child is destined to suffer (together with those around him) then this child 
should be allowed to go through that alloted period of suffering and fulfill its 
karma. A person should not interfere with God and the natural course of events. 
By giving the child the chance to suffer and fulfill its prarabdhakarma one is indeed 
assisting the child in its spiritual progress. By killing the foetus, one is hampering it 
from its spiritual development. Each individual should help the other individual in 
his quest for salvation or moksa. However, one must realise that the path or the 
quest for salvation is not an easy one. In utilitarian ethics the sympathy lies with the 
mother and everyone associated with the problem. In the eyes of some this 
philosophy might seem selfish. It is sad that the foetus cannot speak for itself, and 
hence it is not given the representation it deserves. In matters concerning such 
issues, the law of the country plays a vital role. Popular discussion shows that 
religion is now becoming a matter of convenience. Fundamental principles of a 
religion (example dharma and karma in the Hindu religion) are now becoming a 
matter of convenience. If everyone interpreted the principles of religion according 
to his "own brand of thinking" and to suit his or her own convenience can one 
imagine what would happen to the phenomena of euthanasia and abortion and also 
other issues concerning life and death. Therefore, the law of the country is so 
important, because it gives some consensus on such matters. Matters concerning 
such issues cannot be left to religion alone. Therefore, a great deal of emphasis has 
been placed on the
1 
legal aspect of the phenomena in question, in this thesis. 
II 
I 
Although there arq many who think that a foetus of about twenty six weeks or less 
I 
cannot be consider~d as a living child there are many who think otherwise. Human 
I 
life is precious andiis to be respected and safeguarded regardless of the condition in 
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which it is to be found. Glanville Williams, a utilitarian, has this to say: "Even the 
modern infidel tends to give his full support to the belief that it is our duty to regard 
all human life as sacred however disabled or worthless or even repellent the 
individual may be" (Williams 1958 : 19). Williams, a consistent utilitarian explicitly 
regards not only abortion but also infanticide and euthanasia as morally right in 
appropriate cases. 
According to Joseph Fletcher, no act is intrinsically wrong, moral quality arises from 
the consequences. Fletcher explicitly declares that his theory takes over from 
utilitarianism the strategic principle of "the greatest good for the greatest number". 
The teachings of the Bhagavad Gita and Hindu dharma in general agree with 
Fletcher's policy. For Fletcher, however, not pleasure but love that is the pursuit of 
the good of others on the widest possible scale is the goal (Fletcher 1966 : 37 - 39, 
127). 
Fletcher's system seems to differ from Classical utilitarianism in some ways: First 
his emphasis on love and service to others seems to imply that a morally upright 
person should leave his own interest altogether out of account, except to the extent 
that the good of others requires self concern (Fletcher 1966: 39). This would differ 
from Classical utilitarianism which counts the self equally and directly along with all 
others. Fletcher says that one has to sacrifice one's personal principles for the good 
of the other. Abortion is morally wrong, but if it is done for the good of the others, 
then it becomes morally acceptable. Fletcher claims that Christianity by faith in 
God's love toward man provides a new motive for love, but otherwise love functions 
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in setting moral standards exactly the same for believers as for unbelievers. On 
these grounds Fletcher can accept a completely secular view of abortion, yet claim 
his position to be the only true Christian one. 
Fletcher's argument on killing (in this instance abortion) is not very different from 
the Hindu view. Killing is dharmic. In the Gita Arjuna is instructed by Krsna 
Himself (the Lord) to kill out of a sense of duty. Although the Hindus believe in 
ahimsa (non injury) an exception is made in ritual sacrifice. Killing in Hinduism is a 
religious act; in like manner Fletcher accepts abortion on Christian lines. There 
seems to be a great deal of similarity between Eastern and Western belief and logic. 
Human beings act according to their ratio and is able to rationalise religion in the 
most rational of terms. 
However, utilitarianism does not justify spasmodic senseless violence. No violence 
should be expedient and calculated to yield the greatest net good. Thus the rule 
excluding the birth of unwanted children is not to be taken as an application of a 
general outlook favouring the killing of anyone who happened to come into one's 
way. Rather the argument is that unwanted babies, their parents, and society at 
large are on the whole better off if unwanted babies are aborted. But this may not 
always be true, some unwanted babies, after they are born receive all the love and 
care. 
The attempt to justify abortion in cases involving prospective birth defects is open to 
criticism. If life is a common good even a defective life is better than no life at all. 
Defects cannot touch many central values of the human person. The real reason 
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behind this argument is the philosophy of utilitarianism - the supposition that the 
infant is like a product, and that imperfect specimens be destroyed. This is what the 
debate (arguments) of the pro-abortionists boil down to. 
A sound appraisal of the moral significance of abortion as a method of eliminating 
the defective was given by Martin Ginsberg, a New York State Assembly man in the 
1969 New York legislative debate. The proposed bill would have permitted 
abortion ''when there is medical evidence of a substantial risk that when the foetus is 
born would be so grossly malformed or would have such serious physical or mental 
abnormalities, as to be permanently incapable of caring for himself' (Grisez 1972: 
342). 
Ginsberg, a thirty eight year old lawyer who was crippled by polio at the age of 
thirteen months, walks only with difficulty using metal crutches and leg braces. 
According to Ginsberg (himself) there are a number of people who have achieved 
greatness despite handicaps, Toulous Lautrec, Alec Templeton, Charles Steinmetz, 
Lord Byron and Helen Keller. Then he goes on: "What this bill says is that those 
who are malformed or abnormal have no reason to be part of our society. If we are 
prepared to say that a life should not come into this world malformed or abnormal, 
then tomorrow we should be prepared to say that a life already in this world which 
becomes malformed or abnormal should not be permitted to live" (Grisez 1972 : 
342). This is very sound reasoning, and it shows that those who support abortion on 
these grounds, do not look at the alternative reasoning. This argument is indeed 
food for thought. 
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Abortion used as a form of birth prevention or population control - whether in cases 
of illegitimate children, or in cases of economic hardship or in simple reluctance to 
have a child cannot be justified. Getting down to the bottom of things, the very 
essence of the phenomenon in question is that one is getting rid of a baby, is robbing 
the child of its very existence. The continued existence of the child is simply 
rejected. The ulterior motive governing the phenomenon is avoiding future 
hardship for already existing children in an impoverished family. However good 
these motives may sound and win sympathy and compassion, they do not ethically 
justify the abortifacient procedure because "no deliberate killing" can ever be 
justified, be it viewed medically, legally or theocentrically. 
Moreover, the "goods" sought in all such cases are achievable otherwise. The 
unmarried mother should be helped and arrangements made for the child's care 
whether or not she wishes to bring it up. Such children can be given up for 
adoption. One has to take responsibility for one's action, one cannot simply 
produce and destroy. People who advocate and who have engaged in such actions 
need to do some soul searching. Those who do not want children need not conceive 
them; they do so py their own free acts. The theory of karma says that one must 
take responsibility for one's action. 
It seems appropriate at this stage to ask the question what happens to a woman who 
is raped and conceives a child of her attacker? In this case, she has had no choice, 
the child has come through no act of hers. Moreover, it is not clear that her precise 
concern is to kill the child. She simply does not wish to bear it. If an artificial 
uterus were available she might be happy to have the baby (foetus) removed and 
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placed in such a device, later to be born and cared for as any infant that becomes a 
social charge. Hindus look at the child conceived under such circumstances, in 
various ways and have tried to find a solution to the problem. The Law of Kann.a 
again plays a vital role in understanding such complicated issues. According to a 
Hindu academic in Criminology, it is the karma of that individual to be raped and 
conceive a child under such circumstances. Legal, medical and religious ethics in 
general have viewed this matter with a great deal of sympathy, especially towards 
the bearer and have made exceptions to general rules. It is not easy to pass 
judgement on such a case. Each individual's judgement will obviously be coloured 
by his own beliefs and values. The general attitude of people (including Hindus in 
the Durban area) irrespective of their religions and religious beliefs is that one 
should say yes to abortion in the case being discussed. 
If one has to analyse this answer critically, surely it does not mean that abortion in 
such a case would be ethically right. It is appropriate to ask at this point what basic 
human good is achieved if the developing foetus is aborted? This foetus might have 
the potential of growing into a perfectly normal intelligent human being, capable of 
making a great positive contribution in this "sick" world. Abortion of the foetus 
cannot alter the fact that the victim of the rape has been violated. The unborn 
infant is not the attacker. It is hers as much as his. The fact that she does not want 
to bear the child is an understandable emotional reaction. Here is a case of life 
versus emotion. But really at stake is only such trouble, risk and inconvenience as is 
attendant on any pregnancy. To kill the baby for the sake of such inconvenience 
reveals an attitude toward human life that is not in keeping with its inherently 
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immeasurable dignity. As has been stated abortion does not alter the bare facts of 
what has already transpired, alternatives have been suggested, without placing 
undue burden on the victim, so why not choose the alterative than resort to "killing". 
Psychologically the rape victim is clouded with a sense of guilt, killing the innocent 
foetus adds to the guilt. Her problem is largely to accept herself, to realise that she 
is not inherently tainted and damaged by her unfortunate experience. The unborn 
child is partly hers, and she must accept herself in it if she is really to overcome her 
sense of self rejection. To get rid of the child is to evade the issue not to solve it; a 
woman who uses such an evasion may feel temporary relief but may be permanently 
blocked from achieving the peace with herself she seeks. It may be viewed as an act 
of dharma to give birth, nurture and provide for a child, that has come into this 
world, without her own doing. As already discussed, what has been done cannot be 
undone the "life" that has resulted out of this act should become the focus, and not 
the act itself. In an instance of this nature, one cannot prescribe as to what is moral 
or not. 
Decisions are made according to one's values and interpretations; whatever 
decision is taken one cannot weigh it in terms of its wrongness or rightness. One 
merely sympathises and respects the decision of the victim. It may not be correct for 
the onlooker to pass judgement on such issues. 
Abortion on grounds of incest is permissible both by law and religion. Such acts 
should not have occurred in the first place. In the Hindu religion, the act itself is 
viewed with great contempt. Adults ought to learn to be responsible for their 
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actions. Both parties involved are as much to blame. Human beings are not 
animals, they have the intelligence to choose their marriage or sexual partners. 
Animals engage in incestuous relationships that human beings should never. This 
may be regarded as one of the most important factors that discriminate man from 
beast. The offsprings of such relationships are also not healthy. Therefore, in the 
Hindu community (particularly the Hindi speaking) people are not allowed to marry 
cousins, uncles and aunts, irrespective of the degree of relationship (first, second, 
third, etc.). The older generation and the more conservative Hindu practise this 
staunchly. It seems that their knowledge of biology and especially genetics was far 
more advanced than that of the present generation. Hinduism is a very practical 
religion, their rules and restrictions have taken many things into consideration, 
which perhaps the younger generation may not understand. There is a very close 
link between religion and science in Hindu philosophy. Because of the lack of 
understanding and the lack of knowledge (on the part of the young) the older 
conservative Hindus are termed "old-fashioned". 
If abortion is justified, then it should be performed in a way that gives the child a 
chance of survival, if there is any chance at all. The effort to save the aborted child 
and to find ways of saving all who are justifiably aborted would be a token of 
sincerity that the death of the child really was not in the scope of the intention 
(Grisez 1972: 344). 
One might wonder about the moral status of birth control methods that are 
probably or possibly abortifacient like in the case of the intra-uterine device (IUD) 
and the pill (Tredgold 1964 : 1253). If one recognises that human life is at stake if 
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these methods do indeed work in an abortifacient manner then it is clear that the 
willingness to use them is a willingness to kill human beings directly. The effect of 
killing the already conceived individual if it occurs, is no accident, but the precise 
thing sought in committing oneself to birth prevention. If one is willing to get a 
desired result by killing, and does not know whether he is killing or not he might as 
well know that he is killing, for he is willing to accept that as the meaning of his act. 
One could conclude that those who know the facts and those who prescribe or use 
birth control methods might be abortifacient are abortionists at heart. Hindu 
doctors who were interviewed also shared similar views. 
Western scholars on the abortion debate see the judgement more clearly by 
considering it from the point of view of someone who sincerely believes conception 
prevention to be legitimate and any interference after conception to be unjustifiably 
killing a person. On these assumptions it is clearly insufficient to know that a given 
method prevents births, such a person would be willing to prevent conception but 
absolutely unwilling to interfere once conception has occurred. The abortifacient 
character of a technique, even if certainly known to occur in only a small percentage 
of cases, could not be viewed as incidental to the intended conception prevention, 
since in those cases there would be no conception prevention. Nor could the 
abortions which might occur be outside the scope of the intention defined as birth 
prevention would be abortion. Uncertainty about the methods mode of action 
would perhaps be tolerable if the uncertainty regarded side effects. Here however, 
the uncertainty is concerned with the very meaning of the intended birth prevention 
be it conception prevention or abortion (Tredgold 1964: 1253; Grisez 1972: 344). 
277 
Young Hindu women who are using the intra-uterine device, do not know how it 
exactly functions. They are not aware that it indeed is an abortifacient. All they 
know is that it is a means of birth control; all that they are interested in is that they 
do not give birth to an unwanted baby, even if conception does occur and the zygote 
is washed away with the menstrual flow is of little concern to them. It might be 
adviseable for attending gynaecologists to explain and educate women on the 
workings of the intra-uterine device. Most people are only interested in the end 
result; no one is interested in the process leading to the end result. 
It is often argued that abortion should not be equated to murder. The argument 
indeed becomes a legal issue. On the other hand, "murder" also has an ethical 
sense: it is the wrongful and purposeful taking of human life. Others argue that one 
must question the morality of abortion before equating it with murder. Having 
examined the phenomenon in detail, it is accurate and appropriate to say that 
abortion whenever it involves the direct attack on human life (which very often is 
the case) is murder. The end result of abortion and murder is the same (that is, 
killing a life irrespective of the circumstances). The term murder arouses an 
emotional reaction, hence people who perform the act, and those on whom the act 
is performed, prefer using the word abortion, giving the act more dignity. By 
utilising a softer term one is merely sanctifying an evil act. 
To say this, however, is not to assert that everyone who has an abortion or who 
performs the abortion incurs the full responsibility for murder. Many who do the 
evil deed do not know, or do not fully appreciate what they do - this is true of all 
murder, not only of abortion. Some act through fear, through anxiety and through 
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shame. Probably they feel less guilty than those who act through cool and brutal 
calculation such as a utilitarian. If one's lack of appreciation of what the deadly 
deed really means or if one's weakness to resist is a product of one's own habit of 
treating the good of life lightly or of one's willingness to see and feel the wrong one 
does, then responsibility is not lessened but increased. 
An act of such a nature (namely abortion) should only be performed with due 
consideration to the very act itself; what the opponents of abortion are really asking 
for is a little more responsibility on the part of those engaged in such acts. In such 
acts conscience should play an important role. 
5.3.2.S THERAPEUTIC ABORTION 
The question is asked timeously, what should one save, the mother or the foetus? If 
the one to be aborted has a right to life equal to that of its mother, can a therapeutic 
exception be accepted. Abortion, unquestioningly is performed when the mother's 
life is in jeopardy. The law and religion has made an allowance for this type of 
abortion. However, Hinduism, taking the Law of Karma in all its seriousness, has 
questioned therapeutic abortion, on the grounds that what criteria must one use to 
say that the soul of the mother is more important than the soul of the foetus (taking 
for granted that as soon as conception takes place the soul is present in the embryo, 
foetus or zygote). The mother might be destined to die or suffer ill health, during 
her pregnancy. This might be her kanna. On the other hand therapeutic abortion 
might be looked upon as an act of dharma; thereby saving the mother. It is merely 
on convenience, that society and the law justify therapeutic abortion, but one must 
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be guarded against abuse and extension of the act. Whenever a life is involved 
irrespective of whose, or the very quality of life, one has to act within a certain code 
of ethics. A decision that has to be made must be made within that code of ethics. 
In other words decisions must be rational and not rash. Or to put it in the words of 
Daniel Maguire, "Good ethics is based on reality and makes real distinctions where 
they are real differences. It is furthermore fallacious to say that if an exception is 
allowed, it will be difficult to draw the line and therefore no exception should be 
allowed. It has been said quite rightly that 'ethics like art is precisely a matter of 
knowing where to draw lines'" (Maguire 1973 : 195). 
Much can be done in cases that involve birth defects. Institutions providing care in 
this area are inadequate (as are insane asylums and facilities for the aged). As the 
causes of many defects become known, ways of treating or preventing them can be 
found. The important lesson of thalidomide babies is that there are no new 
thalidomide babies, there will soon be no more German measles or babies suffering 
from its consequences. The public commitment to the care and training of the 
handicapped could be increased. Social security should be extended to give more 
help to parents of severely defective children, for such parents make a contribution 
of great value to society. By allowing the defective babies to be born, one would be 
helping them to work out their karmas. Those that will be helping to provide 
adequate means for these babies to survive will be performing an act of dharma. 
Also to be borne in mind that even if everything possible were done, no public effort 
can eliminate the factors which probably underlie the majority of abortions. These 
factors are simple. Babies are conceived through irresponsibility of intercourse 
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"protected" by a contraceptive and enjoyed with an attitude of complete rejection 
toward the new life which might arise. Having been irresponsibly conceived, the 
babies are unwanted and rejected. Being weak, invisible and unknown to society at 
large such babies are easily killed and disposed of without detection. The act is 
imagined to be as insignificant as the victim is small. Those immediately concerned 
especially abortionists have selfish motives for acting. Society tends to accept the 
practice, because it is a fact, to compromise with it because it is intractable, and 
even to legitimatize it, so that the pressure on society is minimized (in terms of 
finances). 
5.3.2.6 CONTEMPORARY HINDU VIEW 
Those who oppose abortion, argue that human life begins at the moment of 
conception and that the foetus has a right to life. Abortion is murder. A foetus that 
is six to ten weeks old, has a heart beat, fingernails and a capacity to experience 
pain. Abortion can also be regarded as euthanasia. If abortion were legalised then 
it would encourage the decline of morality and loss of reverence for the sanctity of 
life. Promiscuity will be encouraged by legal abortion. Sexual misbehaviour should 
be punished. She had her fun now let her suffer the consequences of irresponsible 
sex. A physician is trained to preserve life and not to destroy it. Abortions in late 
pregnancies will result in killing of viable foetuses who will cry in surgical trash cans 
before they die. In deciding the fate of the foetus, the father as well as the mother 
should have an equal say. Some argue that no such right exists, it is the moral duty 
of each married couple to engage in responsible sexual relations. The rights of the 
individual woman must be weighed against other rights - those of the foetus's and of 
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society to uphold its moral integrity. The right to privacy does not extend to a "right" 
to murder the innocent and helpless. Women who have had abortions are held in 
very low esteem in Hindu society. A young Hindu woman (unmarried) seeking 
abortion needs counselling according to one Hindu doctor. This doctor has been 
doing a lot of counselling, instead of recommending abortion. He will by no means 
perform an abortion. If abortion has to be performed, it must be done in a hospital 
(under the care of proper authorities). The cut off point for abortion (if it is 
absolutely necessary) should be six weeks. A termination performed late in the 
pregnancy is more repulsive because one is dealing with an almost fully formed 
baby. For this reason, if for no other, it is most desirable that, if a termination is to 
be performed it be done early. On the other hand, if abortion is provided for, the 
woman must be given time to realize that she is pregnant and to make 
arrangements. The longer the time given the better from her point of view. A 
woman who starts by wanting an abortion sometimes changes her mind; if the 
operation is postponed, therefore, there is a chance that it will not be needed 
(Williams 1966 : 199 - 200). 
Another Hindu doctor said that he would recommend abortion for social reasons, 
and that he himself will perform abortion if he has to. He also felt that abortion 
should be performed at or before six weeks of pregnancy. However, his wife (a 
nurse) would not approve of abortion on social grounds. Housewives with teenage 
children, said that they do not approve of abortion. However, they would respect 
their children's decision concerning abortion. Another Hindu doctor said that all 
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defective foetuses should be aborted. A mother carrying an abnormal foetus 
normally miscarries. Miscarriage is an act of nature. Therefore, he feels that it is an 
act of dharma to abort a defective foetus. 
Some felt that legal abortion will decrease the number of unwanted children, 
battered children, child abuse cases and possibility of subsequent delinquency, drug 
addiction and a host of social ills believed to be associated with neglectful 
parenthood. Legal abortion will also decrease the number of illegitimate births. 
Legal abortion could decrease the tragedy of the birth of deformed children. Legal 
abortion provides the only humane disposition of a pregnancy resulting from rape or 
incest. 
Others with a more humane attitude said that deformed children have as much a 
right to live as others; many deformed persons lead normal and constructive lives. 
If one were to sanction the disposal of deformed foetuses, then probably one might 
also decide to do away with the elderly and the useless or the non-productive adult. 
If one has to adopt this attitude, then one must do away with the hungry, the 
starving, those walking the streets aimlessly and those suffering from mental 
decadence. If one has to weigh or value an individual in terms of his contribution to 
society, then surely those mentioned above are nothing but a total burden or 
menace to a society. 
Others feel that the mother should have the sole right in deciding whether she wants 
to have the baby or not. The father only becomes a father after the child is born. 
He may contribute fifty percent of the genes, but he does not have to bear and to 
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fully care for the outcome. Some partners may not be husbands and in case of 
disagreement and a husband's denial of abortion the woman is subject to 
compulsory pregnancy and involuntary servitude. 
If women feel this way that they have the right to decide, then they should act in a 
responsible manner, for babies do not come of their own accord. If one wants to be 
treated with dignity, then surely one must act with dignity, that means that one must 
accept responsibility for one's actions irrespective of the consequences. If one wants 
to exercise one's rights then surely one must respect the rights of others, no mater 
how great or how small (or negligible), they might be. The right to one's privacy 
does not extend to a right to end the life of the innocent. 
A foetus that is conceived through rape, should be aborted. This was the general 
view of the people that were interviewed, including Hindu academics. The child 
would be a constant reminder of the incident and this would create much 
unpleasantness. 
Abortions are being carried out in some Hindu homes by elderly women who 
sincerely feel that they are helping people (getting them out of trouble). To those 
who perform this act( murder of the innocent), is an act of dharma. An article that 
appeared in the Tribune Herald (9-5-93) shows that no remorse is felt for their acts. 
Some women are performing abortions on themselves. Many land in hospitals with 
incomplete abortions. The age group varies from sixteen to forty years. Many 
married women are also having abortions. They do this privately without the 
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husband's knowledge; since the foetus is often conceived through extra marital 
affairs and sometimes incest (Tribune Herald 4-10-92). For many having an 
abortion is just getting rid of an unwanted object. Many of these women die in the 
process. This is a regular occurrence in some of Durban's hospitals. Some of the 
Hindu doctors who were interviewed said that this is a regular feature. These 
people (who perform and have abortions) are well aware that it is an immoral act. 
These people hail from all backgrounds, so one cannot attribute this to 
socio-economic reasons. The person who performs the abortion gets some money, 
and the person on whom the abortion is performed is freed of all responsibility. It is 
a mutual benefit to both people. The articles that appear in the local newspapers, 
reveal that these people do not have a conscience. 
It was only the older priests and those people who understood and believed in the 
Law of Karma and Dharma, said no to abortion. The others said that they approve 
of abortion because it sorts out many a problem, even younger priests, and 
academics in Hindu and Indian philosophy supported abortion. Thus it can be seen 
that the utilitarian philosophy is making a great impression on people. Any act it 
seems becomes "good" because it produces the greatest good. Everybody seems to 
be interested in the end result of the act and not in the act itself. Disturbing as it 
may seem this is how the modern Hindu in Durban think. 
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5.4 RE-INTERPRETATION OF KARMA AND DHARMA WITH REGARD TO 
EUTHANASIA, SUICIDE AND ABORTION 
Having examined the phenomena, euthanasia, suicide and abortion, one finds that 
the concepts of karma and dharma, the two fundamental principles of Hinduism 
have been re-interpreted to suit the changing times and social norms. Hindu 
religious principles are not constant, they are flexible. These principles (karma and 
dharma) are modified and re-interpreted to suit changing circumstances and 
situations. The importance of a value, according to Hindu lawgivers, does not lie in 
its abstraction, but only in the context in which it is embodied. Its importance or 
worth vary from time to time and from place to place. No value can be 
universalized or absolutized as good for all times and all regions. Even dharma 
cannot be invested with such universal meaning. Therefore, one cannot talk about 
the rightness or wrongness of an act. Bhisma in the Mahabharata says that what 
might be dharmic for one person, might be adharmic for another, and what might be 
adharmic to one might be dharmic to another (Sheth 1987 : 21 - 22). Bhisma's 
reasoning can be applied in the present times. Euthanasia and abortion, might be 
acts of dharma for some individuals, and adharmic for others. 
Hindu principles and beliefs are guidelines, no scripture advocates its 
implementation, in its totality, provision has always been made for changing 
circumstances, especially in terms of time and place. A great deal of faith is placed 
upon mankind himself, especially on his ratio. Man (Homo sapiens) being an 
intelligent being has to decide on what course of action he must follow. His action 
must be such that order and equilibrium in the universe must be maintained at all 
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times. Therefore, man himself thinks that he is the agent of the Lord. He has the 
intelligence to realise what is good and the ability to perform an action that brings 
about the necessary good. The Hindus in the Durban area have reasoned in this 
manner, and have supported euthanasia and abortion on these grounds. Life to 
them is not always good, some lives have to be destroyed in order to maintain rta 
(order) in the cosmos. Hindu doctors believed that the destroying of some lives 
were acts of dharma. They understood euthanasia and abortion (only in specific 
cases) to be dharmic acts. It was also the patient's karma that he be put to death at 
a certain time (especially in the case of incurable and terminal illnesses). The 
suffering of the patient was meant only to be for a certain period. There was no 
need for prolonged suffering if that life could be terminated sooner. The quality of 
life ethic was taken into consideration. The patient's karma and the physician's 
dharma work interchangeably to provide the desired result. Killing becomes a noble 
and a most desired act. 
Sometimes one may wonder whether the re-interpretation of karma and dharma as 
has been discussed in Chapter Four is not a matter of convenience. An act only 
becomes dharmic if it is done for the good of others. Sometimes euthanasia is 
performed not for the good of the person on whom it is performed, but for the good 
of oneself or others concerned. This is not euthanasia, and such an act is considered 
adharmic. For those who have performed and intend performing such acts with the 
motives just mentioned accumulate bad karma for themselves, and the person on 
whom such euthanasia is inflicted rises to a higher level of spiritual development. 
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According to Hindu philosophy, the selfless service to mankind far outweighs the 
benefits of the direct worship to the Lord Himself. The entire teachings of the 
Bhagavad Gita is based on similar lines. 
Others have argued that to care and nurse such patients is service to the Lord. The 
caring and nursing of patients become acts of dharma. These patients have to 
undergo the suffering, it is their karma. Premature termination of this suffering will 
result in the patient returning in the next life to fulfill that suffering. Therefore, it 
would be better if that suffering were completed in the present life. 
As has been stated earlier, with due consideration to all the factors that one has to 
take into account, decisions of people, irrespective of their religions and religious 
belief are greatly influenced by the financial factor. One can safely conclude that 
the ethics governing life and death is greatly determined by economic and social 
ethics. 
As regards suicide, although Hindu scriptures do not condemn it, it surely cannot 
condone it for the reasons that people commit suicide today. People commit suicide 
today to escape the problems they face in life. As has been discussed earlier in the 
chapter stress and frustration are great contributory factors. There is no salvation 
(moksa) for those who commit suicide, for they do so not for heroic or religious 
reasons but as a form of escape. 





The human being, (of all living beings) is free to shape his future. He is a rational 
being in transit to other worlds. The how and when thereof depend on his destiny. 
Though he is bound in the fetters of his previous actions or hereditary impressions 
he can never do anything by his independent volition, yet he has to improve his 
conduct and purify his intelligence. He has to fructify his life and respond to the 
spiritual evolution by developing and manifesting the potential divinity of his soul 
identified with God as prescribed in Hindu scriptures (Mishra 1978: 56). 
Liberation, realization of one's destiny as atman (self) with Brahman (ultimate 
reality) takes time. First one has to feel the desire to look (for realization) and a 
great deal of experience on the part of man as a self-conscious (finite) being, 
engaged in fulfilling desires for the enjoyment of good things in life, with their 
accompanying frustrations, has to happen before the prospect of looking for 
liberation may even look attractive. This requires transcendence of desires and a 
life force must fulfill its desire for being to the full through phenomenal existence in 
many forms seeking and experiencing all possible human pleasures before finding 
that they no longer attract and something more is needed for total fulfillment. But 
as long as desire for pleasures remains, the death of one life cannot mean the end of 
existence altogether for the impulse or force that constitutes that life, it can only 
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mean a reconstitution of that impulse in another form in another existence so as to 
enable it to continue its search for enjoyment. Lives in any one generation are thus 
not new beginnings but a remodelling of previously existing forms and in this 
process all of existence participates so that interchange between different forms of 
life and even between the living and the non-living takes place. That is to say, 
organic forms may arise out of the inorganic and the organic lapse into the inorganic 
and human beings may be reborn as animals and animals as humans. All this is 
possible in the Hindu view because it does not see the physical, the vital, the mental, 
the conscious and the spiritual as being absolutely distinct and cut-off from one 
another. They constitute a continuum, the beginning and the end of which meet 
(Bowes 1987 173 - 174). 
In this continuing process things happen not haphazardly but according to law. The 
law, in the case of human rebirth is known as the Law of Karma (action) and its 
functioning is part of a more comprehensive functioning according to law, through 
cause-effect relationship, present throughout the universe. This is known as dhanna 
(rta of the Rg Veda). Each thing functions according to its own nature (svabhava) in 
interrelation with other things also functioning in this way - this interrelation being 
part of the dhanna of cosmic existence itself. All change and development takes 
place according to this law-governed nature of things whereby things seek the 
maximum fulfillment of their inherent potentalities in interdependence with other 
things whereby the balance of existence is maintained even though creation contains 
things of opposite nature. 
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It is strongly stressed in the scriptures that a man "doing his duties must desire to 
live a hundred years". By performing appropriate action, man secures for himself a 
better life in the next birth. It is also stressed in the Scriptures (Upanisads) that he 
(a human being) may free himself from all bondages of action in a single life span if 
he strongly desires and endeavours appropriately (meritorious deeds or actions). 
The human body is a spot where the soul has to maintain its positive existence and 
improve its metaphysical status as it comes nearer to the Supreme Lord (Brahman). 
For this reason the life of a human being is the most precious and the most sacred 
asset to the soul. The Yogis practically confirm this scriptural statement by proving 
that the whole universe is centred in a single human physical frame but requires it to 
be developed by means of Yoga-practice. The human body is the sporting ground 
and yoga is the game. Victory or salvation is dependent on how well the game 
(yoga) is played. In playing the game people of advanced nature are treated as the 
support of others in their respective fields and help to make the human community 
run smoothly. Just as a beggar approaches a man of means for alms, a student for 
education approaches a teacher, likewise a sick man seeks for a medical practitioner 
to recover his health. 
This kind of relationship is a "hopeful relationship" because the man in need hopes 
that his desires will never be frustrated. But the relationship between a sick and a 
medical man is sacred too. A man physically afflicted seeks inevitably for the 
service of a doctor. This means that a patient surrenders his precious life to the 
mercy and discretion of a physician. He sacrifices most of his happiness and wealth 
to rid himself of the troubles. He even follows the grim advice he receives even if it 
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may be against his will and means (Mishra 1978 : 57). The greatly responsible 
doctors who discharge their duties consistently often find themselves at a loss when 
they come to treat a sick person suffering severely from an incurable disease causing 
great pain. The doctors are moved by compassion and feel with the patient. At 
such a crucial moment the question arises whether euthanasia is practicable or not. 
In ancient India there were evidently some prescribed measures in practice to end 
life at such a stage. The Smritis, Puranas and the Mahabharata strongly oppose 
suicide but they also advise the people suffering from irremediable diseases to end 
their lives by yoga practice, by fasting to death, entering the sacred fire or immersing 
themselves in the Ganges until they drown. 
A soul enshrined in a body that is suffering from old age or incurable disease is 
stagnant, due to the lack of action. Such a body cannot perform appropriate action 
due to its condition, thereby souls trapped in such bodies cannot progress or 
retrogress due to the lack of action. Hence euthanasia is recommended. 
The understanding of the concept and the practice of the phenomenon is very 
different today as understood and practised by the Hindus of the Classical Period. 
Euthanasia in the Classical Period was really suicide. It was self-inflicted and the 
decision came from the individual himself. The reasons given for self-euthanasia 
were sound and logical. A public declaration (as compared to present day Living 
Will) was made and outside help was permissible. However, euthanasia, understood 
and practised by Durban Hindus today are very similar to Western ways. The 
reasons that were put forth by the majority of the Hindus who were interviewed 
were similar to the Western proponents of euthanasia. 
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According to some Hindu views, euthanasia can be considered both dhannic and 
adhannic depending on the circumstances and situations in which it is administered. 
One of the leading proponents of euthanasia in Western culture is Marvin Kohl. 
His main argument for euthanasia is that as the terminally ill persons cannot be 
cured of their illness and as their death is inevitable, it is an act of kindness to 
intervene in the course of the illness, if their pain or suffering is too great. In a Plea 
for Beneficent Euthanasia he advocates the administration of increasing doses of 
drugs (such as morphine) to relieve suffering until the dosage of necessity reaches 
the lethal stage. In defining a kind act he states "not so obvious is the recognition 
that harm intended as help is neither helpful nor kind and that kindness results only 
from the combination of good intentions and beneficial consequences" (Kohl 1975 : 
234 ). Such an act according to Hindu belief would be adhannic. The objections to 
euthanasia would be on two grounds that of karma and the mode of death. 
A terminal illness represents the repayment of a karmic debt. If the complete 
evaluation of the karmic debt were to be disrupted by an active intervention on the 
part of the physician it would then need to be faced again in a future existence. One 
might not be able to attain a human existence in the future; therefore, one would 
have to face the same ripening karma in a disadvantageous realm of existence. It 
would be preferable to face the results of one's past actions in this lifetime with 
spiritual teachers, friends, family and health professionals to assist one. This 
non-interference with karma, however, does not exclude the compassionate 
intervention of relief of physical pain with analygesics (of necessity not leading to 
lethal doses or to soothe mental distress) with sympathetic listening and counselling. 
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For the compassionate Hindu tender love and care and not euthanasia is 
recommended for the terminally ill. 
Next is the argument based on the mode of death. In most discussions, as to the 
mode of euthanasia, especially for the conscious individual large doses of narcotics 
are presented as a merciful and ideal way to die. Hindus strongly disagree with this 
ideal of the comatose death. The act of dying and the dying process are felt to be a 
vital link between this and subsequent existence. The state of consciousness and the 
level of mindfulness are of crucial importance. Since the mind at the time of dying 
is approximate cause of the continuation into the next lifetime, it is important to use 
the mind near the time of death in practice. No matter what has happened in terms 
of good and bad within this particular time what happens right around the time of 
death is particularly significant. 
These goals are obviously not possible if the dying person is in a narcotic-induced 
coma. It is difficult to know how Kohl views death within the context of a cohesive 
view of existence. In a Plea for Beneficent Euthanasia he apparently identifies with 
"ethical humanists" (Kohl 1975 : 234). However, he never clearly states the 
cosmology assumed in his arguments. If death is viewed in the modem materialistic 
perspective in which death is the final termination of the individual, euthanasia then 
might be considered a truly merciful act, as any suffering near the time of death 
would be completely pointless. However, when death is viewed as an important link 
between this and subsequent existences it gains meaning through as in the case of 
the terminally ill in which death is shortly inevitable, its acceptance and the 
willingness of the dying person to work with it makes the death experience valuable 
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not completely pointless nor unnecessary. Death's significance obviously depends 
upon one's cosmology (Lecso 1986 : 56). 
The more conservative and the older Hindus and especially those who were familiar 
with Hindu religion and philosophy gave a different interpretation. They 
understood the phenomenon through the two fundamental Hindu concepts kanna 
and dharma. Those who steered the middle course (between Eastern and Western 
thinking) re-interpreted the concepts of kanna and dharma. 
Since the subject lends itself to such great controversies, arguments for and against 
euthanasia are many and various. Sound logical arguments were presented from 
many standpoints. This was clearly evident in the research that was undertaken. 
Every argument had a counter-argument. The very tools that were used to 
understand the phenomenon of euthanasia also became centres of controversy. 
New meanings and new interpretations were accorded to the concepts of kanna and 
dharma. 
Although terminal patients do not desire death they nevertheless must confront it. 
They should be free to choose between a slow delibilitating painful death and a 
quick painless one. The constitutional right to privacy protects a competent 
terminal patient's right to determine for himself the time and manner of his death. 
The law should protect those who do not choose euthanasia of their own volition or 
who are incapable of making such decisions for themselves. This is necessary to 
protect society from the danger inherent in allowing euthanasia decisions to be 
made by anyone other than the patient. Nevertheless, a voluntary request by a 
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legally competent terminal patient for a gentle passing should be honoured. In 
addition second parties whose assistance is needed should be protected from legal 
sanctions. 
Man is a social being, his joys and sorrows are shared by those around him. At one 
stage "methodological individualism" was the dominating tendency in Indian 
metaphysics when it dealt with the question of moksa. Moksha in Indian 
metaphysics was purely an individual affair. At the social level, however, Indian 
thought has adopted what may be termed "methodological collectivism". Because 
methodological collectivism has dominated Indian social thought it is not surprising 
that group karma finds an important place there (Pappu 1987 : 308). 
Thus the euthanasia debate centres around not only on the individual concerned but 
also on those who interact with him and especially the family. Hence the suffering is 
not individual, but the entire group is affected. Decisions have to be made, and if 
the decision taken is for the benefit of the individual concerned and for the welfare 
in general then such a decision can be considered dharmic. People are born and live 
in a society, their actions affect one another. Since groups have their own karmic 
properties an individual is an heir both to his own karmic deeds and also to the 
other karmic properties of the group in which he is born. The Dharma Sastras which 
constitute the social philosophical thought of India, state in this connection that 
moksa or release from karma is possible for the individual by performing his 
obligations (dharmas) to the group to which he belongs. According to the Gita one's 
karma determines one's caste (individual karma). One's dharma (duty) is also 
dependent on one's caste (varna). Each of the four varanas has a particular duty to 
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perform. Hence, one acts collectively (Sivananda 1980: 63). It is because of one's 
individual karma, a person is born; when a person is liberated from his karmic 
bondage, it is he alone who is liberated. But between birth and attainment of moksa 
his karmic deeds can take place only in groups and it is impossible for him not to be 
a participant in group karma. Defective infants and their parents is a clear example 
of how group karmas interact. 
Situation ethics fits medical ethics because it is built on the Clinical Model. That is 
situationists like clinicians are case focused and empirical: they do not find the 
answers to right or wrong questions by consulting theories but by examining the 
situations just as physicians do for particular patients. They follow the line of milieu 
therapy in psychiatric medicine; field theory in psychology and context analyses in 
sociology. Situationists do not approach decisions with prefabricated "a priori" 
solutions, of the order of universal negatives like "we must always maintain life" or 
we may never interrupt a pregnancy or to end an innocent life is murder. These 
according to Fletcher are the cliches of an irrelevant ideology (Fletcher, J. 1975 : 
50). 
Therefore, the rightness or wrongness of euthanasia or easy death whether direct or 
indirect depends on the situation. Neither form is intrinsically or invariably good or 
evil. Sometimes mercy killing is right; sometimes letting the patient go is wrong. 
Circumstances alone determine the course of action. And this is the case with 
respect to the voluntary-involuntary distinction as well as the direct-indirect 
distinction. If patients choose their death it is suicide for voluntary euthanasia is a 
form of suicide. Euthanasia is still very much a controversial subject. Therefore, in 
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the final analysis euthanasia may be wrong for those who think it is wrong and right 
for those who think it is right. Given all the due considerations as has been 
discussed in the entire thesis euthanasia is neither right nor wrong. More than the 
rightness or the wrongness of the phenomenon is the very situation in which the 
phenomenon finds itself. 
The research clearly shows that the majority of the Durban Hindus support 
euthanasia in some form (since euthanasia takes various forms). However, their 
reasons varied according to their beliefs and re-interpretation. Situations and 
circumstances and also financial considerations played a key role in the euthanasia 
debate. 
6.2 SUICIDE 
The phenomenon of suicide has also undergone much change from the Classical 
Period to the present times. Suicide was regarded as heroic and religious. It was 
committed for heroic and religious reasons in the Classical Period. As time went on 
mors voluntaria heroica and mors voluntaria religiosa led to abuse even in the 
Classical Period. Hence suicide lost its efficacy in this period. 
The meaning of suicide also changed in the different historical periods. This was 
also due to new ideas or interpretations accorded to the concept of God, Man, 
Cosmology and moksa. 
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At one stage suicide was regarded as the highest form of sacrifice in an era where 
animal sacrifice was in vogue and the sacrifice of man was not uncommon. Today 
sacrifice is re-interpreted as service to man. The Ramayan and the Gita the two 
most popular scriptures amongst Hindus in Durban are replete with such examples. 
Sacrifice also takes the form of duty. Sacrifice which took the form of killing in the 
Vedic and Brahmanic Period, lost its essence in the Smrti Period. Although one 
finds animal sacrifice occasionally, it is losing its popularity. Hence suicide as a 
form of religious sacrifice is no longer in vogue. Suicide is now condemned by 
modern Hindus. Suicide is regarded as a cowardly act, a form of escape from 
problems and situations, which one cannot face. Although many empathise with 
those who commit suicide one does not accept suicide on religious grounds. There 
are many paths to salvation and suicide in contemporary times is definitely not one 
of the paths. 
Contemporary Hindus do not discriminate against the dead. In the Classical Period 
cremation and post-cremation rites were denied to those who committed suicide. In 
present times those who commit suicide are cremated and post-funeral ceremonies 
are performed by their surviving relatives for them. 
Conservative Hindus feel that the souls of those who commit suicide do not reach 
their rightful abodes. Such souls (of those who commit suicide) do not evolve 
spiritually. Therefore, one should never commit suicide, for if one does then one is 
stagnating the soul and depriving it of its spiritual progress. These souls also 
retrogress spiritually. This is a belief held by many conservative Hindus. This belief 
might also act as a deterrent against those who contemplate suicide. 
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Suicide in Durban is very common amongst the young. The reasons have been 
discussed earlier in the thesis. Religion does not play any role in the motivation for 
those who commit suicide. Familial and societal pressures become too intense for 
many to bear, hence suicide seems to be the only easy option. 
6.3 ABORTION 
Hindu Scriptures strongly condemn abortion. The Vedas and the Upanisads state 
explicitly the consequences resulting from abortions both for the person who 
performs the abortion and on whom the abortion is performed. The Scriptures also 
make allowances where abortion may be permissible. 
Although many are aware of the ills of abortion, yet backstreet abortions are on the 
increase. Morality and ethics are receding into the background the world over and 
Durban is no exception. Research shows that people's morals and ethics are 
governed by the philosophy of utilitarianism. Today people do not want to shoulder 
the responsibility of their irresponsible conduct. Abortion seems to be the easy 
option out of a "sticky" situation. Although abortion may be permissible for valid 
reasons (health of mother, abnormal foetus, etc.) research shows that the abortions 
that are carried out today are not for such reasons, but they are more for selfish and 
social reasons. Most of the abortions are done privately and performed by 
incompetent persons. Many victims die in the process when these abortions are 
incomplete and when infection sets in. Some elderly Hindu women perform private 
abortions (Tribune Herald 9-5-93). When such persons perform abortions, they 
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regard it as a dharmic act. They actually feel that they are helping people and they 
do not see it as morally wrong. Exorbitant fees are charged for private abortions. 
While abortion is condemned on social grounds, it may be permissible or even 
regarded as an advancement in medical technology in other instances. Selective 
foeticide is being practised by some doctors. Doctors have killed a Downs 
Syndrome affected foetus - one of twins allowing the other twin to go to term and be 
born normally. Doctors have urgently called for the South African Abortion Act to 
be re-examined to take recent advances in medical technology into account. 
In the South African Medical Journal (February 1994 issue) the doctors said that 
couples who opted to have the procedure, needed thorough counselling about the 
risks of losing both babies, the risks for the remaining twin (including termination of 
the wrong twin) possible risks for the mother and ethical questions. The final 
decision should be left to the parents (Daily News 16-3-94). 
Pro-life supporters see the abortion issue as a human rights issue. They believe the 
unborn foetus has rights too, protected by the Bill of Human Rights. But pro-choice 
supporters say its a womens' rights issue, that the unborn foetus is not an entity until 
it is outside the womb. Therefore, the woman who is carrying the foetus has all the 
rights (Sunday Tribune 29-5-94 ). 
For years the battle between the pro-life and the pro-choice has been a fairly evenly 
matched one, but as real democracy has dawned on South Africa, the balance of 
power may be tipped in favour of newly acquired women's rights. 
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Despite what doctors, psychiatrists and gynaecologists may think about the question 
there is a growing movement towards a more liberal and permissive attitude in 
dealing with unwanted pregnancies and there is a growing popular pressure towards 
a liberalization of the law as well as the practice in relation to abortion. This 
pressure comes to some extent from women themselves expressing the idea that 
they should be able to exercise a larger measure of control over their own destinies 
and the destinies of their families than has been up to now allowed to them in 
patriarchically organised societies. This pressure has also been strongly influenced 
by the revolutionary force of ideas produced by the world-wide population explosion 
and from that of the individual man and woman is towards what Sir Douglad Baird 
has called a fifth freedom, freedom from the tyranny of excessive fertility (Gillis 
1975: 212). 
The psychiatrist's role in dealing with an unwanted pregnancy and a request for 
abortion is not a simple one. His role can only be an advisory one, as in any case it 
is the gynaecologist who will have to carry out the actual abortion procedure. In 
addition the psychiatrist's advice will be governed not only by his own clinical 
opinion but will also be clouded by the laws of the land in which he happens to live. 
Public pressure is now increasingly directed towards social rather than medical 
indications for abortion. This trend which culminates in abortion upon demand may 
create serious personal conflicts among physicians confronted with such requests, 
since their medical training (Hippocratic Oath) with its emphasis on the 
preservation of life has fostered attitudes not conducive to this view. 
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Abortion is a common feature today in South Africa amongst all groups of people 
irrespective of their colour, race or religion. It is common not only amongst the 
young but also the middle-aged {Tribune Herald 4-10-92). 
The government of National Unity, instead of legalising abortion and providing 
abortion clinics should engage in family planning and counselling. These can take 
the form of public lectures and seminars. Health workers should visit schools and 
counsel students. Females as well as males need counselling on the subject of 
abortion. This will result in more responsible behaviour. 
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